Here a Twitter thread on the EU representatives visit and their comments on misinformation fight in Taiwan.
Google also recently donated to fight misinformation in Taiwan
Deng best ability was being practical I would say, rather than super intellectual
Seems like whatever nuanced MMP political system Germany has going on seems to work pretty well. They seem to have long term planning and their economic success speaks for itself. How much is their success due to their system and how much to the remarkable German work ethic is the question.
Nothing indicates that China, much less Russia, has plans to encircle US territory or supplant the US as the worldâs dominant military power. Those possibilities are so remote that it doesnât make sense to speak of intent.
What will be at stake in the future is Taiwanâs independence from China as well as the absolute military dominance of the US in Chinaâs neighbourhood.
I responded to your post because it seemed to mirror the tendency of US governments and Western media to represent any potential partial challenge to US interests anywhere in the world as a direct threat to the US itself. In any other circumstance the irony would be grotesque: the worldâs only global superpower, notorious for its history of disastrous invasions and war crimes committed with impunity, in possession of military bases all over the world, denouncing China and Russiaâs much more modest âexpansionism.â
The distortion seen in Western and much Taiwanese media in this regard is also reflected and amplified in the discussions here on Forumosa: for instance, in the thread discussing the intrusion of Chinese planes into Taiwanâs ADIZ, displays of force by the US - including previous âintrusionâ of US bombers into Chinaâs own ADIZ and naval flotillas being sailed down the strait - were ignored even though clearly relevant in attempting to understand what was going on.
Please note - although this shouldnât have to be said - that nothing in the above is inconsistent with support for Taiwanese independence, or criticism of the CCP, or criticism of Chinaâs military activities. I am merely attempting to point out that an understanding of complex issues like the cross strait conflict or the role of US in world affairs is thwarted by reliance on mainstream Western media that, on certain subjects, through systematic omission of context and selectivity, amount to little more than propaganda.
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None of what you said suggests that the new China-Russia alliance isnât trying to encircle the US either. All youâve said is that you think the USâ past military actions justifies Chinese and Russian expansions. US intrusions into Chinese ADIZ are few and far between, often also disputed. Chinese intrusions into Taiwanâs ADIZ is occurring almost daily.
Why do you say, once again, that Russia and China are trying to encircle the US? Do they have military bases, for instance, in Mexico and Canada? Even if Russia and China could âencircleâ certain US military interests on the other side of the world from the US (they canât) such a situation would be quite distinct from an âencirclementâ of the US itself (which is what China and Russia face).
I most certainly did not say anything of the sort. On the contrary, preempting responses from people of limited literacy, I said explicitly - although I shouldnât have had to say so even once, let alone twice - that nothing in what I wrote was inconsistent with criticism of Chinaâs military activities.
Like I said, thatâs mostly due to geography. Just because Russia and China are unable to have any country connected to the US by land to join their side doesnât mean they arenât truth mg to encircle the US by cutting off itâs naval forces from its allies overseas.
To suggest one can only be encircled by land is like saying Japan wasnât encircled by the ABCS embargo prior to and during WW2 just because no one can ever surround it by land.
Hereâs one for some Saturday night laughs.
The authorities in Beijing have announced that a number of politicos in Taiwanâincluding, among others, Premier Suâhave been placed on a âno entryâ list to China. I guess that will scuttle the premierâs plans to spend the new year break relaxing in Hangzhou.
Chinaâs Taiwan Affairs office ânamed Su [(èèČæ)], Legislative Speaker You Si-kun (æžžé«ć ) and Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu (ćłéçź) as part of âan extremely small minority of diehard Taiwanese separatists who caused extreme harm ⊠to the fundamental interests of the Chinese race.ââ
It gets better. After this offensive proprietorially racialist claim, Premier Su was asked by a DPP lawmaker to comment on these developments. This is what he reportedly said:
âThese foreigners are meddling in Taiwanâs domestic affairs. I fight for Taiwan and I will not give in to intimidation for doing the right thing.â
I love that guy. 
Source: China puts premier Su on no-entry list - Taipei Times
Guy
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We could start a thread of fantasy replies. 
"Dear China, Go fuck yourself. Strongly worded letter to followâŠâ
During a plenary session at the legislature, DPP Legislator Chen Ting-fei (éłäșćŠ) asked Su to comment on the news before congratulating him for being a âBeijing-certified Taiwanese patriot.â
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Chinaâs nuclear arsenal is growing. What does that mean for U.S.-China relations?
The Defense Departmentâs annual report on Chinaâs military power assessed that its nuclear arsenal could quadruple by 2030. Last weekâs report also confirmed that China is building three missile-silo fields, which analysts expect to account for a significant increase in the projected warhead stockpile.
China is modernizing, diversifying and expanding its nuclear forces. As James Cameron recently explained here at TMC, over the summer China also reportedly tested an orbital bombardment system with a hypersonic glider vehicle.
Why are these developments happening now, and what do they mean for U.S.-China relations?
China may be expanding its options
The most likely reason behind Chinaâs changing nuclear force structure reflects Beijingâs attempts to remove any doubts in the minds of other nuclear powers that it can retaliate for a nuclear attack, especially in the face of U.S. nuclear modernization plans.
Historically, China has maintained a relatively small nuclear force with 200 or so operational warheads, perhaps half of which are mounted atop delivery systems capable of reaching the United States. Chinaâs nuclear strategy of assured retaliation aimed to deter nuclear threats or attacks â and ensure that China could retaliate if it came under nuclear attack.
China has long worried about the survivability of its small force for two main reasons. The first is U.S. offensive nuclear capabilities, which give it the ability to find and attack Chinaâs nuclear forces.
The second relates to U.S. missile defenses, particularly after Washington withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Although some analysts doubt the U.S. ability to shoot down missiles fired at the U.S. homeland, our research found that Chinese experts worry that U.S. defenses could diminish Chinaâs ability to retaliate if the United States attacks it with nuclear weapons.
Chinese experts have been watching for signs of growing U.S. missile defense ambitions, like the recommendation in the Pentagonâs 2019 Ballistic Missile Defense Review that the United States explore boost-phase and space-based missile defenses. And the United States tested an SM-3 interceptor against an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. Previous U.S. policy called for the SM-3 to intercept shorter-range missiles only.
A larger nuclear arsenal, kept at a higher state of readiness, would leave China better equipped to deter any nuclear attack its adversaries might be tempted to initiate. And capabilities like the one China reportedly tested this summer could help Chinese weapons overcome new missile defenses â a reminder to the United States that missile defenses can trigger counter-innovations.
A potential conflict over Taiwan raises the stakes
The free fall in U.S.-China relations since 2020, many experts agree, raises the likelihood of a crisis or conflict involving nuclear use by either country. As the conventional (nonnuclear) military balance in East Asia continues to tip in Chinaâs favor, one big question is whether the United States would face stronger temptations to threaten nuclear use as a way of deterring China from using force against Taiwan.
For example, this yearâs Pentagon report indicated that Chinese analysts worry the United States could use low-yield nuclear weapons against a Chinese fleet en route to invade Taiwan. That temptation might be even stronger if U.S. nuclear weapons and missile defenses together could seriously limit Chinaâs ability to retaliate.
In this light, a larger nuclear arsenal might boost Chinaâs chances of deterring the United States from any kind of nuclear use â but also increase Chinaâs confidence about deploying its conventional capabilities. This is what scholars call the âstability-instabilityâ paradox: When adversaries worry less about a conflict going nuclear because their nuclear arsenals are stalemated, theyâre more likely to start nonnuclear conflicts.
Our earlier research has showed that Chinese experts appeared confident that a U.S.-China conflict wouldnât go nuclear. But the rapid deterioration of political relations with the United States has almost certainly shaken that confidence. Chinese analysts also perceived that aspects of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report lowered the threshold for nuclear use. Developing a larger and more sophisticated Chinese arsenal, however, could restore some of that confidence.
While any potential changes in Beijingâs nuclear strategy are unclear, three questions stand out regarding how Beijing might seek to use silo-based missiles to deter the United States. Would Beijing engage in a âshell game,â in which only some silos were loaded with armed missiles, or would it fill all silos with missiles? Would Beijing plan to keep missiles mated with warheads in these silos? And would it keep missiles on high alert, to launch in the event China receives warning of an incoming attack?
For U.S. planners, the projected expansion of Chinaâs arsenal is yet another sign of deepening and destabilizing military-technological competition with the United States. Nevertheless, neither the Chinese military or the Pentagon report say much about the goals of Chinaâs nuclear strategy â and whether the goals of that strategy are expanding to include nuclear first-use. The Chinese government has not publicly acknowledged the construction of the silo fields or provided any information about the current or future size of its force.
Two shifts in Chinaâs nuclear thinking may be happening. First, Chinese leaders believe that they now need to threaten the United States with greater nuclear damage to deter a U.S. nuclear first-strike: a handful of warheads is no longer enough.
Second, Chinaâs leaders may be finding Beijingâs promises not to engage in a nuclear arms race increasingly difficult to fulfill â or less of a priority than deterring U.S. nuclear use with more confidence. But even if the Chinese arsenal does quadruple by 2030, it would still be roughly one-third the size of the U.S. stockpile of 3,750 warheads.
Chinaâs expanding arsenal will pose challenges to the U.S. nuclear posture, forcing the U.S. to plan to deter both Russiaâs and now Chinaâs large and sophisticated arsenal. How this new nuclear environment affects U.S. nuclear modernization plans and future strategic arms control with Russia will depend on whether planners decide the U.S. could face major conflicts with both rivals at once or in quick succession. And how U.S. allies view the credibility of its extended nuclear deterrence guarantees will also be a factor.
Alternatively, the U.S. and China could try arms control. Yet there are few promising signs that either country has the political appetite to discuss their nuclear weapons at all, let alone limits on capabilities.
Just to confirm the two posts immediately above this one: according to the map in this Taiwan News article, Taiwanâs Air Defense Identification Zone apparently takes in parts of ZhĂšjiÄng Province (æ”æ±ç), JiÄngxÄ« Province (æ±è„żç), and FĂșjiĂ n Province (çŠć»șç).
Hereâs some more stuff on the subject (I confess I havenât read either of these two articles):
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Isnât this common knowledge, at least for those of us living in Taiwan? Iâve always felt like the articles in Taiwan News etc. about the ADIZ incursions are trying to misleadingly suggest that the planes are flying over Taipei.
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Yeah, people probably interpret more into these reports than there actually is.
Technically: As far as I understand, âADIZ incursionsâ are referring only to the part of the ADIZ around Taiwan island, until the median line on the Taiwan strait.
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Yes, that was my understanding too. I assume theyâre not reporting every plane landing in Fuzhou.
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Although I knew there had been tensions involving Chinese aircraft, I didnât know the dimensions/extent of this zone. In fact, I had to Google ADIZ.
I donât know whether the cause of my ignorance is sloth, or a desire to maintain some internal peace (however tentative) about the doings between China and Taiwan, or just general goofiness. Maybe it was a combination of things.
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This article seems somewhat enlightening, in that it distinguishes between the air defense identification zone and sovereign air space:
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Regarding the ADIZ: I think there were enough news on the topic probably pretty much anywhere in the developed World for everybody now understand what it means. I have seen plenty of people (idiots) mocking the news saying âoh my God, how dare China to fly over their own country!â.
But we know this is not just Chinese planes flying over China and Taiwan being unreasonable with them, right?
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Is there a map or series of maps that fully illustrates incidents of these kinds in recent months? To me, illustrating would mean showing the relevant portions of routes taken by Chinese aircraft; whether the relevant portions of the routes are merely a matter of concern or an outright violation of some kind; and the specific reasons supporting the claim of a violation.
Iâm not skeptical of Taiwanâs claims; Iâm just in the dark, more or less.
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