Gee, who would have thought it?
[quote=“NYT: Military Hones a New Strategy on Insurgency”]The United States Army and Marines are finishing work on a new counterinsurgency doctrine that draws on the hard-learned lessons from Iraq and makes the welfare and protection of civilians a bedrock element of military strategy.
The doctrine warns against some of the practices used early in the war, when the military operated without an effective counterinsurgency playbook. It cautions against overly aggressive raids and mistreatment of detainees. Instead it emphasizes the importance of safeguarding civilians and restoring essential services, and the rapid development of local security forces.
The current military leadership in Iraq has already embraced many of the ideas in the doctrine. But some military experts question whether the Army and the Marines have sufficient troops to carry out the doctrine effectively while also preparing for other threats.
The subtleties of the battle were highlighted Wednesday when the Iraqi Interior Ministry suspended a police brigade on suspicion that some members had been involved in death squads. The move was the most serious step Iraqi officials had taken to tackle the festering problem of militias operating within ministry forces.
[b]The new doctrine is part of a broader effort to change the culture of a military that has long promoted the virtues of using firepower and battlefield maneuvers in swift, decisive operations against a conventional enemy.
“The Army will use this manual to change its entire culture as it transitions to irregular warfare,” said Jack Keane, a retired four-star general who served in 2003 as the acting chief of staff of the Army. [/b]“But the Army does not have nearly enough resources, particularly in terms of people, to meet its global responsibilities while making such a significant commitment to irregular warfare.”
The doctrine is outlined in a new field manual on counterinsurgency that is to be published next month. But recent drafts of the unclassified documents have been made available to The New York Times, and military officials said that the major elements of final version would not change.
The spirit of the document is captured in nine paradoxes that reflect the nimbleness required to win the support of the people and isolate insurgents from their potential base of support — a task so complex that military officers refer to it as the graduate level of war.
Instead of massing firepower to destroy Republican Guard troops and other enemy forces, as was required in the opening weeks of the invasion of Iraq, [b]the draft manual emphasizes the importance of minimizing civilian casualties. “The more force used, the less effective it is,” it notes.
Stressing the need to build up local institutions and encourage economic development, the manual cautions against putting too much weight on purely military solutions. “Tactical success guarantees nothing,” it says.
Noting the need to interact with the people to gather intelligence and understand the civilians’ needs, the doctrine cautions against hunkering down at large bases. “The more you protect your force, the less secure you are,” it asserts.[/b][/quote]
[edit] Now, I love that the miliary is rethinking its m.o., and that in doing so it’s not coming to mr. smith’s conclusion that it’s not necessary that we win and shape Iraq according to our wishes, only that we hold it, or prevent anyone else from capitalizing by resolving the chaos (or however he put it). However, I distinctly recall the military previously saying that it didn’t want the job of doing the soft-sell, the touchy feelly stuff, because it’s not their mission, not what they’re equipped and trained for. The Canadian Forces have been tasked with doing just that in Afghanistan. In, I think, that’s because too many Canadians don’t like the idea of the Canadian i[/i] Forces being armed and exercising violence as a legitimate tool, but carrying out those other duties may be contributing to the loss of lives. Which creates a problem: here’s a pair of conflicts that can’t/ aren’t being won by shock and awe, and the situtation on the ground is too volatile for the NGOs who know how to do (some of) the work, to move in. Can’t win without the soft stuff, can’t bring in those who will be soft targets. Viciously circular.
Now, way back when, there were all kinds of people saying this… and weren’t listened to. Just dismissed.
But now the military’s come back to this point, so what’s going to stop this merry merry-go-round?
Waiting…
