Does the ROC have a future?

I don’t think this was done to de-emphasise “ROC.” I think it was done to avoid confusion among immigration officials. It’s a sign of Taiwan’s weakness vis-à-vis the PRC actually because the next logical step is to call it “Taiwan, China.” Maybe it was done under specific duress from international actors that we don’t know about? It wasn’t some kind of bold emphasising-Taiwan statement, I’m sure.

To repeat:

Anti-Secession Act (quoted earlier)

I think the above language is an important reason for keeping the ROC name.

I believe that once upon a time, the only country to have established relations with United States was Morocco, may اللّه bless them.

On the topic of national identity, I salute the discussion initiated by a teacher here, which they wrote up as an article in The Taiwan Observer. Bit naive and simplistic views perhaps, although one person got it right on the money: “The ROC, but not necessarily Taiwan, can still be regarded as a sovereign state…” That’s pretty much right.

The back channel folks from CCP and Taiwan’s intelligence must be laughing over such nonsense from both sides.

The Economist has done a useful backgrounder on the current standoff between Taiwan and China. Given the current tense cross-Strait situation, and past crimes of the military dictatorship, I can well understand why many people are just not interested in talking about the better part of the ROC, and certainly, I can’t help feeling The ROC is a shadow of its former self, and that probably some kind of national identity in Taiwan is actually emerging, but for negative rather than positive reasons.
The most intersting thing about the above video, however, is that it exists at all. Taiwan has long been off the radar screen of the West, but is now firmly back on it.

It’s bullshit. Even in the current form you could argue RoC is independent. After all China doesn’t officially recognize anything like RoC. So why does China not attack like right now? And if it isn’t, then why bother saying anything about it anyways?

The threat is meaningless in the sense that whatever you do, the threat will be there. RoC-ese don’t want to identify with PRC. So that is independent by itself. So why not make it official. Because the powers that be still have that romantic notion of taking over the mainland, etc etc. they may not admit it, but it lingers.

I’m not sure what you are saying here. The ROC still officially exists and is a recognised state. Of course, the number of countries recognising the ROC are few. Taiwan, in contrast, is not a state, even if Tsai Ing-Wen says it is. What really worries China is that Taiwan might formally declare independence. I assume this is what you are talking about when you say “So why not make it official.” There’s a good reason why Taiwan won’t declare independence: successive US administrations have told Taiwan: “If you do that on you’re on your own.” That was unofficial of course, but it’s well known to insiders.

Not by the other side in the conflict.

Not by the rest of the world.

A few pint sized nations or islands don’t count.

I’m saying the CCP could interpret the current state as being independent, if it’s suits it purpose.

Say you’re with us or you’re independent - no grey zone. They don’t tolerate grey areas anymore like the former HK SAR right? So again I ask - can’t CCP think of the current state of RoC as independent and attack? Why don’t they? Coz it’s a bluff which has worked for decades. Only because Taiwanese refuse to fight.

If the US support is not there in any case, why bother spending on missile systems etc? If there is no external support and no will to fight, why waste that money ?

I see what you mean now. Well, that is all sort of true. I mean the CCP is playing a waiting game. They seek to divide the Taiwan alliance. Yes, they say can anything they like. Yes, the threat is a bluff, so far. Yes, the US and Taiwan have a commitment to defending the status quo (if not a formal declaration of independence). Yes, by not fighting (declaring independence) Taiwan frustrates China’s ambitions. It’s a three-way balancing act. China seeks to create the perception that unification is inevitable. It’s recent maneuvers, however, show weakness not strength. They’re scared actually. And that is dangerous.

Well, maybe we’ll know soon enough

I don’t know. I’m not privy to the details of the thought processes of the people who make decisions in China.

I think there’s pretty good evidence that it’s a possibility. Some of the evidence is recent:

Some of it goes back a ways:

Zhu Rongji, “Why China Hates NMD [national missile defense program],” Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2000 (bracketed words added by me)

Richard Halloran, “Pentagon report takes no prisoners,” Taipei Times, July 22, 2005 (bracketed words added by me)

I more or less accept the idea that risk consists not only of the probability of harm, but also of the gravity of the harm if it occurs. I also believe that, for the time being, the burden of Taiwan’s maintaining some kind of status quo (which involves refraining from formally claiming or declaring independence, and also refraining from doing so by indirect means such as a formal name change) is less than the risk (i. e., combination of probability and gravity of harm) of formally declaring independence or of formally changing names.

I’m not ignoring the fact there’s risk anyway, regardless of whether the status quo is maintained. I’m not omniscient, but it seems to me that the course that Taiwan is on right now is all right (bearing in mind that to me, it’s at least somewhat dangerous any way that I look at it, but still as “all right” as it can be).

Well, it’s obviously because it’s risky. There is a three-way balance of fear keeping everyone from making the first move. What China wants to do, ideally, is walk into Taiwan the same way it walked into Hong Kong. They are bluffing about attacking actually, and really don’t want a war. When I say “they” I mean the collective, rational decision-making group in state positions, and the Politburo. The unknown factor is Xi Jinping. Although Xi has avoided encouraging a personality cult, he’s clearly ambitious and ruthless and wants to get Taiwan’s scalp in his lifetime. He’s capable of rapidly and skillfully exploiting any weakness he detects in his opponents. He has been reported as saying things like “Prepare for war” at military rallies.

I don’t agree with this statement. I have trouble imagining what source(s) you are following to make this claim.

Guy

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Xi is undoubtedly authoritarian but has not allowed a full-blown personality cult to develop. This is because of the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. In the minds of most Chinese, personality cult = Cultural Revolution = mess. Of course, a lot of fawning goes on, but it’s relatively low key compared to Mao’s cult. Xi has a mini cult, you could say, but I don’t think anyone takes it seriously. A brief study of Xi’s mini cult can be found here, which I include for perspective.
We’re getting a little bit away from the ROC now, but I hope to come back to that question later.

After just glancing at this, I’d hate to see a full-blown one:

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Believe it or not this is cult lite compared to Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung or some African leaders likes Gadaffi. Xi is copying the syle, but not the substance. When I travelled around China a few years ago, there was no evidence of a serious cult. In fact, I only say a few plates with his mush on them in Tiananmen, but no memorabilia and few portraits/photos elsewhere. By contrast, Mao’s rather large statue still stands in many places, and of course, his portrait still adorns Tiananmen. Even Chiang Qing Kuo has a few statues to his honour in Taiwan. It’s all relative of course, and Xi’s mini cult has the potential to grow. Maybe he’s secretly building a memorial to himself somewhere. Xi’s generation still remembers the Cultural Revolution and don’t want it repeated.

Getting back to the ROC…when mainlanders come here they all want to go to the SYS Memorial interestingly enough. Meanwhile, in historical dramas on Chinese television, the Nationalists are portrayed as Nazi-like murderers, with some justification–the killing of communist prisoners in Shanghai, for example–although it’s a very one-dimensional portrayal. It seems to me the CCP is skilful at manipulating memories of the ROC, applauding SYS and the anti-Japanese battles while excoriating CKS and his henchmen. I mean they have comes to terms with the ROC and found a way to incorporate it into the collective consciousness in a way that serves their purposes. In that sense, the ROC lives on in China. I think the brutal aspects of the military dictatorship here, including the White Terror, really gave Taiwanese every reason to hate the ROC, yet it is far from universally hated. Its calendars are still in every public office, and the flag still flies proudly on Constitution Day etc. In other words, the Taiwanese relationship with the ROC is complex and nuanced and still needs to be worked through.

Happy May Day folks.

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It’s my understanding that Chiang Ching-kuo abolished martial law, appointed more běnshěngrén to government positions, picked the běnshěngrén Lee Teng-hui to be his successor (which paved the way to free elections), and presided over much of Taiwan’s initial growth in the semiconductor industry.

That might partially explain the statues.

CCK—unlike his dad—was not into the cult of personality.

I’ve been here for years and and I have yet to see any statue of this man in any public space. I am not saying that don’t exist, but they are way out of (my) sight.

Guy

Cihu mausoleum is often packed with Chinese people.