Depressing report on Taiwan's military

Your own Cato article said taking over the Spratlys is useless too.

But anyway, you said DW isn’t a person. It doesn’t have to be a person. A TV station can be comprised of people who can explore things too. Just getting that elementary point across.

They have. And A2AD is typically talked about in terms of a defensive bubble - it’d be pretty fucking hard to penetrate into China. Now, tell me, how far does that bubble extent out, and can we get to Taiwan outside of that bubble? Or is it well inside? At the edge?

I’ve read some of them, and tons of other opinions too. Anyone talking publicly, if they know anything, isn’t revealing anything they know in any actual detail, knowwhatimsayin’?

I don’t buy that they’re flying an average of ONE sortie a day, legally by international law, into the ADIZ to “exhaust the island’s military.” Hell, isn’t there carping on this thread that the Taiwan military doesn’t practice enough - well, here you go, they can scramble once a day. :smiley:

Yea… so, um, the defense community ( :wave:) constantly looks at many, many possibilities.

Which was in response you your “I considered enlisting” comment, in response to my it’s “easy to say for a dual citizen who hasn’t been back for 7 years” comment, in response to your pressure Taiwan to reinstitute the draft comment. :wink:

That’s not at all what it says…

Taiwan claims two sets of tiny islands in the South China Sea, the largest of which is Taiping in the Spratly chain, and those claims have served as a source of national pride. This summer, China plans a major naval and air power exercise in the immediate vicinity, and speculation exists that those forces could move to seize control of those islands. Most military observers dismiss that possibility, noting that the islands lost whatever strategic value they might have once had for Beijing when the PRC built several artificial islands nearby. However, a takeover would not be primarily for military reasons; the coercive political symbolism would be the driving motive.

Even more than a PRC move against Kinmen and Matsu, such a peripheral provocation would put Washington in a bind. Despite the virulently anti‐​China state of public opinion in the United States, would there be reliable congressional and public support for a U.S. military showdown with China to back Taiwan’s claim to a few miniscule islets in the South China Sea? Such a reservoir of support seems unlikely.

Reality is China could take all of them in a day…

You mean take all of them back :joy:

You say you work in defense but you don’t know the answer to these questions? Taiwan is a primary focus of the A2/AD capabilities the Chinese have developed. Yes…the A2/AD capabilities cover the strait.

Well then you haven’t read anything from the DoD/US military. The stuff they’ve published is detailed enough…

What part of defense do you work in? Your cavalier attitude that is exactly the opposite of what experts say makes me wonder…

China is getting Taiwan to blow nearly a tenth of its defense budget just on scrambling jets. The purpose of this is to put Taiwan’s AF on edge and wear it down.

China also does this to Japan.

Ask any military expert or RTFAs. This isn’t free training for Taiwan and Japan. It’s highly effective gray zone warfare.

Can’t take back what wasn’t yours to begin with

Pfft, that you think you do means you don’t know much about it. :wink:

Uh, no. Just no.

Aerospace development. Stuff that deals with dealing with a2ad. Ha.

No, really - if not enough practice is an issue, why is scrambling 1x a day on average not better than artificial exercises? Pilots do need to stay current. :wink:

No training involving the military is free, but they have to train and fly anyway…

Right…

If you ever decide to RTFAs…

http://www.iips.org/en/research/data/fukuda01.pdf

The applications of these concepts are similar to the actions that preventing the outside
power (such as the U.S.) from entering into a theater and operating freely within a theater.
China had clearly focused on these ideas and capabilities after the U.S. blocked China’s action during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996.

At the time, China sought to pressure on Taiwan by launching short-range ballistic missiles.
But China was prevented from achieving its objectives when the U.S. dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait. Since then, China has started its efforts to prevent U.S. forces from entering the western Pacific theater, and now, after almost 20 years, they have developed considerable A2/AD capabilities.

Perfect example of how somebody who works in a clean room at TSMC might know very little about the semiconductor industry.

Again all the experts say that these intrusions are highly effective gray zone warfare. Just recently the Taiwanese have finally started listening to the US and stopped scrambling jets for every intrusion. The US told them that scrambling for every intrusion was a waste and giving China exactly what it wanted.

It’s not scrambling jets 1x a day. It’s thousands of times. If you work in aerospace you’ll understand how this causes wear and tear and creates a maintenance burden.

So take a look at your ac.uk article - regarding Japan (clue 1). Take a look at fig A under A2 (clue 2) - what about that suggests Taiwan is the primary focus? That figure doesn’t show a threat lay down, but sure suggests one. And it ain’t clustered near Taiwan.

Simarly, take a look at your defense.gov and take a look at where their units are stationed and the eastern theatre laydown. Not Taiwan focused.

Take a look at those things, and tell me how they show a2ad dev in china is Taiwan focused?

China is averaging one incursion into the ADIZ a day. The Taiwanese air force is still flying the F-5 (well, currently grounded (as of last month), but current inventory), so not exactly wearing out a while lot of airframes.

Did you even read it? The introduction:

For the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 1995-­‐1996 Taiwan Straits crisis came as a great shock to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. This is because in response to the PRC’s 1995-­‐1996 campaign of military coercion that was orchestrated against Taiwan, two United States Navy (USN) Carrier Strike Group’s (CSG) were deployed to the Taiwan Straits. The inability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to prevent this deployment made the CCP leadership acutely aware that Taiwan could never be reunified with China unless American military dominance was counterbalanced or weakened. As a result, the PRC backed down and initiated a long-­‐term policy of equipping the PLA with sophisticated military capabilities, to be used under a new Anti-­‐Access and Area-­‐ Denial (A2/AD) operational concept, thereby preventing future American intervention in Chinese affairs.3 These capabilities range from ballistic missiles to anti-­‐satellite weapons and are allocated to the PLA’s respective services, the PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF).4

This is not rocket science dude. What part of this history of China’s A2/AD development is so complicated to understand? Do you really believe that China’s A2/AD capabilities are not intended to cover the Taiwan Strait as a primary focus?

Do you not believe any of the CCP’s explicit statements about the importance of reunification and Xitler’s statements that reunification is a requirement for achieving the “China Dream”?’’

RTFA…

Speaking at parliament, Taiwan Defence Minister Yen De-fa said to the air force had scrambled 2,972 times against Chinese aircraft this year at a cost of T$25.5 billion ($886.49 million).

That claims a initial driver, not the primary focus.

I believe china’s a2ad capabilities is intended to primarily cover their boundaries from incursions as a primary focus, supported by the threat laydowns and coverage in your linked documents. There’s nothing there I see, in a admittedly quick skim, that suggests otherwise - perhaps you can point me to something specific?

How many were against ADIZ incursions, and how many ac did they scramble per Chinese sortie? Ie the statements are not incompatible.
https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ADIZ-Report.pdf

It would not be strategic to take over outlying islands. Both Kinmen and Matsu are close enough to swim to from Mainland China. (I know there used to actually be a swimming competition from Xiamen to Kinmen). Meanwhile, it’s an hour by plane to Taipei from either of those locations. If you want to “scare” Taiwanese people or be “symbolic” about it, sure, take over the outlying islands. But Kinmen is actually farther from Taiwan (location-wise) than lots of parts of China/surrounded by China in three sides. Taking over it doesn’t get you any closer to Taiwan than they already are. It’s also a military base. The soldiers there are lazy AF, but it is a military base…

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I don’t have any answers. All I can think to do about all this is to say the Serendipity Prayer: “God grant me us the serendipity on the Serengeti.”

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The reality is that if China was a free and democratic state, I don’t think for a second that the Taiwanese people would hesitate to be apart of it. They do still claim all of the Chinese mainland (and Mongolia) as their territory so my guess it that the officials in Taiwan are waiting for the inevitable fall of the CCP to reunify with the mainland.

The status quo right now is the only thing stopping WW3 sadly. If the Chinese push too hard, war will come. If the Chinese or America push too hard in the other direction, war will come. And if war comes to the island, it will more than a “freedom” operation in the Middle East.

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The CCP will fall apart and heads will roll at even the slightest humiliation in a war with Taiwan. The CCP is fragile as has been shown by all their purging in the constant battle between reformers and hard liners.

Let me guess—you are not from Canada, or Australia, or New Zealand, or any other settler colony which has somehow found or forged a national identity over time?

I also presume you have not seen any recent polling data about identity in Taiwan?

I think there’s little doubt that the PRC’s hard-fisted tactics have accelerated the trend to identify as Taiwanese and not as Chinese. And no doubt the whole region would benefit if the PRC put away its current grim imperial approach. But even with some kind of political change in China (with little or no indication of this change on the horizon), Taiwan is going its own way.

Guy

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Have a look at a map.

Then explain why China would need aircraft carriers to be a threat to Taiwan.

IIRC Nazi Germany had no aircraft carriers at all, but were a significant threat to the weakly defended British Isles in 1940.