Mindful of right-wing Republicans and their affection for Taiwan, Henry Kissinger rejected the advice of his top China hands in 1975 and influenced President Ford to put off advancing diplomatic relations on a trip to Beijing that year, State Department documents show.
It wasn’t until 1979 and another administration, President Carter’s, that the United States went ahead with diplomatic recognition and at the same time downgraded its relationship with Taiwan and the Nationalist government on the island.
Memos and other documents released this week by the historian’s office at the State Department provide unusual insight into what was a delicate political as well as diplomatic decision.
China experts in the U.S. government believed Ford should use his invitation to visit Beijing to promote “normalization” of relations. In a speech to Congress in April 1975 the president spoke of wanting to “accelerate” it.
In a memorandum to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in July, his advisers made clear they agreed with that goal and saw the trip as an opportunity,
“Our own judgment is not that there should be ‘normalization at any price,’ but that long-term American foreign policy interests will be served by a consolidation of our present, if limited, relationship with (Peking) Beijing … if an acceptable normalization deal can be worked out now.”
[b]Kissinger believed that downgrading Taiwan could touch off a right-wing backlash against Ford in the 1976 presidential election, which Carter won anyhow.
“For political reasons, it’s impossible for the U.S. to go for normalization before '76,” Kissinger told his advisers at a meeting in July. “If there is any one thing that will trigger a conservative reaction to Ford, that’s it.”[/b]
Kissinger prevailed.
The Chinese, while eager to upgrade relations with Washington, patiently accepted a visit to Beijing by Ford that did not achieve that goal and broke little ground.
Looking back in a telephone interview Thursday, Winston Lord, director of policy planning for Kissinger and a senior adviser at the time, said: “It’s true that many of us wished to move the relationship forward significantly in the remainder of Ford’s term.”
And, Lord said, given Ford’s challenge from conservatives and looking toward the election, this was difficult for Ford — and for Deng Xiaoping, who was in the midst of taking charge in Beijing “and couldn’t afford to look soft on Taiwan.”
Negotiations inevitably would involve concessions on both sides.
In an effort to build up the trip, Kissinger and his aides pondered having the president make several other stops so that, as Kissinger put it, “it’s not a special trip to China.”
Maybe a stop in Australia, maybe Malaysia. But can you go to Australia without stopping in New Zealand? Kissinger asked.
[b]“It’s difficult, The New Zealanders wouldn’t understand,” Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib advised.
To which Kissinger replied: “They are the worst bores in the world.”[/b]
Habib responded: “That’s because we never have any problems with them. All they ever talk about is cheese and butter.”
“And mutton,” Kissinger remarked before the conversation moved on.
As it turned out, Ford went to Indonesia and the Philippines on the way home from China.
