I met a senior official of a Western “Trade Office” in Taiwan during a networking social. We discussed under the condition of anonymity, the reluctance of Western powers to export top tier military technologies to Taiwan.
He said a big concern was the possibility of capture of Western military technology by China in the event of an invasion, or the presence of Chinese spies/sympathizers or Taiwanese opportunists selling secrets to China.
The diplomat said that even in the West, with the home turf advantage, Chinese spies or hackers are still able to steal technology. What more in Taiwan, where there is a lot of sympathy for “peaceful reunification”, fear of the alternative, personal gain (China is the biggest trading partner of Taiwan) and so on.
Therefore, in many regards (stealth fighters, submarines, missile defense, etc.) Taiwan is alone.
A point was also raised during the discussion, that the Taiwanese aversion to risk and failure meant research institutes here (NCSIST or universities) do not like to undertake ambitious defense R&D projects, lest a lot of money be poured into a project (like say a new stealth fighter) and it fails to deliver.
Thus Taiwan appears to be stuck in the unenviable position of China’s growing qualitative and quantitative edge, while Taiwan can neither buy nor develop top tier defense technologies.
I’d say it’s too late to close the barn door . . . if that’s even the right analogy here:
A new report from data analytics firm Govini measures Chinese penetration of the U.S. defense supply chain and concludes that our industrial base cannot deter China.
Released this morning, the report was issued by Arlington, VA-based Govini which was awarded a five-year $400 million contract from the Pentagon in 2019 to deliver data, analysis and insights into DoD spending, supply chain and acquisition using a database it continues to compile.
Its simplest and most telling insight lies in the authors’ observation that;
“U.S. domestic production capacity is a shriveled shadow of its former self. Crucial categories of industry for U.S. national defense are no longer built in any of the 50 states. With just 25 well-constructed attacks, using any of a variety of means, an adversarial military planner could cripple much of America’s manufacturing apparatus for producing advanced weapons.”
On the other hand, the data shows limited support for unification even under the “ideal conditions” of economic, social, and political conditions being the same in Taiwan and China (see below). Overall, less than a third of respondents (29.35 percent) supported unification under ideal conditions. KMT supporters were nearly evenly split, with 48.58 percent supporting unification under ideal conditions. Only 16.73 percent of DPP supporters were in favor of unification under ideal circumstances. Support for unification drops if framed under non-ideal conditions, wherein economic, social, and political differences between the two sides continue. Only 11.04 percent of respondents across the board supported unification with non-ideal conditions, with wide divergence between KMT supporters (25.08 percent) and DPP supporters (4.07 percent). It is worth noting that KMT respondents supported both ideal options (i.e., peaceful independence vs. unification under similar conditions) at nearly identical rates.
We used to have an anonymous Interpol agent on here, a couple of ambassadors too if I remember correctly, and maybe the odd CIA/FBI agent! Would be great if we could get them all together, the stories they could tell!
Taiwan has its own missile defense systems to counter potential threats, primarily from China, which claims Taiwan as its territory and has not ruled out using force to reclaim it. Taiwan’s defenses include U.S.-supplied Patriot missile systems (like the PAC-3) and its indigenous Tien Kung (Sky Bow) systems, designed to intercept ballistic and cruise missiles. These are critical because China has an arsenal of over 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at Taiwan, according to estimates from 2024 U.S. defense reports.
the Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan—Luzon is just 250 miles from Taiwan’s southern coast—makes it a logical staging point for U.S. forces in a Taiwan contingency. Analysts widely agree it enhances U.S. capability to respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. For instance, the Tomahawk’s range could target Chinese amphibious fleets or bases during an invasion, while the SM-6 could counter Chinese missiles or ships.
4 years old, but also I imagine if the choice for Taiwan were peaceful unification or blood and sacrifice followed by also unification, the answers might be different. It’s easy for example for comfortable people to say they don’t want their lives to change, it’s something completely different when the island has been blockaded for a year and anyone with dual nationality had already left
are very different matters. Taiwan does live fire drills with a few missiles every few years. Do you think this is enough to give soldiers confidence to use the missiles should push come to shove?
Furthermore, Taiwan’s indigenous missiles are not really so. Taiwan still gets key components from other countries, and just assembles them at NCSIST.
The same Philippines whom (some) Taiwanese look down upon? A Latino friend of mine who got into an argument with a local, was told by the local to “Go back to Philippines.” The ignorant local of course had even gotten his nationality wrong.
Recent global trends indicate that countries need to be responsible for their own defense, and not make the expectation of foreign assistance a cornerstone of their sovereignty.
Taiwan does not have the domestic production capability to replenish missile stocks in the event of a Chinese blockade. Key missile components are still imported, with no plans on the drawing board to change the status quo.
Based on my sources, the Taiwanese submarine project is having substantial problems. Even if the submarines are launched on schedule (my bet is they won’t be) and to spec, they would be too little, too late and technologically a generation behind.
Agreed.
Indeed, many of my expat friends say at the first sign of real trouble, they would be emigrating with their families. Some leave when their sons reach the age to need to do military service.
The Taiwanese on the fence I believe would shift when China cranks up the pain or issues a life-or-death warning: either step aside or resistors/their families would be executed if China takes over.
I would suggest that Taiwan’s cash rich government throw money at the problem of domestic/independent defense technologies - particularly to foreigners who do not have the same fear of failure as locals.
And given that working in sensitive fields can get you on a Chinese blacklist, give foreigners working in such fields many more incentives - Taiwanese citizenship (waiving the requirement they renounce their original citizenship), generous grants and helping foreigners navigate the formidable foreign-language bureaucracy related to military technology development.
It’s certainly what we’ve seen in Hong Kong. There was a bit of resistance but it didn’t last long. Now, everyone is either leaving or adjusting. It’s not like Israel, where the other side wants to exterminate and so the threat is truly existential.
