[quote=“zeugmite”]guangtou:
While you made your points quite clearly, I think there is a fundamental issue you are confused about.
Jiang’s 8 points can be considered China’s starting offer for the 1C2S solution when reunification happens.
Reunification through negotiation being the mainland’s ultimate goal, it certainly would like to discuss Jiang’s 8 points and 1C2S when that is the topic. However, at the current time, reunification is not going to be the top topic for a negotiation that the mainland could have with Taiwan; the foundations are not there; it wasn’t discussed in 1992 and it isn’t going to be discussed the first thing now. That is a long term goal. That’s why Jiang’s 8 points is quite irrelevant at this time. As far as the mainland is concerned, as long as independence is checked and there is a possibility that reunification can happen (i.e not ruled out) down the road, it is satisified. It fundamentally believes time is on its side. This is all stated very clearly in the Anti-Secession Law. If this is not a statement that it is willing to tolerate the status quo, I don’t know what is. It is TI/er extremists In Taiwan that are fidgeting uncomfortably because they are dissatisfied with the status quo. I’m sorry, but that’s the truth.
There are many things to discuss between Taiwan and mainland China on the future of cross-straits ties that is perfectly compatible with the status quo and its prolonging, without having to delve into reunification/independence; one has to keep in mind we are still in an age when you must fly to Hong Kong to end up in Shanghai. This is, frankly, abnormal. Negotiations about normalizing the relationship within the ambiguity that the people of both sides can be happy with is what’s called for, not negotiation about the rights and responsibilities under an eventual reunification. I and many others can care less if extremists aren’t happy with such ambiguity. Not embracing what ambiguity there is that the people of both sides can live with but instead driving a wedge to derail any nascent process is exactly why CSB has made himself irrelevant to ameliorating the cross-straits relationship. It is in this context that even stilted politicians like Lien has room to maneuver.
So to have negotiations for normalizing the interim status quo between the two sides, it is very much the Taiwan government’s reponsibility to concede by embracing ambiguity – one that has been tried and has worked in the past to start talks toward normalizing the relationship, one that a majority In Taiwan can tolerate, and one that is the best hope for keeping the status quo.
On the other hand, if you hold the fundamentalist belief that you won’t enter any talks with mainland China because you presuppose only bad will come out of it, then there is no point for any further comment – and there is no possibility, by definition, for any long-term peace in the straits.[/quote]
Excellent post Z; a lot of material in here, so allow me to cherry pick. Foregive me if I miss the totality of your ideas. I have a lot on my plate at the moment:
Let me recap your position: Jiang Badian constitutes a statement of what the PRC side would be looking for in the event that reunification were to occur. That is, it doesn’t constitute a starting position for negs, but an end result that the Chinese side would be willing to live with. In the meantime, the PRC leadership is willing to accept the SQ as long as it takes, because it has time on its side - because eventually Taiwan will be economically absorbed into ‘China’ anyhow, etc, etc. The only spanner in the works is TI. TI/ers are not happy with the status quo and want to force the issue on a reluctant PRC. Does that sound about right?
It’s a persuasive argument, but I have a similar problem with it as I did with AC’s last post - and that is the burden of adjustment issue, and with it, the issue of first-cause. Your position seems to be saying that if the TI movement pulled its head in, everything would be fine - the PRC leadership would be willing to accept the status quo WITH NO USE-BY DATE. I find this argument very difficult to accept, not least because the PRC leadership must be worried about its own use-by date. Look around the world - communist dictatorships are merely a handful these days, and there is only ONE advanced industrial society that is also an authoritarian country. Singapore is hardly a role model for a nation of a billion plus people. Ultimately political reform that compromises the position of the CCP, of whatever character, will have to be contemplated. If, however, ‘solving the Taiwan issue’ can delay the inevitable, wouldn’t the PRC leadership take a good hard look at it? I would argue that a good chunk of the TI followship in Taiwan is in fact motivated by this very concern - i.e. that one day the Chinese communists are going to lash-out at the island, because they are scared shitless of loosing power. In the meantime, they are also concerned about what the small ‘tokens of friendship’ mean when they are dangled about the place (scholarships for Taisheng kids, whatever). None of it appears genuine - regardless or not if it is - and the TI/ers are given added ammunition every time the PRC does something ‘nice.’ Jesus Christ, even the pandas are given a bad wrap!
In short, the PRC leadership’s position and intentions are driving the agenda here just as much as TI lobby in Taiwan. The ball isn’t just in Taiwan’s court. The challenge for the PRC leadership in this context, IMHO is to reassure Taiwan that it can deal in good faith. Ultimately this is going to be a hard sell, as after all, the PRC may very well be just another teetering communist state…
PS: I’m totally with you on cross-strait negs that encompass the myriad of practical stuff that should have been dealt-with a long time ago (the three links for example). With qualifications, I also agree with your thinking about ambiguity and cutting an intrim deal, but this is gonna have to wait for another post (thread?).
PPS: Thanks also to AC for your last post. I’ll get to it when I find a spare moment…