I saw this and thought some here might be interested. Don’t read the comments.
2 Likes
Stopped just when it was getting interesting.
Here’s the sequel:
2 Likes
West Taiwan should not be so foolish and return to unify Taiwan. We will not accept 1 in less of Taiwanese soil and anyone who attempts to break up Taiwan will be crushed.
2 Likes
This is Sparta !
1 Like
It’s better to have a warfare in the straight of Taiwan than on land.
In that case, the objective should be to sink the troop transports.
It seems to me there are a couple of gaping holes in the video’s war game scenario. For example there’s no paratrooper factor. It’s like war gaming D-Day with only amphibious forces and no airborne assault of tens of thousands of Allied troops. Another questionable assumption is that China will simply give up if its amphibious forces are destroyed. China regards Taiwan as its sovereign territory and is more likely to continue the war by other means if its invasion of Taiwan is defeated. Only total destruction of China’s military power will assure its surrender and that’s the 800 pound gorilla in the room in this war game scenario. Another missing factor is how long can the US sustain a war with China when much of its key military technology is manufactured in Asia? Another issue is there’s no factoring in of the potential of a partial or complete blockade of Taiwan if its invasion is thwarted. How long can Taiwan resist if China starves it of munitions, medicine, food, oil etc?
2 Likes
War game scenarios are like computer games ….just games
1 Like
Can you give me some examples of the US’s key military technologies that are manufactured in Asia?
1 Like
Why wouldn’t the Chinese start with ‘shock and awe’ which is a seemingly favorite opening move when the US is involved in a conflict?
The details are classified for obvious reasons but the general supply chain vulnerabilities are semiconductors/microelectronics, energy storage and high-capacity batteries, castings and forgings:
By far the largest challenge for securing the supply of lithium batteries for DoD is the power of China’s industrial base China dominates the global advanced battery supply chain, including lithium hydroxide (94 percent), cells (76 percent), electrolyte (76 percent), lithium carbonate (70 percent), anodes (65 percent), and cathodes (53 percent)13, 14 Even materials and components manufactured domestically often have reliance on China-produced precursors or are fragile suppliers and single point failures within the supply chain. As electrification is expected to accelerate dramatically by 2030, reliance on China will grow and China’s relative cell dominance is projected to remain stable15 As DoD pursues initiatives to address battery sector challenges, second and third order effects should be studied to ensure reliance on China’s cells and material does not inadvertently grow.
- USDOD
U.S. supply chains currently involve significant materials and products from foreign manufacturers. Multiple US sources report that China and other foreign suppliers can often deliver a completed item for the same cost that a US forge will pay for the raw materials needed to produce the parts of an item As shown above in Figure 4, China is the world’s leading producer of cast products by a wide margin. DoD counts on foreign countries, including China, for very large cast and forged products used in the production of some defense systems and many machine tools and manufacturing systems in which the DoD is reliant.
- USDOD
The United States has very little onshore capability for the outsourced assembly, testing, and packaging (OSAT) of semiconductor devices, holding less than a 5 percent share of these essential functions, with most OSAT operations conducted in Taiwan, China, and Singapore.
The disaggregation and offshoring of significant elements of the U.S. semiconductor production chain heightens risks relevant to national security, including the . . . disruption of the far-flung and delicate chip supply chain by natural disasters or geopolitical conflicts.
U.S. dependency on Taiwanese production of chips for defense systems extends beyond AI. TSMC makes semiconductors used in F-35 fighters and a wide range of “military-grade” devices used by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Many U.S. defense systems use field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) which are similar to commercial versions but introduce certain specific militarily relevant features, such as higher levels of heat and radiation tolerance. The major designers of FPGAs are U.S. firms that depend on Taiwan for much of their production. The U.S. firm Xilinx, for example, invented the FPGA, but most of its semiconductor wafers are manufactured by TSMC and United Microelectronics Co., another Taiwanese firm. The full extent of U.S. reliance on Taiwan for the manufacture of chips for military applications is unknown, but it is an important factor underlying U.S. government pressure on TSMC to move its production of military devices to the United States. . . .
As an independent commission established by Congress recently concluded: “If a potential adversary bests the United States in semiconductors over the long term or suddenly cuts off U.S. access to cutting-edge chips entirely, it could gain the upper hand in every domain of warfare.” U.S. vulnerability is particularly acute with respect to the most advanced chips currently in production, which are essential to the creation and application of artificial intelligence (AI)—intelligence generated by machines—which is expected to revolutionize warfare.
2 Likes
Some of it is manufactured for the PLA 
But also
2 Likes
you know this, assume this, or read this on some random site? 
The US has a trusted foundry program for sensitive dod semiconductors.
This can be a pain, but I’ve never heard of it being an actual issue. I’ve heard of people DOing some batteries in the past (which is frankly bullshit), but push come to shove, just DX from automakers and.i can’t believe it’d be vaguely an issue.
que? we can’t do dod forgings and castings domestically? whaaat? this one gets 2 eye rolls. 
Sometimes using some non sensitive stuff because it’s cheaper doesn’t really feel like an issue if there’s a sustained war.
Intel and global foundries have significant capability. many smaller companies have very good capability, just not at the leading edge tech (which isn’t used in a lot of critical stuff), or at large scale (which did doesn’t need).
There’s different levels of importance on different things, and they are treated very differently, so don’t believe (all of) the hype you read.
As shown above in Figure 4, China is the world’s leading producer of cast products by a wide margin. DoD counts on foreign countries, including China, for very large cast and forged products used in the production of some defense systems and many machine tools and manufacturing systems in which the DoD is reliant.
- p.27
1 Like
So… there’s obviously valid points there in terms of capacity (a lot of it, imo, could be addressed by changing from how Congress funds lots of programs on single year cycles) - I’m not sure that addresses key manufacturing technologies being manufactured in China. I’d suggest most of the c&f challenges (like turbine blades) in that report have little to do with China.
The section you bolded has a footnote : “27. The Navy uses an English firm to supplement domestic suppliers of large parts required for shipbuilding.” It leads one to suspect the China piece of the sentence relates to something like machine tools used in the supply chain use castings that are made in China? um, yeah, ok.
The irony is that America’s war machine has become so complex and expensive that it’s had to rely on China and Russia to build and maintain it. Which means that it’s practically impossible for the US to go to war with either for more than a few months. The only real utility for America’s war machine any longer is against smaller, economically insignificant countries.
1 Like
There’s a difference between sometimes uses (usually indirectly if / when it does), and has to. It’s not a subtle distinction. I’ve worked multiple programs where the customer is even reluctant to use a Canadian or UK vendor, and we manage just fine (that includes Canadian or UK subsidiary of a US vendor).