Iran. It's a done deal


#41

[quote=“agentsmith”]

thefreedictionary.com/conspire

  1. To plan together secretly to commit an illegal or wrongful act or accomplish a legal purpose through illegal action.

  2. To join or act together; combine

  3. To plan together secretly to commit an illegal or wrongful act or accomplish a legal purpose through illegal action.

  4. To join or act together; combine[/quote]
    Right- so in the case of the Iranian nuclear deal, who is conspiring with whom to do what?

[quote]IE 1959 Iranian coup
Iran contra
Operation northwoods
weapons of mass destuction
Trans Pacific Partnership
ect ect ect ect ect[/quote]

Not to mention Arbenz in Guatemala, Allende in Chile, Lumumba in the Congo, NAFTA, etc etc. But we’re talking about Iran and 2015.

If sanctions are not working, why did Iran agree to the deal? What is the plan for regime change? How is striking a deal with Iran a part of regime change? Are you saying Obama is putting on an act with Bibi Netanyahu and the Republicans, hoping that this deal will fail and he has an excuse to invade?

And what about the chemtrails?


#42

DP

No, no, they made me say that, I was just about to reveal the truth…don’t put that thing on me…AAARHHH!!


#43

Who doesn’t think that the US wants to overthrow Assad in Syria? Though possibly Israel does not, as any new regime in Syria will be either ISIS/al Qaeda or- vanishingly small chance- a democratic government which has much more legitimacy in the eyes of the West for its complaints against Israel.

[quote]There is obviously political opposition in Iran and a growing number of young people who do not enjoy living under a theocracy. When Iran opens it’s doors for business this will create plenty of opportunity for the US to infiltrate and promote domestic decent .ie color revolution. That’s my opinion at this time.

If you think iran is not susceptible to domestic dissent please explain.[/quote]

So as Cooperations said, are the mullahs so stupid that they don’t realise that their only hope is to keep Iran under a sanctions regime? Or are they conspiring with Obama to overthrow themselves? Shouldn’t Netanyahu be helping to pass this deal if it’s intended to overthrow the current regime? You have Obama working to destroy the mullahs by lifting sanctions and doing business with them, while Netanyahu, Trump, Walker, Bush, Graham etc, are trying to preserve the current Iranian regime by keeping sanctions imposed . Oh-kaaayyy…


#44


LALALALALA!!! I CAN’T HEAR SUCH LOGIC.


#45

Challenge. If it is your intent to show that the US government was responsible for any of these “regime changes” in the cited countries including Iran, then let’s see it. We did NOT overthrow Allende in 1973. Ironically, the attempt to agitate was in 1970 NOT 1973. The Mossadegh government, ironically, had antagonized the very same actors who would eventually overthrow the shah in 1979. While Britain may have been eager to see this happen (Mossadegh’s removal) and while the US and UK may have funded groups that were counter to Mossadegh, the reality is that forces in Iran were responsible for nearly the entire action (with our without US/UK support) and to lay this at our door is mistaken. As to Lumumba? ???

Finally, IF the US is to be “credited” with these “accomplishments” are you also going to chalk up the removal of Marcos from the Philippines which resulted in a peaceful transition to democracy? Ditto for US tutelage in South Korea and Taiwan and later for Indonesia, Thailand and now Burma? Or do we get to read only the same tired rants of the “I read a book this semester” Noam Chomsky brigade? who also, it should be remembered, took MILLIONS from the US Dept of Defense for his linguistic “efforts.” Funny, he never leads with that, does he?

It reminds me of the joke about communism. “No one read Marx and then became a communist; they rather became communists and THEN read Marx.” It is the same with Chomsky and I wonder how many have actually read his books or those of Edward Said for example. Rather they, too, adopt the cause/posture and then read to justify their beliefs and what do they really read? oh a quote here or there to show that they KNOW ALL ABOUT what happened in Guatemala in 1954! Iran in 1953! Chile in 1973! SEE! Bah! Sophomores… boring!


#46

Challenge. If it is your intent to show that the US government was responsible for any of these “regime changes” in the cited countries including Iran, then let’s see it. We did NOT overthrow Allende in 1973. Ironically, the attempt to agitate was in 1970 NOT 1973. The Mossadegh government, ironically, had antagonized the very same actors who would eventually overthrow the shah in 1979. While Britain may have been eager to see this happen (Mossadegh’s removal) and while the US and UK may have funded groups that were counter to Mossadegh, the reality is that forces in Iran were responsible for nearly the entire action (with our without US/UK support) and to lay this at our door is mistaken. As to Lumumba? ???

Finally, IF the US is to be “credited” with these “accomplishments” are you also going to chalk up the removal of Marcos from the Philippines which resulted in a peaceful transition to democracy? Ditto for US tutelage in South Korea and Taiwan and later for Indonesia, Thailand and now Burma? Or do we get to read only the same tired rants of the “I read a book this semester” Noam Chomsky brigade? who also, it should be remembered, took MILLIONS from the US Dept of Defense for his linguistic “efforts.” Funny, he never leads with that, does he?

It reminds me of the joke about communism. “No one read Marx and then became a communist; they rather became communists and THEN read Marx.” It is the same with Chomsky and I wonder how many have actually read his books or those of Edward Said for example. Rather they, too, adopt the cause/posture and then read to justify their beliefs and what do they really read? oh a quote here or there to show that they KNOW ALL ABOUT what happened in Guatemala in 1954! Iran in 1953! Chile in 1973! SEE! Bah! Sophomores… boring![/quote]

Who are you and what have you done with Fred Smith?


#47

Challenge. If it is your intent to show that the US government was responsible for any of these “regime changes” in the cited countries including Iran, then let’s see it. We did NOT overthrow Allende in 1973. Ironically, the attempt to agitate was in 1970 NOT 1973.[/quote]

In case you have forgotten the context, I was replying to agentsmith’s accusation of US meddling and attempting to interfere in these countries politics to ensure amenable governments were in place.
agentsmith wrote

[quote]1. To plan together secretly to commit an illegal or wrongful act or accomplish a legal purpose through illegal action.
2. To join or act together; combine

  1. To plan together secretly to commit an illegal or wrongful act or accomplish a legal purpose through illegal action.
  2. To join or act together; combine

IE 1959 Iranian coup
Iran contra
Operation northwoods
weapons of mass destuction
Trans Pacific Partnership
ect ect ect ect ect

Back room deals and conspiring with other countries or with ME militant groups is how the US does business and is no secret. Regime change in Iran is still very much on the table and to think this Nuke deal could be part of of a bigger plan would be par for the course as sanctions are not working.

[/quote]If by “was responsible” you mean “acted alone without internal support” then no- but then nobody said that, did they?

I did NOT say the US overthrew Allende. Your point about them interfering in 1970 by itself validates the point about meddling- though yes, they were involved in conspiring against Allende throughout his entire term.

Since you didn’t mention Arbenz, are we taking that as a given?

fred smith wrote

From the CIA’s archives:

[quote] “The military coup that overthrew Mossadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government,”
[/quote]
edition.cnn.com/2013/08/19/polit … ?hpt=po_c2

It’s possible that the CIA was exaggerating its own importance when it made this statement in its own internal history- maybe you should call them up and explain how you know better.

fred smith wrote

Yea, he was the leader of Congo

[quote]he report of 2001 by the Belgian Commission mentions that there had been previous U.S. and Belgian plots to kill Lumumba. Among them was a Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored attempt to poison him, which may have come on orders from U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower.[40] CIA chemist Sidney Gottlieb was a key person in this by devising a poison resembling toothpaste. In September 1960, Gottlieb brought a vial of the poison to the Congo with plans to place it on Lumumba’s toothbrush.[41][42][43][44] However, the plot was later abandoned; the plan is said to have been scrapped because the local CIA Station Chief, Larry Devlin, refused permission.[42][43][45]

However, as Kalb points out in her book, Congo Cables, the record shows that many communications by Devlin at the time urged elimination of Lumumba.[46] Also, the CIA station chief helped to direct the search to capture Lumumba for his transfer to his enemies in Katanga; was involved in arranging his transfer to Katanga;[47] and the CIA base chief in Elizabethville was in direct touch with the killers the night Lumumba was killed. Furthermore, John Stockwell indicates that a CIA agent had the body in the trunk of his car in order to try to get rid of it.[48] Stockwell, who knew Devlin well, felt Devlin knew more than anyone else about the murder.[49]

The inauguration of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in January 1961 caused fear among Mobutu’s faction and within the CIA that the incoming administration would shift its favor to the imprisoned Lumumba.[50] Lumumba was killed three days before Kennedy’s inauguration on 20 January, though Kennedy would not learn of the killing until 13 February.[51]
Church Committee

In 1975, the Church Committee went on record with the finding that CIA chief Allen Dulles had ordered Lumumba’s assassination as “an urgent and prime objective”.[52] Furthermore, declassified CIA cables quoted or mentioned in the Church report and in Kalb (1972) mention two specific CIA plots to murder Lumumba: the poison plot and a shooting plot. Although some sources claim that CIA plots ended when Lumumba was captured, that is not stated or shown in the CIA records.

Rather, those records show two still-partly-censored CIA cables from Elizabethville on days significant in the murder: 17 January, the day Lumumba died, and 18 January, the day of the first exhumation. The former, after a long censored section, talks about where they need to go from there. The latter expresses thanks for Lumumba being sent to them and then says that, had Elizabethville base known he was coming, they would have “baked a snake”.[53] This cable goes on to state that the writer’s sources (not yet declassified) said that after being taken from the airport Lumumba was imprisoned by “all white guards”.[54]

The Committee later found that while the CIA had conspired to kill Lumumba, it was not directly involved in the actual murder.[55]

Declassified documents revealed that the CIA had plotted to assassinate Lumumba. These documents indicate that the Congolese leaders who killed Lumumba, including Mobutu and Joseph Kasavubu received money and weapons directly from the CIA.[42][56] This same disclosure showed that at that time the U.S. government believed that Lumumba was a communist.[57]

A recently declassified interview with then-US National Security Council minutekeeper Robert Johnson revealed that U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had said “something [to CIA chief Allen Dulles] to the effect that Lumumba should be eliminated”.[55] The interview from the Senate Intelligence Committee’s inquiry on covert action was released in August 2000.[58]

In December 2013, the U.S. State Department admitted that President Eisenhower authorized the murder of Lumumba. The CIA Chief, Allan Dulles, allocated $100,000 to accomplish the act, but this plan was not carried out. [59][60
[/quote]
Wiki

fred smith wrote

You mean Reagan abandoning him when opposition grew overwhelming after the US supported him for years?

Don’t know much about South Korea, but its modern history appears to be

-military group takes power, strongly supported by US, gradually becomes more dictatorial,
-protests and resistance lead to collapse of regime, installation of reform government
-military group takes power, strongly supported by US, becomes more dictatorial,
-protest and resistance etc.

As for Taiwan, yes , Jimmy Carter deserves great credit for reining in the KMT by threatening them with withdrawal of support if they cracked down on the dangwai movement- good thing Reagan wasn’t in power at the time.

Summary: US supports anti-communist dictatorship (except in Burma, which was a pro-commie dictatorship); after collapse of Soviet Union, US nudges countries on path to democracy; for which US certainly deserves credit.

Yes, the US has done a great deal of good as well as harm; yes, the Soviet Union was much worse; but, yes, throughout the Cold War (and before in Central America) the US was involved in conspiracies to help put right-wing governments into power.

As well, different presidents have different policies and take different actions- Jimmy Carter supported Taiwanese democracy; Reagan tried to overthrow the Sandinistas; Johnson castigated the Kennedys for running what he termed “Murder Inc.” in the Caribbean.


#48

MikeN: I disagree with most of what you have written but do not care enough to respond.


#49

This is as close as we’ve ever gotten to Fred Smith admitting he was wrong.

[quote=“MikeN”]From the CIA’s archives:

[quote] “The military coup that overthrew Mossadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government,”
[/quote]
edition.CNN.com/2013/08/19/polit … ?hpt=po_c2

It’s possible that the CIA was exaggerating its own importance when it made this statement in its own internal history- maybe you should call them up and explain how you know better.
[/quote]
Please note: Fred Smith was proven wrong :popcorn:


#50

Gee Cooperations, let me REPOST for the fifth or sixth time. See how amazingly easy this is for me. Wonder why you and your ilk cannot even make a half-assed (truer words were never spoken) regarding your “knowledgeable” support for Obamacare about which NO ONE really KNOWS anything at present. The policies are STILL being worked out as are the delivery systems, platforms, laws and who pays. You COULDN’T know the answers to my questions. That is why I LAUGH at your pathetic efforts to skirt the issue, but HERE you go and this HAS BEEN POSTED numerous times. Read on.

[quote]What Really Happened in Iran

The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the Restoration of the Shah

By Ray Takeyh

Back in 2009, during his heavily promoted Cairo speech on American relations with the Muslim world, U.S. President Barack Obama noted, in passing, that “in the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government.” Obama was referring to the 1953 coup that toppled Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and consolidated the rule of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Obama would go on to remind his audience that Iran had also committed its share of misdeeds against Americans. But he clearly intended his allusion to Washington’s role in the coup as a concession – a public acknowledgment that the United States shared some of the blame for its long-simmering conflict with the Islamic Republic.

Yet there was a supreme irony to Obama’s concession. The history of the U.S. role in Iran’s 1953 coup may be “well known,” as the president declared in his speech, but it is not well founded. On the contrary, it rests heavily on two related myths: that machinations by the CIA were the most important factor in Mosaddeq’s downfall and that Iran’s brief democratic interlude was spoiled primarily by American and British meddling. For decades, historians, journalists, and pundits have promoted these myths, injecting them not just into the political discourse but also into popular culture: most recently, Argo, a Hollywood thriller that won the 2013 Academy Award for Best Picture, suggested that Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution was a belated response to an injustice perpetrated by the United States a quarter century earlier. That version of events has also been promoted by Iran’s theocratic leaders, who have exploited it to stoke anti-Americanism and to obscure the fact that the clergy itself played a major role in toppling Mosaddeq.

In reality, the CIA’s impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power. Yet the narrative of American culpability has become so entrenched that it now shapes how many Americans understand the history of U.S.-Iranian relations and influences how American leaders think about Iran. In reaching out to the Islamic Republic, the United States has cast itself as a sinner expiating its previous transgressions. This has allowed the Iranian theocracy, which has abused history in a thousand ways, to claim the moral high ground, giving it an unearned advantage over Washington and the West, even in situations that have nothing to do with 1953 and in which Iran’s behavior is the sole cause of the conflict, such as the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program.

All of this makes developing a better and more accurate understanding of the real U.S. role in Iran’s past critically important. It’s far more than a matter of correcting the history books. Getting things right would help the United States develop a less self-defeating approach to the Islamic Republic today and would encourage Iranians – especially the country’s clerical elite – to claim ownership of their past.

HONEST BROKERS

In the years following World War II, Iran was a devastated country, recovering from famine and poverty brought on by the war. It was also a wealthy country, whose ample oil reserves fueled the engines of the British Empire. But Iran’s government didn’t control that oil: the wheel was held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose majority shareholder happened to be the British government. By the early 1950s, as assertive nationalism swept the developing world, many Iranians were beginning to see this colonial-era arrangement as an unjust, undignified anachronism.

So strong was the desire to take back control of Iran’s national resources that it united the country’s liberal reformers, its intelligentsia, elements of its clerical establishment, and its middle-class professionals into a coherent political movement. At the center of that movement stood Mosaddeq, an upper-class lawyer who had been involved in Iranian politics from a young age, serving in various ministries and as a member of parliament. Toward the end of World War II, Mosaddeq reemerged on the political scene as a champion of Iranian anticolonialism and nationalism and managed to draw together many disparate elements into his political party, the National Front. Mosaddeq was not a revolutionary; he was respectful of the traditions of his social class and supported the idea of constitutional monarchy. But he also sought a more modern and more democratic Iran, and in addition to the nationalization of Iran’s oil, his party’s agenda called for improved public education, freedom of the press, judicial reforms, and a more representative government.

In April 1951, the Iranian parliament voted to appoint Mosaddeq prime minister. In a clever move, Mosaddeq insisted that he would not assume the office unless the parliament also approved an act he had proposed that would nationalize the Iranian oil industry. Mosaddeq got his way in a unanimous vote, and the easily intimidated shah capitulated to the parliament’s demands. Iran now entered a new and more dangerous crisis.

The United Kingdom, a declining empire struggling to adjust to its diminished influence, saw the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a crucial source of energy and profit, as well as a symbol of what little imperial prestige the country had managed to cling to through the end of World War II. So London responded to the nationalization with fury. It warned European companies doing business in Iran to pull out or face retribution, and the still potent British navy began interdicting ships carrying Iranian oil on the grounds that they were transporting stolen cargo. These moves – coupled with the fact that the Western oil giants, which were siding with London, owned nearly all the tankers then in existence – managed to effectively blockade Iran’s petroleum exports. By 1952, Iran’s Abadan refinery, the largest in the world at the time, was grinding to a halt.

From the outset of the nationalization crisis, U.S. President Harry Truman had sought to settle the dispute. The close ties between the United States and the United Kingdom did not lead Washington to reflexively side with its ally. Truman had already demonstrated some regard for Iran’s autonomy and national interests. In 1946, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had sought to seize Iran’s northern provinces by refusing to withdraw Soviet forces that were deployed there during the war. Truman objected, insisting on maintaining Iran’s territorial integrity even if it meant rupturing the already frayed U.S. alliance with the Soviets; Stalin backed off. Similarly, when it came to the fight to control Iran’s oil, the Americans played the role of an honest broker. Truman dispatched a number of envoys to Tehran who urged the British to acknowledge the legitimacy of the parliament’s nationalization act while also pressing the Iranians to offer fair compensation for expropriated British assets.

In the meantime, Washington continued providing economic assistance to Iran, as it had ever since the war began – assistance that helped ease the pain of the British oil blockade. And the Americans dissuaded the British from using military force to compel Iran to relent, as well as rejecting British pleas for a joint covert operation to topple Mosaddeq.

But Truman’s mediation fell short, owing more to Mosaddeq’s intransigence than any American missteps. Mosaddeq, it seemed, considered no economic price too high to protect Iran’s autonomy and national pride. In due course, Mosaddeq and his allies rejected every U.S. proposal that preserved any degree of British participation in Iran’s oil sector. It turned out that defining Iran’s oil interests in existential terms had handcuffed the prime minister: any compromise was tantamount to forfeiting the country’s sovereignty.
TRUE COLORS

By 1952, the conflict had brought Iran’s economy to the verge of collapse. Tehran had failed to find ways to get its oil around the British embargo and, deprived of its key source of revenue, was facing mounting budget deficits and having difficulty meeting its payroll. Washington began to fear that through his standoff with the British, Mosaddeq had allowed the economy to deteriorate so badly that his continued rule would pave the way for Tudeh, Iran’s communist party, to challenge him and take power.

And indeed, as the dispute dragged on, Mosaddeq was faced with rising dissent at home. The cause of nationalization was still popular, but the public was growing weary of the prime minister’s intransigence and his refusal to accept various compromise arrangements. The prime minister dealt with the chorus of criticism by expanding his mandate through constitutionally dubious means, demanding special powers from the parliament and seeking to take charge of the armed forces and the Ministry of War, both of which had long been under the shah’s control.

Even before the Western intelligence services devised their plots, Mosaddeq’s conduct had already alienated his own coalition partners. The intelligentsia and Iran’s professional syndicates began chafing under the prime minister’s growing authoritarianism. Mosaddeq’s base of support within the middle classes, alarmed at the economy’s continued decline, began looking for an alternative and drifted toward the royalist opposition, as did the officer corps, which had suffered numerous purges.

Mosaddeq’s supporters among the clergy, who had endorsed the nationalization campaign and had even encouraged the shah to oppose the United Kingdom’s imperial designs, now began to reconsider. The clergy had never been completely comfortable with Mosaddeq’s penchant for modernization and had come to miss the deference they received from the conservative and insecure shah. Watching Iran’s economy collapse and fearing, like Washington, that the crisis could lead to a communist takeover, religious leaders such as Ayatollah Abul-Qasim Kashani began to subtly shift their allegiances. (Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran’s theocratic rulers have attempted to obscure the inconvenient fact that, at a critical juncture, the mullahs sided with the shah.)

The crisis finally came to a head in February 1953, when the royal court, fed up with Mosaddeq’s attempts to undermine the monarchy, suddenly announced that the shah intended to leave the country for unspecified medical reasons, knowing that the public would interpret the move as a signal of the shah’s displeasure with Mosaddeq. The gambit worked, and news of the monarch’s planned departure caused a serious confrontation between Mosaddeq and his growing list of detractors. Kashani joined with disgruntled military officers and purged politicians and publicly implored the shah to stay. Protests engulfed Tehran and many provincial cities, and crowds even attempted to ransack Mosaddeq’s residence. Sensing the public mood, the shah canceled his trip.

This episode is particularly important, because it demonstrated the depth of authentic Iranian opposition to Mosaddeq; there is no evidence that the protests were engineered by the CIA. The demonstrations also helped the anti-Mosaddeq coalition solidify. Indeed, it would be this same coalition, with greater support from the armed forces, that would spearhead Mosaddeq’s ouster six months later.

THE PLOT THICKENS

The events of February made an impression on a frustrated Washington establishment. The CIA reported to U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, who had inherited the Iranian dilemma when he took office a month earlier, that “the institution of the Crown may have more popular backing than we expected.” Secretary of State John Foster Dulles cabled the U.S. embassy in Tehran that “there appears to be [a] substantial and relatively courageous opposition group both within and outside [the] Majlis [Iran’s parliament]. We gather Army Chiefs and many civilians [are] still loyal to the Shah and would act if he gave them positive leadership, or even if he merely acquiesced in [a] move to install [a] new government.”

After the protests, the Majlis became the main seat of anti-Mosaddeq agitation. Since Mosaddeq’s ascension to the premiership, his seemingly arbitrary decision-making, his inability to end the oil crisis, and the narrowing of his circle to a few trusted aides had gradually alienated many parliamentarians. In response, the prime minister decided to eliminate the threat by simply dissolving the Majlis. Doing so required executing a ploy of dubious legality, however: on July 14, all the National Front deputies loyal to Mosaddeq resigned their posts at once, depriving the chamber of the necessary quorum to function. Mosaddeq then called for a national referendum to decide the fate of the paralyzed legislature. But this was hardly a good-faith, democratic gesture; the plebiscite was marred by boycotts, voting irregularities, and mob violence, and the results surprised no one: Mosaddeq’s proposal to dissolve parliament was approved by 99 percent of the voters. Mosaddeq won his rigged election, but the move cost him what remained of his tattered legitimacy.

Meanwhile, Mosaddeq seemed determined to do everything he could to confirm Washington’s worst fears about him. The prime minister thought that he could use U.S. concerns about the potential for increased Soviet influence in Iran to secure greater assistance from Washington. During a meeting in January, Mosaddeq had warned Loy Henderson, the U.S. ambassador, that unless the United States provided him with sufficient financial aid, “there will be [a] revolution in Iran in 30 days.” Mosaddeq also threatened to sell oil to Eastern bloc countries and to reach out to Moscow for aid if Washington didn’t come through. These threats and entreaties reached a climax in June, when Mosaddeq wrote Eisenhower directly to plead for increased U.S. economic assistance, insisting that if it were not given right away, “any steps that might be taken tomorrow to compensate for the negligence of today might well be too late.” Eisenhower took nearly a month to respond and then firmly told Iran’s prime minister that the only path out of his predicament was to settle the oil dispute with the United Kingdom.

By that point, however, Washington was already actively considering a plan the British had developed to push Mosaddeq aside. The British intelligence agency, MI6, had identified and reached out to a network of anti-Mosaddeq figures who would be willing to take action against the prime minster with covert American and British support. Among them was General Fazlollah Zahedi, a well-connected officer who had previously served in Mosaddeq’s cabinet but had left after becoming disillusioned with the prime minister’s leadership and had immersed himself in opposition politics. Given its history of interference in Iran, the British government also boasted an array of intelligence sources, including members of parliament and journalists, whom it had subsidized and cultivated. London could also count on a number of influential bazaar merchants who, in turn, had at their disposal thugs willing to instigate violent street protests.

The CIA took a rather dim view of these British agents, believing that they were “far overstated and oversold.” Nevertheless, by May, the agency had embraced the basic outlines of a British plan to engineer the overthrow of Mosaddeq. The U.S. embassy in Tehran was also on board: in a cable to Washington, Henderson assured the Eisenhower administration that “most Iranian politicians friendly to the West would welcome secret American intervention which would assist them in attaining their individual or group political ambitions.”

The joint U.S.-British plot for covert action was code-named TPAJAX. Zahedi emerged as the linchpin of the plan, as the Americans and the British saw him as Mosaddeq’s most formidable rival. The plot called for the CIA and MI6 to launch a propaganda campaign aimed at raising doubts about Mosaddeq, paying journalists to write stories critical of the prime minister, charging that he was corrupt, power hungry, and even of Jewish descent – a crude attempt to exploit anti-Semitic prejudices, which the Western intelligence agencies wrongly believed were common in Iran at the time. Meanwhile, a network of Iranian operatives working for the Americans and the British would organize demonstrations and protests and encourage street gangs and tribal leaders to provoke their followers into committing acts of violence against state institutions. All this was supposed to further inflame the already unstable situation in the country and thus pave the way for the shah to dismiss Mosaddeq.

Indeed, the shah would be the plot’s central actor, since he retained the loyalty of the armed forces and only he had the authority to dismiss Mosaddeq. “If the Shah were to give the word, probably more than 99% of the officers would comply with his orders with a sense of relief and with the hope of attaining a state of stability,” a U.S. military attaché reported from Tehran in the spring of 1953.

IF AT FIRST YOU DON’T SUCCEED

On July 11, Eisenhower approved the plan, and the CIA and MI6 went to work. The Western intelligence agencies certainly found fertile ground for their machinations, as the turmoil sweeping Iran had already seriously compromised Mosaddeq’s standing. It appeared that all that was left to do was for the shah to officially dismiss the prime minister.

But enlisting the Iranian monarch proved more difficult than the Americans and the British had initially anticipated. On the surface, the shah seemed receptive to the plot, as he distrusted and even disdained his prime minister. But he was also clearly reluctant to do anything to further destabilize his country. The shah was a tentative man by nature and required much reassurance before embarking on a risky course. The CIA did manage to persuade his twin sister, Princess Ashraf, to press its case with her brother, however. Also urging the shah to act were General Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr., a U.S. military officer who had trained Iran’s police force and enjoyed a great deal of influence in the country, and Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., a CIA official who had helped devise the plot. Finally, on August 13, 1953, the shah signed a royal decree dismissing Mosaddeq and appointing Zahedi as the new prime minister.

Zahedi and his supporters wanted to make sure that Mosaddeq received the decree in person and thus waited for more than two days before sending the shah’s imperial guards to deliver the order to the prime minister’s residence at a time when Zahedi was certain Mosaddeq would be there. By that time, however, someone had tipped Mosaddeq off. He refused to accept the order and instead had his security detail arrest the men the shah had sent. Zahedi went into hiding, and the shah fled the country, going first to Iraq and then to Italy. The plot, it seemed, had failed. Mosaddeq took to the airwaves, claiming that he had disarmed a coup, while neglecting to mention that the shah had dismissed him from office. Indeed, it was Mosaddeq, not the shah or his foreign backers, who failed to abide by Iran’s constitution.

After the apparent failure of the coup, a mood of resignation descended on Washington and London. According to an internal review prepared by the CIA in 1954, after Mosaddeq’s refusal to follow the shah’s order, the U.S. Department of State determined that the operation had been “tried and failed,” and the official British position was equally glum: “We must regret that we cannot consider going on fighting.” General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s confidant and wartime chief of staff, who was now serving as undersecretary of state, had the unenviable task of informing the president. In a note to Eisenhower, Smith wrote:

The move failed. . . . Actually, it was a counter-coup, as the Shah acted within his constitutional power in signing the [decree] replacing Mosaddeq. The old boy wouldn’t accept this and arrested the messenger and everybody else involved that he could get his hands on. We now have to take a whole new look at the Iranian situation and probably have to snuggle up to Mosaddeq if we’re going to save anything there.

The White House, the leadership of the CIA, and the U.S. embassy in Tehran all shared the view that the plot had failed and that it was time to move on. It seems that some operatives in the CIA station in Tehran thought there was still a chance that Zahedi could succeed, if he asserted himself. The station might even have maintained some contact with Zahedi; it’s not clear whether it did or not. What is clear is that by that point, the attempt to salvage the coup became very much an Iranian initiative.

A TRAGIC FIGURE

In the aftermath of the failed coup, chaos reigned in Tehran and political fortunes shifted quickly. The Tudeh Party felt that its time had finally come, and its members poured into the streets, waving red flags and destroying symbols of the monarchy. The more radical members of the National Front, such as Foreign Minister Hossein Fatemi, also joined the fray with their own denunciations of the shah. An editorial in Bakhtar-e Emruz, a newspaper Fatemi controlled, castigated the royal court as “a brothel, a filthy, corrupt place”; another editorial in the same newspaper warned the shah that the nation “is thirsty for revenge and wants to see you on the gallows.” Such talk alarmed military officers and clerics and also outraged many ordinary Iranians who still respected the monarchy. Mosaddeq himself did not call for disbanding the monarchy. Despite his attempts to expand his powers at the shah’s expense, Mosaddeq remained loyal to his vision of a constitutional monarchy.

The shah issued a statement from exile declaring that he had not abdicated the throne and stressing the unconstitutionality of Mosaddeq’s claim to power. Meanwhile, Zahedi and his coconspirators continued their resistance. Zahedi reached out to armed military units in the capital and in the provinces that remained loyal to the shah and told their commanders to prepare for mobilization. Zahedi also sought to widely broadcast the shah’s decree dismissing Mosaddeq and appointing Zahedi himself as prime minister, and the CIA station in Tehran appears to have helped distribute the message through both domestic and foreign media.

The efforts to publicize the shah’s decree and Mosaddeq’s studied silence are instructive. Many accounts of the coup, including Roosevelt’s, cast the shah as an unpopular and illegitimate ruler who maintained the throne only with the connivance of foreigners. But if that were the case, then Zahedi and his allies would not have worked so hard to try to publicize the shah’s preferences. The fact that they did suggests that the shah still enjoyed a great deal of public and institutional support, at least in the immediate aftermath of Mosaddeq’s countercoup; indeed, the news of the shah’s departure provoked uprisings throughout the country.

These demonstrations did not fundamentally alter the views of U.S. representatives in Iran. As Henderson later recalled, he initially did not take the turmoil very seriously and cabled the State Department that “it would probably have little significance.” Momentum soon built within Iran, however. The clergy stepped into the fray, with mullahs inveighing against Mosaddeq and the National Front. Kashani and other major religious figures urged their supporters to take to the streets. Unlike some of the demonstrations that had taken place earlier in the summer, these protests were not the work of the CIA’s and MI6’s clients. A surprised official at the U.S. embassy reported that the crowds “appeared to be led and directed by civilians rather than military. Participants not of hoodlum type, customarily predominant in recent demonstrations in Tehran. They seemed to come from all classes of people including workers, clerks, shopkeepers, students, et cetera.” A CIA assessment noted that “the flight of [the] Shah brought home to the populace in a dramatic way how far Mosaddeq had gone, and galvanized the people into an irate pro-Shah force.”

Mosaddeq was determined to halt the revolutionary surge and commanded the military to restore order. Instead, many soldiers joined in the demonstrations, as chants of “Long live the shah!” echoed in the capital. On August 19, the army chief of staff, General Taqi Riahi, who had stayed loyal to Mosaddeq until then, telephoned the prime minister to confess that he had lost control of many of his troops and of the capital city. Royalist military units took over Tehran’s main radio station and several important government ministries. Seeing his options narrowing, Mosaddeq went into hiding in a neighbor’s house. But the prime minister was too much of a creature of the establishment to remain on the run for long, and he soon turned himself in. A few months later, Mosaddeq was convicted of treason, for which the mandatory punishment was execution. However, given his age, his long-standing service to the country, and his role in nationalizing Iran’s oil industry, the sentence was commuted to three years in prison. In practice, he would go on to serve a life sentence, spending the remaining 14 years of his life confined to his native village.

Mosaddeq was a principled politician with deep reverence for Iran’s institutions and constitutional order. He had spent his entire public life defending the rule of law and the separation of powers. But the pressures of governing during a crisis accentuated troubling aspects of his character. His need for popular acclaim blinded him to compromises that could have resolved the oil conflict with the United Kingdom and thus protected Iran’s economy. Worse, by 1953, Mosaddeq – the constitutional parliamentarian and champion of democratic reform – had turned into a populist demagogue: rigging referendums, intimidating his rivals, disbanding parliament, and demanding special powers.

Popular lore gets two things right: Mosaddeq was indeed a tragic figure, and a victim. But his tragedy was that he couldn’t find a way out of a predicament that he himself was largely responsible for creating. And more than anyone else, he was a victim of himself.

THE MYTH OF U.S. FINGERPRINTS

Since 1953, and especially since the 1979 Islamic Revolution that toppled the shah, the truth about the coup has been obscured by self-serving narratives concocted by Americans and Iranians alike. The Islamic Republic has done much to propagate the notion that the coup and the conspiracy against Mosaddeq demonstrated an implacable American hostility to Iran. The theocratic revolutionaries have been assisted in this distortion by American accounts that grossly exaggerate the significance of the U.S. role in pushing Mosaddeq from power. Chief among these is the version that appears in Roosevelt’s self-aggrandizing 1979 book, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. In his Orientalist rendition, Roosevelt landed in Tehran with a few bags of cash and easily manipulated the benighted Iranians into carrying out Washington’s schemes.

Contrary to Roosevelt’s account, the documentary record reveals that the Eisenhower administration was hardly in control and was in fact surprised by the way events played out. On the eve of the shah’s triumph, Henderson reported in a cable to Washington that the real cause of the coup’s success was that “most armed forces and great numbers [of] Iranian civilians [are] inherently loyal to [the] Shah whom they have been taught to believe is [a] symbol of national unity as well as of [the] stability of the country.” As Iran underwent its titanic internal struggle, even the CIA seemed to be aware that its own machinations had proved relatively unimportant. On August 21, Charles Cabell, the agency’s acting director, reported to Eisenhower that “an unexpectedly strong upsurge of popular and military reaction to Prime Minister Mosaddeq’s Government has resulted, according to late dispatches from Tehran, in the virtual occupation of that city by forces proclaiming their loyalty to the Shah and his appointed Prime Minister Zahedi.”

In addition to overstating the American and British hand in orchestrating Mosaddeq’s downfall and the shah’s restoration, the conventional narrative of the coup neglects the fact that the shah was still popular in the early 1950s. He had not yet become the megalomaniac of the 1970s, but was still a young, hesitant monarch deferential to Iran’s elder statesmen and grand ayatollahs and respectful of the limits of his powers.

But the mythological version of the events of 1953 has persisted, partly because since the Islamic Revolution, making the United States out to be the villain has served the interests of Iran’s leaders. Another reason for the myth’s survival is that in the aftermath of the debacle in Vietnam and in the wake of congressional investigations during the mid-1970s that revealed the CIA’s involvement in covert attempts to foment coups overseas, many Americans began to question the integrity of their institutions and the motives of their government; it hardly seemed far-fetched to assume that the CIA had been the main force behind the coup in Iran.

Whatever the reason for the persistence of the mythology about 1953, it is long past time for the Americans and the Iranians to move beyond it. As Washington and Tehran struggle to end their protracted enmity, it would help greatly if the United States no longer felt the need to keep implicitly apologizing for its role in Mosaddeq’s ouster. As for the Islamic Republic, at a moment when it is dealing with internal divisions and uncertainties about its future, it would likewise help for it to abandon its outdated notions of victimhood and domination by foreigners and acknowledge that it was Iranians themselves who were the principal protagonists in one of the most important turning points in their country’s history.[/quote]


#51

[quote]Odd that the Iranians have no idea they have just succumb to the great Satan’s plan and the Israelis are doing an amazing job of faking their opposition :laughing:

Again, you haven’t described how we get from this plan to regime change. It doesn’t make any sense. You’re more paranoid than the mullahs.
[/quote]

So out of the blue the US decides to make a deal with Iran yet continues it’s aggressive policies towards Iran’s allies. Why? At the same time the US who has catered to Israeli policies and have attacked Iraq and Syria and the behest of Israel all of a sudden give Israel the middle finger? Why?
I do not believe at this time the US has changed their policies towards Iran or Israel.

I do believe this deal creates opportunity for spies/provocateurs to infiltrate via NGOs/NCOs to forment revolution. The EU who has suffered economically due to sanctions on Russia at the behest of the US also get a much needed economic boost, which in turn relieves pressure of large corporation breathing down the backs of the likes of Merkel. US reparations to the EU for their cooperation against Russia.

Russia continues to be a thorn in US policies and threat to Bretton Woods and are very much in the crosshairs of the Globalists. If Iran was to open it’s oil market to the EU ,this would not only throw a loop into Russia’s pipeline plans,but Russia’s economy as a whole.

Re Israeli’s opposition to this deal, I think there is a disagreement with strategy on how Iran should be dealt with. Israel wants a shot term solution (war) and the US by covert means.

Then again , maybe this deal is all Obama’s work to create a legacy for himself as his term comes to and end? :loco:


#52

I’m glad you have the skills of clicking copy/ paste down. Let’s give you a sticker :bravo:

[quote]What Really Happened in Iran

The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the Restoration of the Shah

By Ray Takeyh[/quote]
The interesting thing about Ray Takeyh is no matter how much evidence you put in his face that contradicts what he writes about Iran, he keeps writing the same thing. The two of you have a knack for ignoring evidence, so it’s no wonder you like him.
foreignaffairs.com/articles … coupdunnit
Here is a very thorough critique of Takeyh’s article and his very weak response.


#53

noting FS’s quotation, the interesting sentence:

So even assuming everything in this account is objectively accurate, namely that the fall of Mossadeq should not be attributed to American machinations, we still have the conclusion that yes, CIA was deeply involved in covert attempts to overthrow foreign governments in that period.

Nice.


#54

fred smith from another thread

You mean, just like you acknowledged the US did?

Technically, the US did not invade Iran or Guatemala or Chile or the Congo or Gaza or Yemen or Lebanon - it just funded and continues to fund a number of actors that have destabilized nations and regions.


#55

Ah cute… the Noam Chomsky/Edward Said brigade’s approach to critical thinking. Are any of you saying the US was PRIMARILY responsible or INSTRUMENTAL in the success or actions of any of these coups? Looks like a lot of backtracking to me.

YES!!! The US funded actors and plotted coups. But did this happen in a vacuum? Were there any other actors funding agents as well? The issue is whether the US involvement was key or instrumental to overthrowing any of the various regimes. The strongest case is in Guatemala with Arbenz, and no I don’t believe that two banana companies could subvert/influence entire US military/diplomatic strategy. As to Chile and Iran, well, the effort was primarily a result (90 percent plus) of LOCAL actors as IT ALWAYS IS. What is so amusing to me is the intense effort to pillory the US while failing to acknowledge other actors like the USSR, Cuba, etc. As Chomsky likes to present simplistic arguments, it would appear that the US is the ONLY actor and that there were no reasons whatsoever to fear a communist takeover of Iran or Chile or Nicaragua or … and we have seen how well communist regimes have governed, the vast improvement in all sorts of socioeconomic indicators which is why the loss of certain freedoms in the interests of “social justice,” Whoops! economic fairness WHOOPS! have been worth it. It is as if all of you think that communism from World War II to 1989 was just another system that the people of these nations were able to “freely” choose and that this would not have consequences of any kind for the West. But then, when we hear about Cambodia, again, it is all US actions to bomb the border in 1970 that led the communists under Pol Pot to take over and I suppose somehow, the US government and not the Pol Pot regime is/was responsible for the 3 million killed or similarly the mass exodus and deaths of Boat People from Vietnam? Given that, by then, we KNEW what communist regimes would deliver, why is anyone confused/unclear about why we were fighting them? Finally, let’s hear from the brigade, as usual, who will defend Cuba’s economic record… hint: it is all to do with the amazing education/literacy campaign and terrific health care (please please PLEASE go there!) and then for ALL the deaths after Pinochet took over in Chile, how many happened in Cuba? Anyone? Anyone? Oh and I suppose it would be interesting to compare the socioeconomic indicators in Cuba/Chile 1959/1973/2015 and please oh please someone tell us it is all about the US embargo that has “impoverished” the Cuban nation despite the fact that it can trade with EVERY OTHER country on the planet! or nearly every other country (at least as far as I know). LET’S have this discussion. LET’S! :whistle:


#56

[quote]
The interesting thing about Ray Takeyh is no matter how much evidence you put in his face that contradicts what he writes about Iran, he keeps writing the same thing. The two of you have a knack for ignoring evidence, so it’s no wonder you like him.
foreignaffairs.com/articles … coupdunnit
Here is a very thorough critique of Takeyh’s article and his very weak response.[/quote]

I will stand by Ray Takeyh’s account. Did you actually read any of this? I know how short your attention span is. IF you did AND you are highly impressed with riposte and you find Takeyh’s response “weak,” then it is very telling about you.


#57

this is too funny. so now you’ve decided that the bar is that US involvement, no doubt by covert and illegal means, is immaterial until it reaches a threshold of actually succeeding, and largely by its own efforts, in overthrowing a regime. So the CIA could throw tens of millions of dollars to destabilise a regime (which could have additional consequences), torture thousands of people, hell, even kill dozens, BUT it gets a pass because it didn’t succeed. wow, i want to work at that company. how cushy.

So basically, Putin gets a pass until and unless Russia actually topples the Ukranian government


#58

Don’t you mean the USA gets a pass.

Remember?
libertynews.com/2014/03/undeniab … -included/

hangthebankers.com/george-so … ne-crisis/

[quote]George Soros told CNN’s Fareed Zakaria over the weekend he is responsible for establishing a foundation in Ukraine that ultimately contributed to the overthrow of the country’s elected leader and the installation of a junta handpicked by the State Department.

“Well, I set up a foundation in Ukraine before Ukraine became independent of Russia. And the foundation has been functioning ever since and played an important part in events now,” Soros responded.[/quote]


#59

Don’t you mean the USA gets a pass. [/quote]

Under FS logic, they all get a pass.


#60

Don’t you mean the USA gets a pass. [/quote]

Under FS logic, they all get a pass.[/quote]

Logic is a commodity in shot supply around here. Maybe if there were less Hasbara …