Iraq: Victory Is Not an Option

Politics International Politics
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Today’s retelling of “The Emperor’s New Clothes” is brought to you by William E. Odom.

[quote=“Washington Post: William E. Odom”]The new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq starkly delineates the gulf that separates President Bush’s illusions from the realities of the war. Victory, as the president sees it, requires a stable liberal democracy in Iraq that is pro-American. The NIE describes a war that has no chance of producing that result. In this critical respect, the NIE, the consensus judgment of all the U.S. intelligence agencies, is a declaration of defeat.
[…]
A Congress, or a president, prepared to quit the game of “who gets the blame” could begin to alter American strategy in ways that will vastly improve the prospects of a more stable Middle East.

No task is more important to the well-being of the United States. We face great peril in that troubled region, and improving our prospects will be difficult. First of all, it will require, from Congress at least, public acknowledgment that the president’s policy is based on illusions, not realities. There never has been any right way to invade and transform Iraq. Most Americans need no further convincing, but two truths ought to put the matter beyond question:

F
irst, the assumption that the United States could create a liberal, constitutional democracy in Iraq defies just about everything known by professional students of the topic.
[…]

S
econd, to expect any Iraqi leader who can hold his country together to be pro-American, or to share American goals, is to abandon common sense. It took the United States more than a century to get over its hostility toward British occupation. (In 1914, a majority of the public favored supporting Germany against Britain.)
[…]
As Congress awakens to these realities – and a few members have bravely pointed them out – will it act on them? Not necessarily. Too many lawmakers have fallen for the myths that are invoked to try to sell the president’s new war aims. Let us consider the most pernicious of them.

  1. We must continue the war to prevent the terrible aftermath that will occur if our forces are withdrawn soon. Reflect on the double-think of this formulation. We are now fighting to prevent what our invasion made inevitable! Undoubtedly we will leave a mess – the mess we created, which has become worse each year we have remained. […] But this “aftermath” is already upon us; a prolonged U.S. occupation cannot prevent what already exists.

  2. We must continue the war to prevent Iran’s influence from growing in Iraq. This is another absurd notion. One of the president’s initial war aims, the creation of a democracy in Iraq, ensured increased Iranian influence, both in Iraq and the region. Electoral democracy, predictably, would put Shiite groups in power – groups supported by Iran since Saddam Hussein repressed them in 1991.
    […]

  3. We must prevent the emergence of a new haven for al-Qaeda in Iraq. But it was the U.S. invasion that opened Iraq’s doors to al-Qaeda. The longer U.S. forces have remained there, the stronger al-Qaeda has become.
    […]

  4. We must continue to fight in order to “support the troops.”
    […]During their first tours, most may well have favored “staying the course” – whatever that meant to them – but now in their second, third and fourth tours, many are changing their minds.[…]But the strangest aspect of this rationale for continuing the war is the implication that the troops are somehow responsible for deciding to continue the president’s course. That political and moral responsibility belongs to the president, not the troops. Did not President Harry S. Truman make it clear that “the buck stops” in the Oval Office? If the president keeps dodging it, where does it stop? With Congress?
    […]
    Embracing the four myths gives Congress excuses not to exercise its power of the purse to end the war and open the way for a strategy that might actually bear fruit.

T
he first and most critical step is to recognize that fighting on now simply prolongs our losses and blocks the way to a new strategy. Getting out of Iraq is the pre-condition for creating new strategic options. Withdrawal will take away the conditions that allow our enemies in the region to enjoy our pain. It will awaken those European states reluctant to collaborate with us in Iraq and the region.

S
econd, we must recognize that the United States alone cannot stabilize the Middle East.

T
hird, we must acknowledge that most of our policies are actually destabilizing the region. Spreading democracy, using sticks to try to prevent nuclear proliferation, threatening “regime change,” using the hysterical rhetoric of the “global war on terrorism” – all undermine the stability we so desperately need in the Middle East.

F
ourth, we must redefine our purpose. It must be a stable region, not primarily a democratic Iraq.[/quote]
Given that it’s, well, a given, that this war’s been lost, I’d like to see some serious analyzes of what the aftermath is likely to look like and bring. Very likely, it’ll be hellish, but for how long? And what’s likely to emerge?

Anyone reads any thing serious on the subject?

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Really? REALLY?

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Really? REALLY?[/quote]

Yes. YES.

I know you’ll continue to hold out, and when the US pulls out, blame the president–he or she–who has courage enough to recognize what Bush refuses to see, blame the press, blame the timid population, the French, and–no doubt–Jimmy Carter. But don’t let that stand in your way. I’m asking for serious analyses of what will happen when defeat is recognized and the US withdraws; you can just pretend I’m asking what would happen if the US recognized defeat and withdrew.

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Do you have the National Intelligence Estimate report? I would prefer to read it directly rather than Odom’s “interpretation” of its findings.

Thanks tons.

Fred

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dni.gov/

You’re welcome.

In return, perhaps you could tell me how you think the Turkey/Kurdish issue is likely to be manged when Iraq fragments. The Kurds aren’t going to give up what they’ve got, and they’re not going to hold back from outright autonomy and independence when the opportunity comes. And the Turks are feeling particularly nationalistic, feisty, and not particularly welcome in the EU. What’s going to stop Turkey from pushing the Kurds south, or east, spilling blood all the way?

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Here are those findings as from the summary. Would Jaboney here like to explain to me how these findings would lead Odom to arrive at his conclusions. I am just trying to better understand the thought processes involved… Many thanks for all your help…

[quote]Key Judgments
Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. If strengthened Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of violence and establish more effective security for Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an opportunity to begin the process of political compromise necessary for longer term stability, political progress, and economic recovery.
• Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate.
The challenges confronting Iraqis are daunting, and multiple factors are driving the current trajectory of the country’s security and political evolution.
• Decades of subordination to Sunni political, social, and economic domination have made the Shia deeply insecure about their hold on power. This insecurity leads the Shia to mistrust US efforts to reconcile Iraqi sects and reinforces their unwillingness to engage with the Sunnis on a variety of issues, including adjusting the structure of Iraq’s federal system, reining in Shia militias, and easing de-Bathification.
• Many Sunni Arabs remain unwilling to accept their minority status, believe the central government is illegitimate and incompetent, and are convinced that Shia dominance will increase Iranian influence over Iraq, in ways that erode the state’s Arab character and increase Sunni repression.
• The absence of unifying leaders among the Arab Sunni or Shia with the capacity to speak for or exert control over their confessional groups limits prospects for reconciliation. The Kurds remain willing to participate in Iraqi state building but reluctant to surrender any of the gains in autonomy they have achieved.
• The Kurds are moving systematically to increase their control of Kirkuk to guarantee annexation of all or most of the city and province into the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) after the constitutionally mandated referendum scheduled to occur no later than 31 December 2007. Arab groups in Kirkuk continue to resist violently what they see as Kurdish encroachment.
• Despite real improvements, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—particularly the Iraqi police—will be hard pressed in the next 12-18 months to execute significantly increased security responsibilities, and particularly to operate independently against Shia militias with success. Sectarian divisions erode the dependability of many units, many are hampered by personnel and equipment shortfalls, and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside of the areas where they were recruited.
• Extremists—most notably the Sunni jihadist group al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) and Shia oppositionist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)—continue to act as very effective accelerators for what has become a self-sustaining inter-sectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis.
• Significant population displacement, both within Iraq and the movement of Iraqis into neighboring countries, indicates the hardening of ethno-sectarian divisions, diminishes Iraq’s professional and entrepreneurial classes, and strains the capacities of the countries to which they have relocated. The UN estimates over a million Iraqis are now in Syria and Jordan.
The Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term “civil war” accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.
Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate, we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.
• If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring countries—invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally—might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI would attempt to use parts of the country—particularly al-Anbar province—to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion.
A number of identifiable developments could help to reverse the negative trends driving Iraq’s current trajectory. They include:
• Broader Sunni acceptance of the current political structure and federalism to begin to reduce one of the major sources of Iraq’s instability.
• Significant concessions by Shia and Kurds to create space for Sunni acceptance of federalism.
• A bottom-up approach—deputizing, resourcing, and working more directly with neighborhood watch groups and establishing grievance committees—to help mend frayed relationships between tribal and religious groups, which have been mobilized into communal warfare over the past three years.
A key enabler for all of these steps would be stronger Iraqi leadership, which could enhance the positive impact of all the above developments.
Iraq’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics. Nonetheless, Iranian lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants clearly intensifies the conflict in Iraq. Syria continues to provide safehaven for expatriate Iraqi Bathists and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq.
• For key Sunni regimes, intense communal warfare, Shia gains in Iraq, and Iran’s assertive role have heightened fears of regional instability and unrest and contributed to a growing polarization between Iran and Syria on the one hand and other Middle East governments on the other. But traditional regional rivalries, deepening ethnic and sectarian violence in Iraq over the past year, persistent anti-Americanism in the region, anti-Shia prejudice among Arab states, and fears of being perceived by their publics as abandoning their Sunni co-religionists in Iraq have constrained Arab states’ willingness to engage politically and economically with the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad and led them to consider unilateral support to Sunni groups.
• Turkey does not want Iraq to disintegrate and is determined to eliminate the safehaven in northern Iraq of the Kurdistan People’s Congress (KGK, formerly PKK)—a Turkish Kurdish terrorist group.
A number of identifiable internal security and political triggering events, including sustained mass sectarian killings, assassination of major religious and political leaders, and a complete Sunni defection from the government have the potential to convulse severely Iraq’s security environment. Should these events take place, they could spark an abrupt increase in communal and insurgent violence and shift Iraq’s trajectory from gradual decline to rapid deterioration with grave humanitarian, political, and security consequences. Three prospective security paths might then emerge:
• Chaos Leading to Partition. With a rapid deterioration in the capacity of Iraq’s central government to function, security services and other aspects of sovereignty would collapse. Resulting widespread fighting could produce de facto partition,
dividing Iraq into three mutually antagonistic parts. Collapse of this magnitude would generate fierce violence for at least several years, ranging well beyond the time frame of this Estimate, before settling into a partially stable end-state.
• Emergence of a Shia Strongman. Instead of a disintegrating central government producing partition, a security implosion could lead Iraq’s potentially most powerful group, the Shia, to assert its latent strength.
• Anarchic Fragmentation of Power. The emergence of a checkered pattern of local control would present the greatest potential for instability, mixing extreme ethno-sectarian violence with debilitating intra-group clashes.[/quote]

dni.gov/press_releases/20070202_release.pdf

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[quote=“fred smith”]Here are those findings as from the summary. Would Jaboney here like to explain to me how these findings would lead Odom to arrive at his conclusions. I am just trying to better understand the thought processes involved.[/quote]You want me to explain his thought processes? To what end? You can read the findings and draw your own conclusions. As can I.

What do you make of these findings?
In these findings, do you see any reason to reach contrary conclusions?

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I am sorry. I read a list of challenges but I am struggling to see where this war is “lost.” Can you help with that…

Also, curious that you want to use these Intelligence assessments. I thought that after the whole “no wmds in Iraq” thing that you might no longer view the CIA with the same respect. Or did you change your mind?

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My respect is targeted. Institutions gain it grudgingly, and keep it not easily. Intelligence and excellence do better. As does honesty. Individuals do better still.

The point is not the CIA; the point is the information and its interpretation.

Is the information accurate? Yes, it seems to be.
Is the interpretation probably correct? Likely so.
Is that utterly different than some earlier NIEs? Absolutely.

If you can’t see why the war is “lost” perhaps you could cook up a list of objectives heading into the war. I’m sure you’ve made such a list here before. Odom suggests that it had something to do with “the assumption that the United States could create a liberal, constitutional democracy in Iraq”. Clearly, that’s not going to happen. Transforming the region IS happening, though not in ways congenial to Western (to say nothing of American) ends, so that’s not providing grounds to celebrate. Just the opposite.

Come on, fred, where’s the win? The loss is spelled out in blood, now in ink. Where’s the win?

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Good thing that you are not self-critical.

Ah, therein lies the rub eh?

What information? These are scenarios.

I see a list of challenges. I asked you to show me where in this report someone could draw the conclusion that we had “lost.” Would you be so kind as to show us how you think Odom or even you yourself might conclude that based on the views and scenarios presented in this report.

I don’t see that so tell me where and how this is that different?

Yes, that is ONE of the goals. Others were to remove Saddam and determine once and for all that Iraq was not and would not develop wmds. Those were the main goals. How did we do? Second, I have stated since the very beginning that we would be in Iraq 60 years. Do you recall? This has not changed. Why would we need to be in Iraq for 60 years? if everything was expected to work out perfectly in a few years?

I disagree.

Again, I disagree and while we could keep repeating how we each disagree for quite some time, I think that you should at the very minimum explain how you have arrived at these rather broad conclusions based on this report. Can you? Will you?

We have already won. No one is going to control Iraq. We are the ones who hold it strategically. While we may not hold it effectively. Anyone who wants to move ahead will have to deal with us. We will be able to shape it to a large degree to our own designs but it will take time. Reread the 60 year part. Now, you have seen the “win” by the Democrats in the Senate and House. How has that changed anything on the ground in Iraq? Not very much and this is just as I predicted because while the Republicans lost, conservatives did not. Do you see that?

Anyway, the gloom and doom is to some extent justified. I will grant you that. But I am optimistic and have been ever since we took out Fallujah in November 2004. Will we face major challenges and obstacles over the next 30 years? 60 years? Of course. Examine the US relationship with our European allies and even East Asian ones. We do not need to be “popular” with them. Ultimately, everyone knows that cooperating with the US is important and why? because we are truly the actor with the least ulterior motives in this and the actors understand that. The masses on the streets may rise up to protest but all the players know where their bread is buttered and where the future lies and that lies with us. Sorry, if that bothers you.

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[quote=“fred smith”]I asked you to show me where in this report someone could draw the conclusion that we had “lost.” Would you be so kind as to show us how you think Odom or even you yourself might conclude that based on the views and scenarios presented in this report.[/quote]I’ll deal with how I reach my conclusions.

The political situation is fubar:[quote]• Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate. [/quote]

More complex than merely a civil war, with outside interference and mass refugee movements and the possibility of wider destabilization. [quote]• Significant population displacement, both within Iraq and the movement of Iraqis into neighboring countries, indicates the hardening of ethno-sectarian divisions, diminishes Iraq’s professional and entrepreneurial classes, and strains the capacities of the countries to which they have relocated. The UN estimates over a million Iraqis are now in Syria and Jordan.
The Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qa’ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term “civil war” accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.
Coalition capabilities, including force levels, resources, and operations, remain an essential stabilizing element in Iraq. If Coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this Estimate, we judge that this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi Government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation.
• If such a rapid withdrawal were to take place, we judge that the ISF would be unlikely to survive as a non-sectarian national institution; neighboring countries—invited by Iraqi factions or unilaterally—might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI would attempt to use parts of the country—particularly al-Anbar province—to plan increased attacks in and outside of Iraq; and spiraling violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion. [/quote]Not to mention Turkish incursions. What are the chances that the Kurds will act to hold Iraq together and keep Turkey out of it, thereby allowing them to enjoy what autonomy they have?
Not much chance. [quote]• The Kurds are moving systematically to increase their control of Kirkuk to guarantee annexation of all or most of the city and province into the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) after the constitutionally mandated referendum scheduled to occur no later than 31 December 2007. Arab groups in Kirkuk continue to resist violently what they see as Kurdish encroachment. [/quote]

Could a regional conference, such as advocated by the Iraq Study Group help? [quote]A number of identifiable developments could help to reverse the negative trends driving Iraq’s current trajectory. They include:
• Broader Sunni acceptance of the current political structure and federalism to begin to reduce one of the major sources of Iraq’s instability. (Not going to happen)
• Significant concessions by Shia and Kurds to create space for Sunni acceptance of federalism. (Never happen)
• A bottom-up approach—deputizing, resourcing, and working more directly with neighborhood watch groups and establishing grievance committees—to help mend frayed relationships between tribal and religious groups, which have been mobilized into communal warfare over the past three years. (You mean like the role played by the clerics immediately falling the fall of Baghdad? Gee, if only they’d been supported earlier.)
A key enabler for all of these steps would be stronger Iraqi leadership, which could enhance the positive impact of all the above developments.
Iraq’s neighbors influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics.[/quote]

  1. Nothing from outside is going to help given “the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics”.

  2. “[G]iven the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation,” within the next 12-18 months, and beyond. You know what Burke wrote about the character of the French Revolution, and the probability of its’ “leaders” acting reasonably with a blood-thirsty mob of supporters at their backs? This is worse.

  3. No one wants to be in the middle of a civil war, but “[t]he Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq.” Lots of luck with sorting that out, particularly in the light of #1 & #2.

  4. If you pull out, the Kurds will out, and the Turks come in. If you stay, the situation remains. If you pull back into the desert, you sit and watch a bloodbath drown the last shreds of American legitimacy in the venture. International respect plummets, as does domestic support for anything beyond the water’s edge. But that’s what you’re advocating, isn’t it?

[quote=“fred smith”]We have already won. No one is going to control Iraq. We are the ones who hold it strategically. While we may not hold it effectively. Anyone who wants to move ahead will have to deal with us. [/quote] That was a nasty fall back position when you first trotted it out, and it’s no better now. Whether you say it, or Cheney, it’s just as nutty. “Have we won? Of course we have! We’ve created another Somalia, only in a strategically important region, sitting on trillions of dollars of oil. It’s a great day for freedom! MISSION ACCOMPLISHED!” :roflmao: :roflmao: :roflmao:

You haven’t won, you’ve lost. You’ve lost, and your strategy amounts to nothing other than continuing to lose so that you can deny every other group the chance to declare victory. Somalian ghoulishness.

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Our primary mission was to remove Saddam. He is gone. His regime isn’t coming back. We have determined that Iraq has no and will have no wmds.

I have always said we would be there for 60 years. We do control Iraq strategically. We may not “have” it in the sense that you refer nor will any government that we support but we do have the ability to deny it to anyone else and we will be the best game in town for the far foreseeable future.

Again, great. You have apparently read a lot into the report and you agree with the conclusions of Odam. I do not. Sorry but I do not think that this report supports with certainty that those scenarios will all take place. AND I reject the 12 month to 18 month timeline. This is going to take a generation. I have always said so. Talk to me in 25 years. What I will do is to admit that I was wrong about suppressing the violence and restoring stability. I said we would know after two to three years and unfortunately now the answer is in and it is not one favorable to my stance. BUT I also do not think that the time has arrived to start talking about final outcomes. THAT I also reject.

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[quote=“fred smith”] AND I reject the 12 month to 18 month timeline. This is going to take a generation. I have always said so. Talk to me in 25 years. What I will do is to admit that I was wrong about suppressing the violence and restoring stability.[/quote] You know as well as I that the NIE’s time line is 12 -18 months, and the situational time line extends beyond that. The NIE’s a myopic crystal ball.

Most people, when giving an issue the brush off, say talk to me in 6 months, so 25 years is impressive. In 25 years, will you quote Zhou Enlai?

[quote=“fred smith”] I said we would know after two to three years and unfortunately now the answer is in and it is not one favorable to my stance. BUT I also do not think that the time has arrived to start talking about final outcomes.[/quote]Fine. In the long run, little’s finalized; maybe in the very long run.

Now, as you say, the answer at this point is not favorable to your stance. In all honesty–no Cheney/Blitzer games, please–have you (begun to, if it’s too soon) reconsidered your positions or assumptions? If so, have you revised any of these?

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We are not going anywhere. Period. Does not matter who is elected, Republican or Democrat. This is a fait accompli. Ask Spook. He has a number of “views” on my stance. He also knows that we are not going to leave Iraq any time soon no matter what. I suggest that perhaps many of you realize that too now given that the Democrat takeover of Congress has resulted in … no changes…

I suggest that the rest of you get on board because your protests are enfeebling and ultimately pointless.

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Time will tell. But, I don’t think we’ll be there fo rthat long.

The strategy of our opponents will be and is, to make the price of that control as high as possible. There is plenty of room for them to play spoilers. If we are really lucky, we could end up with a Lebanon. That is a piss poor outcome.

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Do quagmires have timelines and exit strategies? I don’t think so.

Fred knows that. I know that. In that sense we’re on the same page.

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The only legal option they really have is to pull funding, which would only harm the troops. If an anti-war candidate gets elected next year, that is a different story. That will be the test.

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Well, then we are consigned to wait and see. In the meantime, there are other fish to fry. I suggest that we go after them in our remaining two years to tilt the balance once and for all.

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Did I miss someone mentioning in another forum that the new US embassy complex in Baghdad is reported to consist of 21 buildings on 104 acres? [quote]“The fortress-like compound rising beside the Tigris River here will be the largest of its kind in the world, the size of Vatican City…”[/quote] …Far too large for any sane petroleum concerned CEO/war-monger/kickback-king to abandon, regardless of mixed chatter from legislators and protesters.

When will the quisling Iraqi government have enough power to expel us/US? Why even speculate such a question. Change must come from within the America population. There has been a war on for the minds of the masses since politicians had power. Some who care to walk their talk of wanting a better future (globally and domestically) are now calling for impeachment for a variety of issues such as war crimes, 9/11 investigations, voting fraud investigations, and more. While the former 109th Congress had little effect towards enacting a law to prosecute the administration for lies, the reported agenda for the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform looks like a great start. One of the 50+ official investigations in the House is targeting the Cheney/Bush/PNAC/Chickenhawk administration is the “Government Use of Propaganda”. Especially intriguing is that finally some sunshine for truth is making its way through the red and blue clouds of hypocrisy and corruption: “GAO Finds Federal Departments Spent More than $1.6 Billion in Media Contracts” (link is a googled PDF into html - actual pdf (Feb. 13, 2006).

Short of the American population demanding regime change and prosecution of criminal elements (to bring some sense of justice for the wars of aggression and human suffering); And short of some ultra powerful group (say some Bilderbergers for instance) reversing their support of the neo-con American oil cartel and undermining their use of propaganda to blind Americans; I agree that American influence in Iraq will be greater than the military occupations of Germany, Japan and Korea for a very, very long time.

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“Today Americans would be outraged if U.N. troops entered Los Angeles to restore order; tomorrow they will be grateful. This is especially true if they were told there was an outside threat from beyond, whether real or promulgated, that threatened our very existence. It is then that all peoples of the world will plead with world leaders to deliver them from this evil. The one thing every man fears is the unknown. When presented with this scenario, individual rights will be willingly relinquished for the guarantee of their well being granted to them by their world government.”
– Henry Kissinger speaking at Evian, France, May 21, 1992 Bilderburg meeting. Unbeknownst to Kissinger, his speech was taped by a Swiss delegate to the meeting.