The one in my parent’s highland village lists EVERY SINGLE young man from that parish. Think of that for a minute. A village that lost every single one of its young men to the war. There’s over 200 names there.
OK. Point made. When I saw similar circumstances in France I was quite shocked; I figured that some consideration was due to that and considering how much real estate was flattened and how each year when the fields are plowed you literally must watch for UNEXO. My guess is that is the the same in Belgium.
Makes you wonder how glib being when we are when we are so critical of appeasement…
BTW: Is that thanks to Kitchener?
Got to agree with the original argument (and not just because my family tradition is RN).
Even if the Luftwaffe had cracked the RAF, they still would not have been able to establish total air superiority, and even that would have not been enough to protect an invasion force against the Royal Navy.
Operation SeaLion= Alien Space Bats.
[quote=“MikeN”]Got to agree with the original argument (and not just because my family tradition is RN).
Even if the Luftwaffe had cracked the RAF, they still would not have been able to establish total air superiority, and even that would have not been enough to protect an invasion force against the Royal Navy.[/quote]
Meanwhile on the other side of the world:
[quote]HMS Prince of Wales, a 35,000-ton King George V class battleship built Birkenhead, England, was completed in March 1941. In late May, while still not fully operational, she was sent into action with the German battleship Bismarck and received significant damage from heavy gunfire. Following repairs, Prince of Wales carried Prime Minister Winston Churchill across the Atlantic to Newfoundland. There, on 9-12 August, Churchill joined U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt for the Atlantic Charter conference, the first meeting between the two English-speaking leaders of what was emerging as the “Grand Alliance” against the Axis powers.
Following her return to British waters, Prince of Wales went to the Mediterranean, where she successfully engaged Italian planes off Malta in late September. Sent to the Far East with the battlecruiser HMS Repulse to counter the swiftly developing Japanese threat in the region, she arrived on 2 December 1941. On 8 December, the day of the Pearl Harbor Raid on the other side of the International Date Line, the Japanese landed in northern Malaya. Prince of Wales, Repulse and four destroyers were sent to attack the invasion force. After finding no targets, the British ships were returning to Singapore when, late in the morning of 10 December, they were attacked by a strong force of Japanese high-level bombers and torpedo planes. With no friendly planes to protect them, both heavy ships were hit several times. Repulse sank at about 1230. Prince of Wales capsized and followed her to the bottom less than an hour later. The first capital ships to be sunk by air attack while operating on the high seas, their loss further shocked a naval world already stunned by the events at Pearl Harbor only a few days earlier.[/quote]
history.navy.mil/photos/sh-f … /pow12.htm
microworks.net/pacific/perso … epulse.htm
warship.org/no11986.htm
Thanks for the history lesson Dr Evil. I get a lot of these war stories in the history channel. It seems to cover a lot of the second world war stuff. Quite interesting really.
I don’t get it.
Ships can demonstrably be sunk by aircraft. They need to be protected by other aircraft. Without the RAF there would have been nothing to stop the Germans sinking the entire RN in a matter of days and then invading at their leisure. (Or accepting Britain’s surrender.)
As a prelude to invasion the Luftwaffe was tasked with destroying the RAF’s bases, which they would have achieved in next to no time if Churchill hadn’t started the bombing of civilians instead.
Here’s a better WWII question: Why did the advancing Germans pause and effectively allow the British Expeditionary Force to evacuate from Dunkirk? If they had hammered them properly the Brits would have had no army left to speak of and Churchill would have been the second Prime Minister to have failed in dealing with Hitler. Without effective leadership or an army Britain would probably have been forced to agree terms to end the war much like the French.
[quote=“tmwc”]
Here’s a better WWII question: Why did the advancing Germans pause and effectively allow the British Expeditionary Force to evacuate from Dunkirk? If they had hammered them properly the Brits would have had no army left to speak of and Churchill would have been the second Prime Minister to have failed in dealing with Hitler. Without effective leadership or an army Britain would probably have been forced to agree terms to end the war much like the French.[/quote]
Because Hitler thought he could cut a deal with the Brits and bring them into the 3rd Reich without pounding them into rubble. Unfortunately for him, Churchill “stayed the course”…
Because Hitler ordered that the drive toward Paris take paramount importance, rather than throwing his army first at the retreating Brits and afterwards marching to Paris, as Guderian and the other commanding generals recommended. The Germans could have easily wiped out the British Army if Hitler had listened to his officers. Not for the last time would Hitler’s insistence on meddling directly in military strategy, contrary to the best advice of the generals, lead to a disastrous tactical error. Hitler’s micromanagement of military affairs on the Eastern Front proved much more disastrous for the Germans, if you want some more examples.
[quote=“tmwc”]I don’t get it.
Ships can demonstrably be sunk by aircraft. They need to be protected by other aircraft. Without the RAF there would have been nothing to stop the Germans sinking the entire RN in a matter of days and then invading at their leisure. (Or accepting Britain’s surrender.)
As a prelude to invasion the Luftwaffe was tasked with destroying the RAF’s bases, which they would have achieved in next to no time if Churchill hadn’t started the bombing of civilians instead.[/quote]
For different a opinion, see “Why Operation Sealion Wouldn’t Work.” An excerpt:
[quote]Last but not least, aircraft – also not enough to stop the Royal Navy. The main problem is that they don’t have the range to reach Scapa Flow, so they can’t actually attack the British ships until they are already well on their way to where they will do the most harm. The Germans didn’t have much capability to attack ships, anyway. They had no dedicated naval attack aircraft, no torpedo bombers, and their pilots lacked both training and experience in naval attacks.This was demonstrated in the Norway campaign, when they achieved a very low success rate against outnumbered, unarmed ships. In contrast, a battleship task force with a full screen of cruisers and destroyers has a tremendous number of antiaircraft batteries with all-around coverage, and can deal tremendous punishment to enemy aircraft. In the Pacific war, even when both sides had extensive antiship capabilities, air battles between American and Japanese fleets often lasted for many attacks over a period of days, with hundreds of aircraft being able to sink many major vessels in a task force, but virtually always leaving many survivors. Even a Royal Navy force with no air support at all could survive for the required few days in the channel under attack by an air force much better against ships than the Luftwaffe.
In fact, the Luftwaffe would have been quite bad against ships. Virtually all of its bombers were level bombers, which drop bombs from high altitude against stationary targets to good effect. Ships, however, can manouver so as to make themselves harder to hit - and level bombers thus become poor choices to use against ships even in the hands of expert pilots (only the Japanese had any real success with them in the war). Dive bombers and torpedo bombers are generally more effective. As mentioned previously, Germany had no torpedo bombers and its only dive bomber was the Stuka. The Stuka was the terror of the skies in the 30s, but by 1940 it was considered slow, vulnerable, and short ranged. Stukas would have suffered horrendous loss rates against the intense air defense of capital ship groups with concentrated destroyer screens. It’s also worthy to note that, due to their range and speed, they could only make an absolute maximum of three attacks on Royal Navy elements sailing from Scapa Flow before they reached the channel. Realistically, only one or two. Thus the British fleet elements sailing south to stop the invasion would not experience significant air attack until they were already within range of the invasion fleet and its supply lines.[/quote]
[quote=“MikeN”]For different a opinion:
The Luftwaffe [i]did[/i] have the range and [i]did[/i] bomb Scapa Flow on 16 March 1940. The main problem the Germans military had was Hitler. He couldn’t/didn’t stick with a program that was working. Had they [i]maintained[/i] their attacks on the the RAF in September 1940, they would have established total air supremacy in the south by October and that Meine Herren und Damen would have been that. The Royal Navy would have had serious problems evacuating the Royal Family and government to Canada.
In any case, even with air support, the Royal Navy’s Channel Force suffered heavy losses to the Luftwaffe in Spring 1940.
If the invasion fleet was capable of crossing the Channel in a matter of hours, then it wouldn’t really matter what the RN had in Scotland. The only way to prevent invasion would be to keep the ships close at hand - within easy striking distance of the Luftwaffe.
If aircraft were not considered to be effective against ships then why did anybody spend money on aircraft carriers? Midway, anyone?
It’s easy to argue in retrospect that force X may have been able to overcome force Y, but if you were a soldier would you want to put your army into boats without total air superiority to protect them against one of the world’s largest navies? I wouldn’t.
Fighter command aircrew not from the UK who took part in the battle:
Aus: 21 killed: 14
NZ : 129 Killed 14
Can: 90 Killed: 20
SA : 22 Killed: 9
Rhodesian: 2 Killed -
Jamaican: 1 Killed -
Irish: 9 Killed: -
American: 7 Killed 1
Polish: 141 Killed 29
Czech: 87 Killed: 7
Belgian: 24 Killed: 6
French: 13 Killed: -
Palestinian: 1 Killed -
[quote=“Dangermouse”]
Palestinian: 1 Killed -[/quote]
Palestinian. Well. Hmmm. That must have been Pilot Officer George Ernest Goodman.
[quote]42598 George Ernest Goodman was Pilot Officer, later Flying Officer in No. 1 Squadron. His story is exceptional as he was born in Haifa, Israel on 8/10/20, though he may not have been Jewish. Wynn says he was British solely because he had a British passport – like most born under the Mandate - but he was in fact an Israeli “sabra” and the only Israeli in the Battle of Britain. RAF Museum researcher John Edwards testifies to these facts in an article in “London Jewish News” , 22/9/2000, by reporter John Kaye. Furthermore in Mason’s book on page 506, Goodman is described as “Palestinian”, in another as “Israeli”, and yet another also as Israeli. The author also has in his possession an official copy of Goodman’s birth certificate, all in Hebrew, from the Haifa municipality in Israel, now kept at the AJEX Musuem.
Educated at Highgate school he was son of Sydney and Bida Goodman, was in the OTC and took a commission in the RAF in early 1939, joining his Hurricane Squadron in France in March 1940, where he shared a kill of an HE 111 and shot down another later which had helped sink the SS Lancastria off St Nazaire. Later, flying from Northolt he shot down an Me109, shared in another, then shot down an He 111 and then shared a Do 17 and then shot down another 110. On August 18th he was hit in his Hurricane P3757 but managed to land safely. On September 6th 1940 he shot down another 110 but was himself shot down , baling out with an injury. His plane crashed at Brownings Farm, Chiddingstone Causeway. He later shared a Ju 88, damaged a Do 17 and was awarded the DFC on 26/11/40.
In Nov. 1940 he flew the ferry route for the Middle East with 73 Squadron and stopped at Lagos where his parents were working in the diplomatic service. He saw his mother for the last time (his father was away) and as the Squadron later flew out, they did a roll over the Goodman home and then were away.
In February 1941 he shot down a CR42 in the Western Desert, and a 110 at Tobruk, but he was shot down but crash landed behind the British lines. He then shared an Hs 126, destroyed a Ju 87 and shared another, all over Tobruk. In April he took leave in Haifa, Israel, with his two sisters, but on June 14th 1941 he was shot down and killed by flak over Gazala. He is buried in Knightsbridge cemetery, Acroma, Libya, grave 10.C.21.[/quote]
[quote=“Doctor Evil”]Palestinian. Well. Hmmm. That must have been Pilot Officer George Ernest Goodman.
[/quote]
Thanks for the interesting link.
[quote=“Taichung social Club”]The Battle of Britain was won more by Goering’s blunder than anything else.
The Luftwaffe began by targeting air fields in Southern England. The situation became critical, and fighter command was on the verge of breaking when Goering ordered the Luftwaffe to concentrate its attacks on London. That, and that alone, saved fighter command and allowed the RAF to retain air superiority over the south coast.[/quote]
I totally disagree.
I don’t think it is really quite that simple. From what I know of the Battle of Britain, there were many deciding factors:
The first downfall was that on the 15th of August, if I remember correctly, the Luftwaffe made an attempt to outflank the southern defences by attacking the north east with forces from Denmark and Norway.
This was an attempt so costly to the German air force that it was never repeated.
After that, the attacks moved progressively inland. Fighter command was beginning to feel immense strain at this point, especially on the sector stations guarding London. This may have proved fatal had it continued. Losses of Hurricanes and Spitfires were overtaking supply, but most serious of all was that the output of new pilots, who must in any case be less experienced than those replaced, was failing to keep pace with casualties.
The switch to attacking London had come at the critical point, but even so, post war records have shown that the Germans had been trying to destroy the RAF and had switched to London because they were losing far too many aircraft.
By October, the Luftwaffe had been reduced to fighter-bomber forays during the day and night city bombing during the night.
In the bombing of London, the Germans thought Fighter Command was sure to come up in strength to defend the city and so might in strength be shot down. If you ask me, this was a logical tactical decision by Goering to make at the time.
So the reasons are manifold:
The switch to London was certainly one, (but we can argue that the battle was already won at this point and was a deciding reason for the switch).
The superiority of Dowding as a Commander in Chief to that of the self indulgent Goering was another.
The frontal attack tactics operated by RAF squadrons ie: forming a line and flying towards enemy aircraft to shoot them down, instead of approaching from behind and high.
The extraordinary weakness of the German intelligence - a surprising feature considering its excellence before and during the battle of France.
While Fighter command new exactly what faced it, the Luftwaffe was not only ill-informed about the complexities and methods of the British defensive system, but it did not know the strength and locations of Fighter command.
Fighter pilots in a Staffel never saw an intelligence officer, although in every Fighter Command squadron there was at least one. Intelligence officers existed only at Geshwader level in the Luftwaffe, therefore intelligence about the British only filtered down casually to the pilots by word of mouth, usually from pilot to pilot.
There were reasons more fundamental though: The British fighters were part of a scientific system of air defence evolved over many years, operating in exactly the role for which they were designed.
The German bombers and fighters, in contrast, were attempting an unfamiliar task by a series of improvisations.
The Luftwaffe had not been trained or equipped for a long campaign of attrition against fixed targets over a long distance, as the Luftwaffe had not imagined for many years such a campaign.
Not only this, but the Luftwaffe had existed really as a wing of the German army, answering to requests of close air support.
There were also flaws in the German equipment. Against German expectations, the bombers proved too vulnerable to operate by themselves and had to be escorted. But the long range Me110 could not perform well against the skillfully handled Hurricane or Spitfire, and the excellent ME109 only had short endurance.
Over London, having wasted fuel by escorting bombers at low speed, it only had some ten minutes of combat time remaining. Having overshot London by a few miles, there was no way it could fight.
To fighter commanders like Adolf Galland ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Galland ) this was a decisive factor in the German failure.
One of the Luftwaffe’s most stupid oversights was not to install long range tanks on the ME109’s.
There were also other factors which decided the outcome of the battle. The dreaded channel, waiting to swallow up any damaged German aircraft returning home and prison camp for any that took to the silk over British soil.
By contrast, any British pilot who baled out could be reunited with their squadron pretty quickly.
Such factors together with high losses quickly had the effect of eroding the spirit of even the brave and determined men who made up the Luftwaffe aircrews.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the Luftwaffe is one not commonly appreciated.
Though it had great numerical advantages over fighter command, its advantages in the vital single engined fighters was by no means overwhelming.
Against skillful and determined opponents operating a scientific system of defence, the Luftwaffe was simply not strong enough and this was also a deciding factor which prompted the Germans to switch tactics to night bombing and for Hitler to postpone the invasion of Britain until the following year.
I disagree with the article. The Battle of Britain was won in the air. Goering’s High Command had hoped that British fighter planes would engage German fighters and bombers over the English Strait, rather than over England itself. Dowding refused to take the bait, and let the Luftwaffe spend more time and fuel by travelling all the way to Britain.
Attrition did wear the Luftwaffe out. It is true that switching from attacks on RAF airfields to the bombing of London gave the RAF precious time to replenish itself. However whether this was a stupid revenge mistake by Hitler, or due to attrition fighting over England is debatable.
I’d say the role of the British Navy in defeating a German invasion would be insignificant. Goering had pondered the idea of dropping masses of paratroopers by air over Britain (something the PLA and PLAAF is considering in the event of an invasion of Taiwan). But the thought of seeing all those planes carrying these paratroopers being shot down in flames by the RAF was too much to stomach.
So obviously the Luftwaffe needed air superiority first before an invasion of Britain can take place.
The same can be said of the PRC when trying to invade Taiwan. Sending an armada of ships in a DDay style invasion of Taiwan is outdated. The preparations for that is lengthy and will be easily noticed by spy satellites before the invasion even begins. Most likely the PLAAF will try to do what Goering pondered: Drop paratroopers by air over Taiwan, reinforced by air attacks on military installations. But before that can happen, air superiority needs to be achieved first.
Glad to see this article still inspiring comment.
I did read the article, but I just don’t get it. It’s nonsense. It’s like saying the Battle of El-Alamein was won by the Navy. In fairness the research points out that they are referring to Germany’s non-invasion of Britain, rather than the Battle of Britain which really just refers to the aerial battle. To put it in the language they have is insulting to the RAF and needlessly so. No one ever pays tribute either to the men and women hecticly making the planes faster than Gerry could shoot them down. Or the chappies on the coast with their eyes glued to their binoculars. Or the weathermen. And so on.
Another factor: although the Luftwaffe had prototypes for a few 4-engine (heavy) bombers from Junkers and Dornier, none went into production, and twin-engined tactical support bombers, like the He 111, were used in the Battle of Britain. The smaller bomb size and total payload of the twins meant that the RAF’s runways were more reparable after an attack, among other things.
This channel started popping up in my Youtube recommendations.
Watching this right now:
I like the commentary and the fact the commentator was on the ground.
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I appreciate all the micro analysis of various elements of the strategies, airplanes, etc. From a macro viewpoint I believe that if Germany gained air superiority then Britain was lost…no matter how superior their navy was compared to Germany. The vulnerability of ships to air attack was well documented during the war.
At the same time, I think believe a key point is Germany’s invasion of Russia. My belief is that due to allocation of resources to the eastern front Germany would have not quickly defeated Britain (if Germany gained air superiority) but would eventually have done so. Of course, if Germany had not invaded Russia then WWII might have ended much differently.
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