I think, however, that given the stakes in Iraq and given that we are supporting a democratically elected government that all of us can recognize the importance of seeing this through. Saddam ws a shitbag who killed millions and threatened the region. Removing him stopped that part of the killing, but the Iraqis continue to fight among themselves. Not a reason for NOT removing him in my view. WE all know that he was going to restart his wmd programs so the reason to remove him was valid even though no actual wmds were found. Kenneth Pollack outlines all of this in his book written and published before the actual invasion. Good reading.
I do not think that continued sniping over the decisions to remove Saddam are in order. They are certainly not taking place anymore among the US and the Canadian, Belgian, French and German governments so I think that the citizens of those nations should refrain from endlessly bringing up this litany of complaints.
Saddam was a real threat.
Saddam was a bad man.
Saddam is gone. That is good.
The US was right to remove him.
The US is right to stay.
The Iraqis have a chance for something better. Let’s help them attain those goals.
The US is not the problem.
"…
Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s people.
The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda.
The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.
…"[/quote]
fred’s hero, the most hated and arguably most disgraceful US President in history said, “Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.”
Presidential verbiage (fear-inciting propaganda): “some of the most lethal weapons ever devised” – did he NOT exactly define WMDs? Who in MSM reported this remark in any other fashion? So, what are some of the realities we now know?[quote]The 2006 Senate Intelligence Committee report found that:
Findings do not support the 2002 NIE judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
Findings do not support the 2002 NIE assessment that Iraq’s acquisition of high-strength aluminum tubes was intended for an Iraqi nuclear program.
Findings do not support the 2002 NIE assessment that Iraq was “vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake” from Africa.
Findings do not support the 2002 NIE assessment that "Iraq has biological weapons.
Findings do not support the 2002 NIE assessment that Iraq possessed, or ever developed, mobile facilities for producing biological warfare agents.
Findings do not support the 2002 NIE assessment that Iraq “has chemical weapons” or “is expanding its chemical industry to support chemical weapons.”
Findings do not support the 2002 NIE assessment that Iraq likely retained covert SCUD SRBMs.
Findings do not support the 2002 NIE assessment that Iraq and developed a program for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to deliver biological agents.
Similarly, the CIA’s Duelfer’s Report Iraq concluded that Iraq:
HAD NO WMD’s.
“had no . . . strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions” ended
Iraq failed “to acquire long range Iraq’s nuclear program ended in 1991 following the Gulf War.”
“Iraq unilaterally destroyed is undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter.”
In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent product systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons."
This is consistent with pre-war findings:
Former Treasury Secretary O’Neil, who was a member of the National Security Council, indicated that “in the 23 months I was there, I never saw anything that I would characterize as evidence of weapons of mass destruction.”
In January 2004, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report on WMDS in Iraq concluded that the evidence prior to the war indicated that Iraq’s nuclear program had been dismantled and its chemical weapons had lost most of their lethality. In addition, the report concluded that the administration “systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq’s WMD and ballistic missile programs”.
This is consistent with other pre-war reports. For example, in September 2002, the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency concluded “there is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or whether Iraq has – or will – establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.”
Sources: Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD; Ruben Bannerjee – Al Jazeera 04.06.03, NOW Update 05.22.03, Scheer – AlterNet.org 06.10.03; WMD in Iraq – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 60 Minutes 01.11.14; Dreyfus & Vest – Mother Jones Jan-Feb 04; Suskind – The Price of Loyalty. [/quote]
fred’s hero said a couple lines later, “with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions”.
First lets remember that Kissinger sanctioned assassinations, making him a clear-cut terrorist although he has enjoyed influencing both Presidents Bush 41 and 43. So who are the other terrorists this President Bush is referring to? Even though the accused al Qaida and its ringleader have yet to be found responsible for 9/11, Saddam’s connections and support for al Qaida proved to only be another lie to promote fear and justification for illegally invading and occupying another nation.
fred, for how long will you try to stretch neocon republican deceit to paint a respectable picture of the bush/cheney/rove administration? Plainly stated, this goal of yours is ‘Optimistically Pathetic’ or ‘Pathetically Optimistic’ – you pick.
Why don’t you ask yourself one question: Was Saddam a threat? Were the wmds (real or potential) a threat? Had sanctions collapsed? Were nations flouting the UN approved sanctions? Ironically for all the discussion of the unilateral efforts of the US to remove him, there were certainly a lot of illegal (according to international law!) activities by a number of nations who openly flouted international law to trade with Saddam. These nations include France, China, Russia, Turkey, Iran, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Egypt among others. Finally, the conclusions of both the Butler and Duelfer reports were that Saddam WAS a threat EVEN THOUGH he did not have actual wmds because the INTENT was still there and it was only a MATTER OF TIME. Given that every nation recognized that it would be the US and the US alone that had the ability or will or forces to stop him, why was it wrong for the US to take him out BEFORE he became an IMMINENT threat as Bush repeatedly stated? Again, Pollack’s book came out in 2002 and was widely covered by the press. He gave frequent briefings to any manner of Congressman and intelligence committees. His findings predicted nearly exactly what would happen. So I seriously doubt that NO ONE knew what to expect in Iraq. He got it down to a T including the Iranian efforts to hinder the process of setting up a new government. The only thing that I believe he did not get correctly was that he predicted that nations that had otherwise been benefiting greatly (financially from trade with Iraq) such as France and Russia would eventually give in to the inevitable once the US was committed to removing Saddam. He also correctly asserted that many nations would not go willing along with this unless there was UN approval since it would give them the domestic cover that they needed (as they were too cowardly to take a position otherwise).
This is only a lie IF Bush KNEW that these intelligence services did not know. EVERY one of these intelligence services CLAIMED to know that he had wmds. So the “lie” would not be Bush’s, it would be the intelligence services of the US, India, Israel, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt. Even Kenneth Pollack in his book Threatening Storm outlined the exact nature and threat of his wmds and that threat was not diminished by Saddam NOT actually having say nuclear weapons. He cited various people involved in the programs who reported that they were widely dispersed and that Saddam (given the knowledge and skill of his scientists) could put them back together quite easily when sanctions collapsed and he had every confidence given conditions both in the region and in the UN that this was only a matter of time.
Not true? I think that you are missing out on a few historical details regarding the use of chemical weapons against the Iranians and Kurds.
Another lie? What about the invasion of Iran, Kuwait and the threatened re-invasions of Kuwait. According to Kenneth Pollack, Saddam had learned his lesson and from those who defected, it was determined that with a nuclear weapon (he realized that he had acted too early with regard to his invasion of Kuwait not that he should not have invaded) he would re-invade Kuwait while threatening to lob this at the Saudi oil fields or Tel Aviv while continuing onto Saudi Arabia. Once he had a fait accompli, he believed that he could threaten the region into accepting it.
Another lie?
Many terrorist organizations were present in Iraq. It had a history of supporting these both financially and with arms mostly in the 1970s and 1980s. It briefly improved in the 1980s because it needed Western help with regard to its efforts to fight Iran. Finally, during the 1990s, it made contacts with many terrorist organizations including al Qaeda though the exact extent of any cooperation was not known. The belief was that Saddam would use these groups as a last resort to attack any nation that attempted to engage in regime change.
That was not a danger? none at all? We don’t know that it would have actually taken place. You cannot claim that it would not have. BUT a danger it remained.
It really is a pity that fools such as yourself cannot actually gamble with your lives and your lives alone. It would aid greatly in raising the level of intelligence I should think. Darwin would live to see his theories put into practical application, but no, you get to mouth off about how there were no dangers while sitting safe behind the lines protected by the US military and intelligence services. A true pity.
Here are the KEY findings of the Butler report. Why not use the BBC rather than the bushlied web site? I imagine that one might be a bit more fact-focused than the other. What do you think?
[quote]At-a-glance: Butler report
Lord Butler’s inquiry has published its verdict on the intelligence used to justify the war against Iraq. Here are the main points.
The reliability of intelligence
Doubt has been cast on a “high proportion” of human intelligence sources - and so on the quality of intelligence assessments given to ministers and officials
The problems were partly caused by weaknesses in the way MI6 carried out its checks on sources
There was third hand reporting of information about Iraqi chemical and biological weapons -with a sub-source reporting to a second MI6 main source
One MI6 source reported authoritatively on some issues but on others was “passing on what he had heard within his circle”
Reports from a third MI6 main source have been withdrawn as unreliable
Information used to justify the certainty of claims to the public about Iraq’s production of chemical weapons came from “a new source on trial”
Information from another country’s intelligence agency on Iraqi production of biological and chemical agents “were seriously flawed” and the grounds for British assessments that Iraq had recently produced such stocks “no longer exist”
There was no “over-reliance” on dissident Iraqi sources
Iraqi weapons
[color=red]It would be rash to say now that no evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programmes will ever be found [/color]
Before the war Iraq wanted to get banned weapons, including a nuclear programme
Iraq was developing ballistic missiles with a longer range than allowed
It did not have significant, if any, stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state fit for use, or developed plans for using them.
The war decision
There was “no recent intelligence” to lead people to conclude Iraq was of more immediate concern than other countries, although its history prompted the view there needed to be a threat of force to ensure Saddam Hussein’s compliance
The inquiry is surprised ministers, officials, and intelligence agencies did not reassess the quality of intelligence as UN weapons inspectors failed to make finds in the months immediately before the war
Intelligence only played a “limited” role in determining the legality of the war
No evidence was found that Britain went to war to secure continued access to oil supplies
Tony Blair’s policy to Iraq shifted because of 11 September, not the pace of Iraq’s weapons programmes.
The 45-minute claim
The claim that Iraq could use weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes should not have been made in the government’s weapons dossier without explaining what the claim referred to
MI6 now says the intelligence report on the claim “has come into question”, with doubts cast about one of the links in the reporting chain
Uranium from Niger
[color=darkred]British intelligence on the claim that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger was “credible”. There was not conclusive evidence Iraq actually purchased the material, nor did the government make that claim. [/color]
Mobile biological weapons laboratories
It was “reasonable” for intelligence chiefs to report about Iraq seeking more mobile biological weapons labs
But the intelligence from the source did not show Iraq had recently produced stocks of biological agents
This evidence could not have existed if MI6 had talked to the source directly from 2000 onwards.
The weapons dossier
“A serious weakness” was that the intelligence chiefs’ warnings about the limitations of their judgements were not made clear enough
Judgements in the dossier “went to (although not beyond) the outer limits of the intelligence available”
The impression there was “firmer and fuller” intelligence backing up the dossier was reinforced when Tony Blair told MPs on its publication day the picture painted by intelligence agencies was “extensive, detailed and authoritative”
Joint Intelligence committee (JIC)
[color=red]No evidence has been found of “deliberate distortion or of culpable negligence” [/color]
In general, original intelligence was reported correctly in JIC assessments, with the exception of the 45-minute claim
An intelligence report important in drafting the dossier should have been shown to key experts in the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), who were right to raise concerns
JIC chairman John Scarlett should not withdraw from taking up his new job as director of MI6
There is a strong case for future JIC chairmen being people with experience of dealing with ministers in very senior roles and being “demonstrably beyond influence” and so probably in their last post.
The workings of government
The inquiry team is concerned about the “informality” of government procedures reduced the “scope for informed collective political judgement” - a reference to cabinet decision making
Other countries of concern
[color=red]Uncovering Libya’s weapons programmes was a “major intelligence success” [/color]
The dismantlement of Pakistan nuclear scientist AQ Khan’s efforts to sell nuclear technologies to countries of concern is a “remarkable tribute” to the work of the intelligence agencies, with good cooperation between US and UK agencies
It is difficult to get intelligence about North Korea but the agencies’ ingenious tactics have provided important insights on exports of missile delivery systems.
Intelligence work in Iran, North Korea, Libya and the AQ Khan problem show the importance of exploiting links between supplies and buyers when fighting weapons proliferation.
These “success stories” also show there can be “lucky breaks” but they come from the foundation of knowledge developed over several years and close collaboration between all involved.
Terrorism
All British intelligence agencies are developing new techniques and there is “clear evidence” they are cooperating at all levels
The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre has proved a success after working for more than a year
International collaboration on counter-terrorism has been significantly improved in the last six or seven years
The inquiry team is worried the procedures of the international community “are still not sufficiently aligned to match the threat” of terrorism
Osama Bin Laden
In January 2000, the Joint Intelligence Committee said Bin Laden had some toxic chemical or biological materials and an understanding of their use. But there was no hard intelligence he owned genuine nuclear material
A JIC assessment in 1999 said one of Bin Laden’s followers claimed Bin Laden “intended to attack US and UK targets in India, Indonesia and the US, by using means which even the US could not counter, implying the use of chemical or biological material”. [/quote]
[quote]Evidence. The problem of discerning WMD in Iraq is highlighted by the prewar misapprehensions of weapons, which were not there. Distant technical analysts mistakenly identified evidence and drew incorrect conclusions. There is also the potential of the obverse problem. Observers may have evidence before them and not recognize it because of unfamiliarity with the subject. Often ISG found no evidence of one thing or another. It may be that a more accurate formulation might be we recognized no evidence. This is a fundamental conundrum in assessing alien circumstances.
It is vital to understand that in such an environment—an environment alien to those accustomed to Western democracies—implicit guidance from the leader can be as compelling and real as explicit guidance. Indeed, in the security-conscious world of Saddam, it would be surprising to find explicit direction related to sensitive topics like WMD. This would especially be the case for programs of presidential interest or direction. It is important to understand what one should expect to see and what one should not expect to see. [/quote]
[quote]Two examples from interactions in the 1990s may be illustrative. An Iraqi minister in 1994 asked, “Why do you Americans always attack buildings?” Iraq, of course had been subject to several bombing attacks, and the question seems simple on the surface. However, it reveals something about American assumptions. Intelligence analysts look at overhead imagery and identify buildings with some function. Digital Imagery is also used for targeting weapons such as cruise missiles. Implicit in this process is an assumption that destroying a building will destroy the capability. Discussions and observations of the Iraqis showed that they reacted to this understanding of the American process by effectively dissolving the images we were focusing on. They disassociated capability from the buildings we were able to image. To wit, they would simply take key equipment and move it out of buildings and disperse it in ways that we could not resolve into our targeting and intelligence-operating system. This was shrewd but obvious. It affected the data we were examining.
A second example of Iraq learning the signatures inspectors sought occurred while UNSCOM was attempting to investigate the governmental apparatus the Regime used to conceal material from UN inspectors. The inspectors assumed that only Saddam would give instructions on such sensitive matters. Hence, inspectors investigated those governmental arms directly connected to the Presidency, e.g., the Diwan, the Special Security Organization, the Special Republican Guard, etc. In effect, the inspectors were modeling an organization chart that branched out from the President. These organs became high-priority targets for the UN inspectors. This was perfectly logical from their perspective.
Of course, one effect of this investigation was to teach the Iraqis how we investigated and what we looked for. And, like the previous case where Iraq reacted by dissolving the image that we looked for, it should be expected that Iraq would avoid using entities that would show up on organization charts or that would follow the types of order we had earlier tried to picture.
The Regime, drawing on the experience of the 1990s with the UN and given the priorities to which it subscribed, scrambled the types of signatures they knew we would be searching for. This contributed to the difficulty in verifying what happened to Iraq’s WMD.[/quote]
[quote]
Key Inflection Points. A few unique points in time shaped Saddam’s perspectives regarding WMD after the 1991 Gulf war. However, it must be stated that Saddam’s experience with WMD previously had been very positive. Senior Iraqis have said that it was their firm conviction that the use of ballistic missiles and chemical munitions saved them in the war against Iran. Missiles allowed them to hit Iranian cities, and chemical munitions (101,000 were used) countered the Iranian “human wave” attacks.
In addition, the Iraqis believed that their possession and willingness to use WMD (CW and BW) contributed substantially to deterring the United States from going to Baghdad in 1991. WMD demonstrated its worth to Saddam. Moreover, senior Iraqis have observed that,
[color=red]if Saddam had waited until he finished his nuclear weapon before invading Kuwait, the outcome would have been much different.[/color]
Therefore, it was a tough decision he faced when confronted by the UN resolution linking lifting the of sanctions with WMD disarmament. Ultimately, his top priority (after survival) was to get out of the UN constraints. That priority underlies the actions of the Regime during the past 13 years. This may seem obvious but is easily forgotten. The spring and summer of 1991 were defining moments for Baghdad on this point. [/quote]
and finally…
[quote]During the first few inspections (June-July 1991), it became clear that the inspectors were more serious and intrusive than Baghdad expected of the United Nations. Baghdad was still surrounded by a huge array of military force that was fully capable of invading. Baghdad nevertheless initially chose to conceal WMD capabilities with a goal of preserving future WMD options. Indeed, Iraq used CW against Shia within its own borders just two months earlier.
Baghdad was found blatantly cheating. The immediate consequence during this period was that the UN Security Council, including the United States, did not restart the recently ended conflict but did pass a new resolution on 15 August 1991 (UNSCR 707) demanding more access and more intrusive rights for UN inspectors. The message was thus mixed. The UN Security Council could agree on demands but not on enforcement. What was the impression received by Saddam? He was clearly refusing cooperation with the UN resolutions. Saddam crushed internal dissent, including the use of chemical weapons, just as he did in the late 1980s. Yet, military force was not used against him. However, more intrusive legal strictures were imposed. Saddam identified the envelope of limits around him.
The Regime continued to mix compliance with defiance. It now appears clear that Saddam, despite internal reluctance, particularly on the part of the head of Iraq’s military industries, Husayn Kamil, resolved to eliminate the existing stocks of WMD weapons during the course of the summer of 1991 in support of the prime objective of getting rid of sanctions. The goal was to do enough to be able to argue that they had complied with UN requirements. Some production capacity that Baghdad thought could be passed off as serving a civilian function was retained, and no admission of biological weapons was made at all.
[color=red]But the clear prime theme of Saddam was to defeat the UN constraints. Dispensing with WMD was a tactical retreat in his ongoing struggle.[/color]
From the evidence available through the actions and statements of a range of Iraqis, it seems clear that
[color=darkred]the guiding theme for WMD was to sustain the intellectual capacity achieved over so many years at such a great cost and to be in a position to produce again with as short a lead time as possible[/color]
—within the vital constraint that no action should threaten the prime objective of ending international sanctions and constraints.
Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained that he purposely gave an ambiguous impression about possession as a deterrent to Iran. He gave explicit direction to maintain the intellectual capabilities. As UN sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation. He directed that ballistic missile work continue that would support long-range missile development. Virtually no senior Iraq; believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.
[color=red]Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect of supporting future WMD reconstitution[/color]
.
The onset of the OFF program began what became a burgeoning source of real disposable income. The revenues Iraq garnered grew incredibly from an estimated $250 million in 1996 to $2.76 billion in 2001. The process of oil exports offered leverage in the international oil markets. The UN system for controlling Iraqi oil exports had the unintended consequence of allowing ample opportunities for corruption. Corruption of this process suited the objectives of Saddam of escaping the fetters of the sanctions controlled by the UN Security Council.
As experience grew with the process of the Oil for Food program, Iraq found that the allocation of oil liftings was also a splendid opportunity to develop influence. Iraqi oil liftings were priced below market substantially; hence, obtaining the right to lift a tanker full of Iraqi oil was worth a considerable amount of money. While Iraq, due to the constraints imposed upon it by the UN system, could not legally receive cash, the price differentials could be pocketed by whatever trader designated to lift Iraqi oil. Saddam, again demonstrating his style of influence, distributed these allocations to those he deemed helpful in eroding support for sanctions.
Saddam applied a dual approach to this objective. On the one hand he emphasized the suffering of the innocent Iraqi civilian population and argued that the sanctions were immoral. At the same time he gave prominent vocal Iraq supporters and willing influential UN-officials lucrative oil allocations. He gave individuals a moral rationalization for their support and friendship to the Regime. This worked with individuals as well as countries.
[color=red]The Regime’s strategy was successful to the point where sitting members of the Security Council were actively violating the resolutions passed by the Security Council. [/color]
1998—End of Inspections. The patience and utility of cooperating with the Security Council and the UN inspectors were diminishing in the view of Baghdad during the course of 1998. The potential of the inspection process leading to a formal lifting of sanctions by the Security Council was seen as diminishing.
[color=red]The approach of eroding the constraints of sanctions until they collapsed appeared more promising. [/color]
Certainly the flow of imports and revenues was growing. The divisions in the Security Council were greater between the United States and the United Kingdom on one side and France and Russia on the other. (Iraq encouraged competition between France and Russia to do more to support Baghdad.)
At the same time, Baghdad viewed the domestic controversies in the United States as indicating, if not weakness, certainly a distraction to the White House. During the summer of 1998, when UNSCOM surfaced its concern over the evidence it found that Iraq had, contrary to its declarations, weaponized VX in missile warheads, Baghdad appears to have concluded that there was no prospect of satisfying the inspection teams. Cooperation with UNSCOM was seen as a trap, not a path to ending sanctions.
Baghdad ended full cooperation in August and began a series of confrontations with the UN that aimed at bringing its dialogue to the Secretary General and Security Council directly, and marginalizing UNSCOM. Baghdad was largely successful in drawing the Secretary General into the controversy and causing France and Russia to take firmer positions on its behalf. Ultimately, Iraq did not fully cooperate with UNSCOM in a test period of renewed inspection activity during December 1998. The United States and United Kingdom reacted militarily with a circumscribed bombing campaign that took place between the time President Clinton completed a previously scheduled visit to Israel and the beginning of Ramadan, about four days later.
The Security Council was left deeply divided. UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors departed Iraq just before the bombing and never returned. The Iraqis were satisfied with the outcome. They said, given a choice of sanctions with inspections or sanctions without inspections, they would prefer without.
The UN Security Council struggled for a year to find a new consensus on Iraq. Finally, after much debate they passed a new resolution in December 1999 (UNSCR 1284). It included (largely at Russian insistence) language about the suspension and ultimate lifting of sanctions. Nevertheless, Iraq ignored its demands and also paid no further consequences. Clearly their strategy was to erode sanctions, and they saw no need to accept a new set of inspectors.
2000—The End is in Sight. By 2000, the erosion of sanctions accelerated. The semi-annual debates over the renewal of sanctions in the Security Council became the forum for Iraqi proponents to argue the case for relaxing sanctions further. Out of concern that this pillar of containment policy was about to collapse, the United States (under a new administration) proposed “Smart Sanctions” in early 2001. This was an attempt to bolster support for sanctions within the Security Council by narrowing the targeted items subject to scrutiny. There was a reversal of a presumption of denial to a presumption of approval of items to be acquired under the Oil-For-Food program.
Syria had recently signed an oil export protocol that provided for reopening of the Iraq-Syria pipeline. Initially, the United States tried to curtail this program, but failed. Baghdad could read this turn of events only as growing momentum of its strategy to undermine sanctions with the goal of an ultimate collapse.
[color=darkred]The new administration in Washington gave no evidence of changing the approach toward Iraq.[/color]
The sanctions debate in the Security Council in June 2001 was indicative with the Russians demanding further relaxation and a concrete signal from the Council that sanctions would be lifted if Iraq satisfied the elements of UNSCR 1284. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and the new Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri, were making progress internationally. France, Russia, and Syria (then a member of the Security Council) were all quite vocally supporting Iraq in sanctions debates in the Security Council.
Prohibited goods and weapons were being shipped into Iraq with virtually no problem. The only notable items stopped in this flow were some aluminum tubes, which became the center of debate over the existence of a nuclear enrichment effort in Iraq. Major items had no trouble getting across the border, including 380 liquid-fuel rocket engines.
[color=red]Indeed, Iraq was designing missile systems with the assumption that sanctioned material would be readily available.[/color]
Politically, the Iraqis were losing their stigma. The Baghdad International Fair in November 2001 was attended by hundreds of companies. The Rasheed Hotel was filled with businessmen from all over the world. The Arab summit in Beirut in March 2002 offered the headline photo of Taha Yasin Ramadan embracing his Saudi counterpart. Funding filled the coffers of various ministries. The Iraqi OPEC delegations were treated with as much or greater interest than the Saudis. The Oil Minister was treated like a rock star. The oil markets were extremely sensitive to the prospects for Iraqi oil on the market. In fact, the very uncertainty about Iraqi oil gave Baghdad even greater leverage over the international community since, by its whims, energy prices would vary significantly and have corresponding effects on the world economy.
In international politics, Saddam capitalized on his position as the only Arab leader willing to stand up to the Americans. This position undermined the positions of the leadership in neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Their populations, being sympathetic to the Palestinians, saw Saddam as bolder than their own leaders. By this stance, Saddam created a powerful lever against these governments at virtually no cost.
From Baghdad the long struggle to outlast the containment policy of the United States imposed through the UN sanctions seemed tantalizingly close. There was considerable commitment and involvement on the part of states like Russia and Syria, who had developed economic and political stakes in the success of the Regime. From Baghdad’s perspective, they had firm allies, and it appeared the United States was in retreat.
[color=red]The United Nations mechanism to implement the Oil For Food program was being corrupted and undermined. The collapse or removal of sanctions was foreseeable. This goal, always foremost in Saddam’s eyes, was within reach[/color]
.
11 September 2001 The progress Baghdad had made toward escaping sanctions changed following 11 September 2001. Saddam did not immediately understand this.
Reflecting Saddam’s ill-formed understanding of the United States, Baghdad fully grasped neither the effect of the attacks on the United States nor their implications for Iraq’s position in the United Nations. The seriousness of the change in the international atmosphere and Iraq’s diplomatic position became clear to Saddam only after President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union speech. He saw a seriousness he had not earlier recognized. Still, he tried to bargain with the Security Council rather than outright accept new inspections. The dithering cost him.
Washington was building a huge and expensive military force around Iraq. Efforts to secure access and support for potential military action were pursued. In the Security Council a new, tougher resolution was passed (UNSCR 1441). Momentum was building that would be increasingly hard to deflect. Belatedly, following the speech by President Bush at the UN General Assembly in September 2002, Saddam finally agreed to unconditional acceptance of the UNMOVIC weapons inspectors.
The work of UNMOVIC inspectors on the ground was pursued energetically and in a charged political environment. Iraq was surrounded by a large and expensive, military force.
[color=orange]Sustaining such a force for any length of time would be impossible.[/color]
It was not a stable situation, and Saddam realized his position far too late.
Readers of this report can weigh for themselves the actions taken by all governments in response to Saddam and his WMD ambitions. It is a complicated story over a long period of time. Hopefully, this report will illuminate some of the important dynamics and the trends.
Charles Duelfer
Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence
Baghdad, September 2004[/quote]
The only reason any government or organization in the Middle East is a threat to the United States is because we’re over there taking sides in their imbecilic religious wars. If we weren’t up to our necks – by choice – in that religious strife no one in the Middle East would be any more a threat to us than the Tamil Tigers, ETA, the IRA or any other terrorist organization is whose distant conflicts we’ve wisely chosen to avoid.
Right, but unfortunately, most of the world is dependent on oil and will be for the near future and these high oil prices give these whacko nutjobs an influence beyond what they would warrant if they were just the IRA, Tamil Tigers, etc. I realize for you it is always about the Jews and Israel, but I for one think that even if Israel disappeared we would still be having a lot of problems with this region.
I have a question for Rascal, our eternal vigilante on international law. The US had to invade because sanctions collapsed. There was no way to control Saddam or guarantee that he could not rearm. What then does someone like Rascal have to say about the many nations who broke international law by trading with Saddam? What does he have to say about the French and Russians for example who flouted UN resolutions and allowed their airliners to fly to Baghdad? I just want to understand when and how to be outraged about such unilateral actions that defy the international community…
Oh Good! Please explain to us how the sanctions program had not collapsed. You might want to look at the figures for illegal trade and the inability of the US and UK to get a clear resolution in the UN regarding “smart sanctions” in 2001. Guess who opposed those efforts? France, China and Russia. Naturally, such an action was not “illegal,” but the flights to Baghdad among other actions were in DIRECT VIOLATION of UN resolutions. Binding resolutions. At least the US invasion was not in DIRECT violation of UN resolutions. It was merely an action that did not receive UN approval. That is a difference, eh? that such a legalistic mind such as yours will surely appreciate. The US action was not legal, but then was it necessarily illegal? I mean there was no UN vote to brand the US action as illegal, there was no UN resolution right? and the UN eventually did approve the US occupation of Iraq so does that not set some sort of precedent? In the meantime, we have a whole list of nations that were in DIRECT VIOLATION of numerous security council resolutions. Ah… Explain away…
Love Fred
I will be gone for 12 days so my responses will be intermittent at best. Now, don’t all cry at once.
Right, but unfortunately, most of the world is dependent on oil and will be for the near future and these high oil prices give these whacko nutjobs an influence beyond what they would warrant if they were just the IRA, Tamil Tigers, etc. I realize for you it is always about the Jews and Israel, but I for one think that even if Israel disappeared we would still be having a lot of problems with this region.[/quote]
Ha ha ha. It was necessary for the US to conquer and occupy Iraq, because those wacko nutjob Iraqis would otherwise screw us over by jacking up the price of oil.
:roflmao:
Too bad that theory is complete bullshit Frederique. Check out the below chart of the weekly price of crude oil.
You’ll notice that on 9/11/01, when those wacko nutjobs (who somehow had something to do with Iraq even though we all know they didn’t) attacked the US, the price of oil was actually fairly low, and falling, at $20 something per barrel. Now look at March 20, 2003, the date the US began it’s invasion of Iraq. What a surprise: it was only then, when the US attacked Iraq, throwing the whole region into turmoil, that the price began rising precipitously more than tripling in just 4 short years of imperialist conquest.
So, I believe you’re right that a bunch of wacko nutjobs have the power to drive the price of oil to dangerous heights. But those nutjobs are in Washington, not Iraq. Let’s just hope they don’t attack Iran and drive the price even higher.
I was referring to the part where you claimed that this was the reason why ‘the US had to invade’. Further Saddam (Iraq) was contained, its military cripppled, and there was a plan for a UN (there you go) watchdog to ensure that he would not develop WMD in future. The US did not have to invade, it wanted to.
I hope you won’t forget to include Israel, I heard they are quite good at that, too.
Don’t forget that France, China and Russia plus most non-veto holding states had been trying to get the sanctions completely removed since the mid-90s because it was apparent then that the sanctions were punishing Iraqi civilians, not Saddam. Guess who opposed those efforts? US and UK. Oil for food was the compromise reached between US/UK, plus a small handful of other countries and the rest of the UN (the majority).
[quote]Too bad that theory is complete bullshit Frederique. Check out the below chart of the weekly price of crude oil.
You’ll notice that on 9/11/01, when those wacko nutjobs (who somehow had something to do with Iraq even though we all know they didn’t) attacked the US, the price of oil was actually fairly low, and falling, at $20 something per barrel. Now look at March 20, 2003, the date the US began it’s invasion of Iraq. What a surprise: it was only then, when the US attacked Iraq, throwing the whole region into turmoil, that the price began rising precipitously more than tripling in just 4 short years of imperialist conquest.
So, I believe you’re right that a bunch of wacko nutjobs have the power to drive the price of oil to dangerous heights. But those nutjobs are in Washington, not Iraq. Let’s just hope they don’t attack Iran and drive the price even higher.[/quote]
Cleary, my point was that high oil prices give these regimes the money to act in ways that require more attention from the US. If Iran were in Africa with no oil money to fund terrorism and buy sophisticated weaponry, what would the worry be? I never said any invasion of Iraq was about high oil prices or maintaining high oil prices or any other such stuff. I said that Iraq was invaded because it had oil. Saddam with the resources that oil gave him was a threat when had he been some tinpot dictator in South America or Africa, he would not have been. It gave him the resources to buy a lot of weapons and fund a lot of weapons-related programs. Your apology is accepted.
