Zueggy, the S-J Peace Treaty nowhere hands Formosa to China. Not mentioning something is not the same as “pretending it doesn’t exist.” I didn’t mention the TRA either, but that doesn’t mean I am “pretending it doesn’t exist.” Using loaded language like that guarantees that no one is going to pay attention to you, except to laugh.
Also, you still owe me the precise chapter and verse in the Shanghai Communique where the US says Taiwan is part of China.
Finally, the only reason anyone pays attention to Chinese claims is because they have threatened to murder Taiwanese to get what they want, and apparently are both willing and able to do it. Otherwise, it would be like Portugal’s claim to Olivenca or Guatemala’s claim to Belize, an interesting but essentially meaningless bit of hubris. It is fear, not ethical or legal weight, that makes people sit up and pay attention to that expansionist monster across the Strait.
[quote=“Shanghai Communique”]. . . . . the Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.[/quote]
I believe that this is the passage in question. You may not like this . . . . however, you have to remember several things: (1) Chinese is a language essentially without verb tenses. Hence, as we know Taiwan is not currently part of China, so this Communique’s clear inference is that Taiwan is to be a part of China, nevertheless in Chinese this becomes something very close to Taiwan is a part of China.
(2) Other passages such as "the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China . . . . " and "Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland . . . . . " also give the impression that Taiwan is actually already a part of China.
(3) There is no handy word in Chinese for acknowledges that, hence in the Chinese version this is rendered as recognizes that.
It should be noted that the Shanghai Communique was never ratified by the U.S. Senate, and is not a valid treaty. They are just agreements between the PRC government and U.S. presidents who are no longer in power. (and, in the case of Nixon, no longer alive)
Yes, very true. However, “recognition of foreign governments” is a political question, which is the exclusive concern of the US President. Neither the Congress nor the Courts have power of review.
As such, the three bilateral communiques represent established US policy in the realm of foreign affairs.
Right. It is well known that the English and Chinese versions are somewhat different.
That’s in the Chinese side, Dick. It is not in the US side, and the US neither mentions nor agrees to it. The English position of the US is very clear: the US nowhere in there acknowledges that Taiwan is part of China. That is why Zueggy’s position on the SC doesn’t hold water.
Sure. But the meaning of “acknowledge” could have been rendered into Chinese, but Beijing did want to do that. Hence, there are two different versions of the Communique in two languages, each of which says what the owning government wants it to say. All the US side says is that the Chinese on either side (heck, if you were theologically so inclined, you could even argue that the SC makes a distinction between the Taiwanese and their KMT overlords) believe that Taiwan is part of China. Nothing very revolutionary about that. It is entirely consistent with the studied ambiguity of the US position on Taiwan.
I somehow doubt that there are two highly divergent worded versions of the Shanghai Communique floating about. I certainly doubt that the PRC inserted anything into the Chinese version that isn’t in the US version as it would be fairly obvious. Do you have any proof to back up your accusations that the Chinese and English versions of the Shanghai Communique are as different as you say?
I am unable to find the original chinese text unfortunately, only the english ones. However the English versions I have read, all read the same. Including the one found at taiwandocuments.org/communique01.htm, a pro-independence website. It seems unlikely that they would use the Chinese(translated into English) version if the original English version was more friendly to their cause. I have no doubt that minor differences do exist between the original Chinese and English texts, but that is not a result of willful political manipulation but I postulate rather that it is a natural result of translation. So far, all I have heard is hearsay, that some people claim that the Shanghai Communique differs between languages. Unfortunately I have been unable to validate this, and no one has chosen to support that it is so. If this does happen to be so, I would like to be aware of it. As of now, however, the burden of proof is not on me to prove that the English and Chinese versions of the Shanghai Communique are the same, but rather on the many others who must prove that it is different.
They are not “highly” divergent and I never said they were. They are different. Here’s an article:
taipeitimes.com/News/archive … 0000177032
The Chinese version of the communique uses the verb “recognizes” here, but in subsequent clarifications, State Department policy makers have been adamant in insisting that the English version is the one accepted by the US and that “acknowledges” is diplomatic language for “we take note of this position without necessarily agreeing with it.”
[quote]Can we say semantics of a notoriously pro-green news outlet? The difference between the word used does not change the spirit of the agreements. In Chinese, the definition is even more irrelevant. R
Ok! I didn’t read the whole post, but I think the only way unification can happen is after Taiwan becomes independent. If China allows Taiwan to peacefully declare independence and work with Taiwan towards unification at a later date, approaching Taiwan as an equal, Taiwan could be free to make a decision that would be without protest because there would be no coersion.
I’m interested that the US thinks that ‘all Chinese on either side’ claim that Taiwan is part of China. What happens to the USs One China principle if it becomes clear that the the people on the Taiwanese side don’t consider Taiwan part of China? Presumably, if you could prove (e.g. via a referendum) that one side doesn’t believe this, then logically it renders the Shanghai Communique invalid … (of course, there’s a difference between ‘logically’ and ‘politically’!)
[quote=“david”]I’m interested that the US thinks that ‘all Chinese on either side’ claim that Taiwan is part of China. What happens to the USs One China principle if it becomes clear that the the people on the Taiwanese side don’t consider Taiwan part of China? Presumably, if you could prove (e.g. via a referendum) that one side doesn’t believe this, then logically it renders the Shanghai Communique invalid … (of course, there’s a difference between ‘logically’ and ‘politically’!)
Any thoughts?[/quote]
It doesn’t matter . . . . . .
You have to look at the background to the Shanghai Communique, which can be found in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. From reading Article 2b of the Treaty, it is clear that Japan renounced all sovereign rights over “Formosa and the Pescadores”, but these areas were not given to the ROC, in fact there is no specific mention of the sovereignty of these areas being transferred to any other country.
So, from reading the SFPT, what is our conclusion about the “lawful government of Formosa and the Pescadores”? We would have to say it is undetermined . . . . . . as of that date, which was 1952.
Who decides what the future fate of these areas will be? The United States does. That is in Article 4b (but most people don’t understand that clause . . . . . . )
Well, some twenty years later, we have the Shanghai Communique where the USA is taking care of this matter. Basically, the Shanghai Communique is filling in the gap of the SFPT in terms of making the determination of the lawful government of “Formosa and the Pescadores” . . . . . . . . and it determined that the lawful government is the PRC. Hence, even up to the present day, the USA is trying very hard to push Taiwan into the “embrace” of the PRC.
The US is the principal occupying power under the SFPT, and it has final say over the disposition of “Formosa and the Pescadores.” That is the situation from the point of view of international treaty law.
That isn’t my understanding. From the wording, all the US is saying is “if both sides think it’s an internal (Chinese) issue, we won’t get in the way”. So my point is, if one side starts to say “Err … actually, we don’t think we’re part of China after all”, and the US acknowledges (recognises? accepts? notices? take your pick) this, then the Shanghai Communique becomes irrelevant.
All you’re saying is that legally, you believe it is up to the US to define the status of Taiwan - and the Shanghai Communique is their attempt to do this. If the Shanghai Communique is void, then Taiwan’s legal status is up in the air again.
I think that you are looking at the wording and ignoring the important contexts of history, international treaty specifications, and international legal arrangements.
You are forgetting that the US and China have already agreed that the future final status of Taiwan is to be as an SAR of the PRC. The PRC is the “lawful government of the area.”
You need to do a complete historical review of the status of Taiwan beginning with October 25, 1945. Unfortunately, the vast majority of historical texts incorrectly note that day as “Retrocession Day”, however under the laws of war such an interpretation is impossible. In fact, that day simply marks the beginning of the belligerent occupation of “Formosa and the Pescadores” by CKS and his representatives. There was no transfer of “sovereignty” on that date.
It is up to the US to define the status of Taiwan. That is clearly stated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, if you want to understand how such an analysis fits in with the parameters of “military occupation”, you will have to do quite a bit a additional research into military law. Most civilians have done little to no research on military law, military government, and the laws of war. Hence, they cannot read treaties and other international agreements from a “military” point of view . . . . . . . As one example, they cannot understand Article 4b of the SFPT.
The Shanghai Communique is not void. It is an Executive Agreement, and as such is not reviewable by the US Congress, or the courts. (As per the “separation of powers” doctrine, and in consideration that the Commander in Chief has plenary powers over foreign affairs and matters regarding the so-called “war powers”.) Without other overriding Congressional legislation, the Commander in Chief can decide matters regarding territorial issues as well.
Who are the Chinese in Taiwan? Since there was no transfer of sovereignty to the ROC, it would seem to only include the KMT Chinese refugees and their exiled government representatives that arrived after WWII - not the resident “Formosans”. As such, it seems the communique is only restating the old position that both the governments of Mao and Chiang claim Taiwan as part of China.
Cultures and histories change. Taiwan’s history can be viewed a divergent from China’s if we are willing to accept Taiwan as a seperate entity. Taiwan’s experience and the way Taiwanese respond to the Taiwan experience have created in many Taiwanese a sense of national identity. National identity is a political concept in which leaders try to rally disparate people into claiming a narrative of similarity.
From an early age humans naturally form a concept of same and different. Cultures are no different. The need for a nation state rises from a group of people who view each other as “one”, feeling the need to defent their culture from the “other”.
Taiwan’s unfolding historical narrative has created an understanding in the majority of Taiwanese that they share a common fate and culture that is being threatened by an outside “other”. All national identies are constructed, just as the PRC has constructed a national narrative that achieves a national goal of Chinese unity. China’s official historical narrative has the sole purpose of nationalizing China.
Taiwan is going through a similar process to create a Taiwanese narrative to nationalize Taiwanese by proposing Taiwan has a history and culture that is unique to Taiwan and that could not fit China’s own narrative without degrading Taiwan.
You decide.
I don’t like to see this argument. Although Deng Xiaoping replaced Hu Yaobang with Zhao Ziyang in January 1987 at an unusully long Politburo Standing Committee meeting beginning the current wave of capitalist reforms, multinationals did not begin seriously investing in China until the last decade of the second millennia. No enterprise can expect a profit for 3-10 years due to overhead. If you want to find a reliable statistic, show me bankruptcy figures for companies in industries with quick turnover still in the red after 6 years in the market and figures for companies with slow turnover still in the red after 7-10 years in the market.
[quote]Which brings me to the seventh and final insight that we gleaned from this mission. At every stop on our tour, one subject always came up from return-focused Western investors: Can we make money investing in China? The Chinese realize that the answer to the question has to be “yes.” They know full well that if they make money in China, so can we, if we buy shares in their publicly-traded companies. That