How Amateur Sleuths Broke the Wuhan Lab Story and Embarrassed the Media

You’re right, but nothing happens overnight, and the anti-CCP sentiment has been dramatically accelerated around the world because of these events. Public perception is almost universally negative, not 55% or anything, we’re talking 85% in many countries now. And that’s a good starting point.

Also worth pointing out that from a TW perspective, it seems like the world is taking a long time to come around…and it is, but it also just woke up in the last 2 years to a lot of this stuff (maybe got going a bit before covid because of the foreign housing ownership insanity).

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So, have Fauci and Collins been disingenuous lately in saying the US hasn’t been funding GOF research in Wuhan? Are they relying on the fact that they funded EduHealth and not the research directly? Or are they saying something else?

I think there is a bit of buck passing going on. They did fund EcoHealth directly, and then Wuhan was given money as a subcontractor, or perhaps more of the status of a collaborator, but I don’t know how much detail of the Wuhan work was made known to the NIAID. Knowing grants and grant obligations, though, i suspect that NIAID would have wanted to know quite a bit.

but the real issue is probably that Wuhan said one thing, and then did another. The papertrail for exactly what the funds were spent on is probably very murky, missing, or fabricated, or all of these, and I would not trust anything i see from China one bit.

there are certainly things that China/Wuhan could have done with the money that were perfectly legitimate, like funding their trips to collect samples, maintaining collection points in hospitals, admin for a screening program across China. So EcoHealth money may have been spent as intended, and the other research was not funded by USA. hard to tell really.

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It seems disingenuous to me. Here’s a list of NIAID-funded projects to EcoHealth every year between 2014 and 2020:

Here’s the funding sections of a couple of papers originating from these projects, coauthored by Daszak (“PD”, EcoHealth) and Zheng-Li Shi (“ZLS”, Wuhan Institute of Virology):

From 2018:

This study was jointly funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China Grant (81290341) to ZLS; the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health (Award Number R01AI110964) to PD and ZLS, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Emerging Pandemic Threats PREDICT project Grant (Cooperative Agreement No. AID-OAA-A-14-00102) to PD; and Singapore NRFCRP Grant (NRF2012NRF-CRP001–056) and CD-PHRG Grant (CDPHRG/0006/2014) to LFW.

From 2020:

This study was funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health (Award Number R01AI110964) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Emerging Pandemic Threats PREDICT project (cooperative agreement number GHN-A-OO-09-00010-00), the strategic priority research program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (XDB29010101), and National Natural Science Foundation of China (31770175, 31830096). All work conducted by EcoHealth Alliance staff after April 24th 2020 was supported by generous funding from The Samuel Freeman Charitable Trust, Pamela Thye, The Wallace Fund, & an Anonymous Donor c/o Schwab Charitable. Coronavirus research in L.-F.W.’s group is funded by grants from Singapore National Research Foundation (NRF2012NRF-CRP001-056 and NRF2016NRF-NSFC002-013). We also gratefully acknowledge the authors from the Originating laboratories responsible for obtaining the specimens and the Submitting laboratories where genetic sequence data were generated and shared via the GISAID Initiative, on which some of our analysis are based (see Supplementary Table 36 for complete acknowledgement of GISAID data).

Those are just two examples, but it seems pretty clear to me that NIAID was (and apparently is) funding the research at WIV. Only the abstracts of the grant applications seem to be available online, but the purpose of the research seems pretty clear and more details will undoubtedly be present in the full applications:

Test predictions of CoV inter-species transmission. Predictive models of host range (i.e. emergence potential) will be tested experimentally using reverse genetics, pseudovirus and receptor binding assays, and virus infection experiments across a range of cell cultures from different species and humanized mice.

Here’s a passage from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article relating to your question:

*The US role in funding the Wuhan Institute of Virology.*

4. The US role in funding the Wuhan Institute of Virology.[2] From June 2014 to May 2019, Daszak’s EcoHealth Alliance had a grant from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), part of the National Institutes of Health, to do gain-of-function research with coronaviruses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Whether or not SARS2 is the product of that research, it seems a questionable policy to farm out high-risk research to foreign labs using minimal safety precautions. And if the SARS2 virus did indeed escape from the Wuhan institute, then the NIH will find itself in the terrible position of having funded a disastrous experiment that led to the death of more than 3 million worldwide, including more than half a million of its own citizens.

The responsibility of the NIAID and NIH is even more acute because for the first three years of the grant to EcoHealth Alliance there was a moratorium on funding gain-of-function research. When the moratorium expired in 2017, it didn’t just vanish but was replaced by a reporting system, the Potential Pandemic Pathogens Control and Oversight (P3CO) Framework, which required agencies to report for review any dangerous gain-of-function work they wished to fund.

The moratorium, referred to officially as a “pause,” specifically barred funding any gain-of-function research that increased the pathogenicity of the flu, MERS or SARS viruses. It defined gain-of-function very simply and broadly as “research that improves the ability of a pathogen to cause disease.”

But then a footnote on p.2 of the moratorium document states that “[a]n exception from the research pause may be obtained if the head of the USG funding agency determines that the research is urgently necessary to protect the public health or national security.”

This seemed to mean that either the director of the NIAID, Anthony Fauci, or the director of the NIH, Francis Collins, or maybe both, would have invoked the exemption in order to keep the money flowing to Shi’s gain-of-function research, and later to avoid notifying the federal reporting system of her research.

“Unfortunately, the NIAID Director and the NIH Director exploited this loophole to issue exemptions to projects subject to the Pause –preposterously asserting the exempted research was ‘urgently necessary to protect public health or national security’—thereby nullifying the Pause,” Dr. Richard Ebright said in an interview with Independent Science News.

But it’s not so clear that the NIH thought it necessary to invoke any loopholes. Fauci told a Senate hearing on May 11 that “the NIH and NIAID categorically has not funded gain-of-function research to be conducted in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.”

This was a surprising statement in view of all the evidence about Shi’s experiments with enhancing coronaviruses and the language of the moratorium statute defining gain-of-function as “any research that improves the ability of a pathogen to cause disease.”

The explanation may be one of definition. Daszak’s EcoHealth Alliance, for one, believes that the term gain-of-function applies only to enhancements of viruses that infect humans, not to animal viruses. “So gain-of-function research refers specifically to the manipulation of human viruses so as to be either more easily transmissible or to cause worse infection or be easier to spread,” an Alliance official told The Dispatch Fact Check.

If the NIH shares the EcoHealth Alliance view that “gain of function” applies only to human viruses, that would explain why Fauci could assure the Senate it had never funded such research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. But the legal basis of such a definition is unclear, and it differs from that of the moratorium language which was presumably applicable.

Definitions aside, the bottom line is that the National Institutes of Health was supporting research of a kind that could have generated the SARS2 virus, in an unsupervised foreign lab that was doing work in BSL2 biosafety conditions.

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thanks for the extra detail, Andrew. does not change my comments above, though: we still don’t know exactly what they did at Wuhan, and there is no doubt that stuff not listed in the grant applications or post-reports also took place. but I think that EcoHealth did fund in good faith, as part of a general public health initiative. and the same thing is going on in other countries across the world.

If you acted in good faith, why would you immediately start engaging in highly suspicious behavior that seemed designed to downplay the possibility the virus leaked from the lab?

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I’m not sure if that matters - I don’t see how the stuff I posted above is at all consistent with the statement by Fauci that “the NIH and NIAID categorically has not funded gain-of-function research to be conducted in the Wuhan Institute of Virology” (unless we change the definitions of the words “not” and “categorically”).

Here’s Fauchi commenting on why he was funding the “human bat interface” in China, I think people may have some follow up questions to this later. Prompted at 9 min 50

Wow, that’s just bizarre. True, you wouldn’t want to do this sort of thing on the US mainland, but surely what you’d do is set up the lab on some tiny island in the Pacific, not contract it out to one of the most populous regions on earth. Is this guy a proper doctor?

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I took it as him saying the research should be in China because that’s where these viruses tend to originate. I didn’t get how the Aussie woman interpreted Fauci.

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I guess it’s hard to tell when sentences are taken out of context, but even if that’s what he was arguing, it doesn’t make a whole lot of sense. If you’re messing around with potentially-dangerous viruses, you take them somewhere they can’t escape and cause damage.

He certainly doesn’t sound like a scientist. He’s got that folksy way of trying to simplify things that American politicians have.

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Which has just as much to do with the qualifications of the staff and ability to follow safety protocols as it does to do with geography.

Apparently Fauci is not familiar with the word chabuduo. Or has never owned anything made in China.

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well, that’s what BSL4 rooms are all about (biological safety levels range from 1, f-all safety precautions except safety cabinets, etc, all the way up to BSL4 which requires total scrubbed air, spacesuits, all lab access through airlocks and autoclaves, all material incinerated, etc).

the problem was that at Wuhan, there appears to be work that should be done in BSL4 that was actually done in BSL2, hence the US alarm bells signalled after a 2019 visit and the pulling of funding after that. that’s how it got out, and how people got sick. very minimal risk if things are done with appropriate precautions, even if it is in a big city. Look at the US CDC labs in Atlanta, for example. Same risk, vastly different skillsets.

Our university does not even have a BSL3 lab, let alone a BSL4 (which is needed for work on dangerous human pathogens like HIV, anthrax, birdflu, and SARS). we decided that the effort was not worth the research return, and the cost. but somebody has to do it, especially if your work involves looking for these diseases.

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soooo … as Baobab said: chabuduo strikes again.

Just a small point, but I think that work related to COVID-19 and other SARS-type diseases is BSL-3 not BSL-4, no? See here, for example.

I believe that BSL-4 is for Ebola and Marburg etc. (highly fatal and untreatable, IIRC) - way more dangerous than coronavirus.

I think HIV is BSL-2/BSL-3, and anthrax BSL-3 as well?

i think that BSL4 covers diseases that spradd via aerosol, like coronavirus, but i take your point that i may be conflating some of the levels with each other. it’s been a long time since i’ve had to know that (and i have never personally worked in anything bigger than BSL2).

let me take a refresher and get back to you.

BSL1: for work with several kinds of microorganisms including non-pathogenic strains of Escherichia coli and Staphylococcus , Bacillus subtilis , Saccharomyces cerevisiae and other organisms not suspected to contribute to human disease. hand wash on entry and exit, a lockable door.

BSL2: * Access to the laboratory is limited when work is being conducted.

  • Extreme precautions are taken with contaminated sharp items.
  • Certain procedures in which infectious aerosols or splashes may be created are conducted in biological safety cabinets or other physical containment equipment.[11]

Biosafety level 2 is suitable for work involving agents of moderate potential hazard to personnel and the environment.[12] This includes various microbes that cause mild disease to humans, or are difficult to contract via aerosol in a lab setting.[14] Examples include hepatitis A, B, and C viruses, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), pathogenic strains of Escherichia coli and Staphylococcus , Salmonella , Plasmodium falciparum , and Toxoplasma gondii .[14][15]

BSL3: for work involving microbes which can cause serious and potentially lethal disease via the inhalation route. Biosafety level 3 is commonly used for research and diagnostic work involving various microbes which can be transmitted by aerosols and/or cause severe disease. These include Francisella tularensis , Mycobacterium tuberculosis , Chlamydia psittaci , Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, Eastern equine encephalitis virus, SARS-CoV-1, MERS-CoV, Coxiella burnetii , Rift Valley fever virus, Rickettsia rickettsii , several species of Brucella , chikungunya, yellow fever virus, West Nile virus, Yersinia pestis ,[15] and SARS-CoV-2.[18]

BSL4: Biosafety level 4 laboratories are used for diagnostic work and research on easily transmitted pathogens which can cause fatal disease. These include a number of viruses known to cause viral hemorrhagic fever such as Marburg virus, Ebola virus, Lassa virus, and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever. Other pathogens handled at BSL-4 include Hendra virus, Nipah virus, and some flaviviruses. Additionally, poorly characterized pathogens which appear closely related to dangerous pathogens are often handled at this level until sufficient data are obtained either to confirm continued work at this level, or to permit working with them at a lower level

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No, BSL-3 also includes aerosolized pathogens and can involve respirators etc. where needed. BSL-4 rooms are really rare, the distinction being high lethality and lack of vaccination/treatment options.

I don’t know what types of facilities COVID-19 tests etc. are run under - I’m guessing BSL-2 or BSL-3, but that’s probably relatively low risk.

COVID-19 tests using carefully handled samples are done in BSL2: we do thousands of them here.

working with the live virus in other ways is BSL-3.

or potentially BSL-4 for the wild ones that nobody knows what they are.

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Yes, BSL 4 rooms are rare. Many countries have only one or a few, but certainly Wuhan has one.

list at Wiki Biosafety level - Wikipedia