To hate America is to hate mankind

[quote=“Dangermouse”]The ones who hate George Bush generally keep their traps shut. The pro Bush folk don’t and have quite large mouths. An example of this can be seen quite clearly on this forum.[/quote]Bullshit.

[quote=“Dangermouse”]Oh. I’m so offended.[/quote]No need.[quote=“Dangermouse”]I think there is a simmering hatred there somewhere. Switching on the TV every now and then to see a burning Star Spangled Banner is enough proof to me; the internet clearly shows there are plenty of people who hate America just from the plethora of websites available.[/quote]Yeah…and these nut bags get al of the media attention. Whats a country to do. Its media is against it…:unamused:[quote=“Dangermouse”]Yes indeed. In your view.[/quote]Proven media bias.[quote=“Dangermouse”]No, I don’t think so. As I said, I don’t hate America per se, I just feel the need to balance out all the right wing loonies out there who believe America can do no wrong. Believe all you like.[/quote]Along with the Yeti, Sasquatch and “Nessie” these creatures have yet to be proven a reality.
Disclaimer: I personally believe in the existence of Sasquatch and Nessie. The Yeti…I’m still decideing on that one.[quote=“Dangermouse”]Well, I wouldn’t remember this and you are clearly alot older than I am so you will be able to easily recall such times. I do know that my friend’s Grandmother still spits on Japanese cars though, but that’s another story.[/quote]Can’t help you here. I’ve owned too many Nippon products to claim a bias. But I do not trust Nipponese Gov’t or business people to be fair. Forewarned is forearmed.[quote=“Dangermouse”]Perhaps.[/quote]Well said[quote=“Dangermouse”] Many would say different. And I’m not saying America deserves this, but again, perhaps it needs a wake up call. It is only in the view of the west that this is a dysfunction; I’m sure it is quite normal to the fellows in the region who have an axe to grind with you.[/quote]I think you’re really on our side. Just let go…you’ll feel better.[quote=“Dangermouse”]If you are reffering to the British Government here, I would say that you’re falling down somewhat as, as far as I can see, my government is Pro US and perhaps our tiny population is being brianwashed in the opposite way to the way you declare.[/quote]We like the Brits. Always have and always will.[quote=“Dangermouse”]
Hang on there Fred - The Japanese were awful during the war and treated people very, very badly. I think this remark is rather poor considering what the Japanese got up to. People hated (and still do hate) the Japanese for what they did, not jsut for what the history books say. Consider what went on during the war here in Taiwan not 15 miles from where you are sitting in Taipei. The Japanese were bastards and they still don’t have the gumption to apologise.[quote]Still a problem.[quote=“Dangermouse”]No Fred - the difference is that a): The things that Japan did over 50 years ago and are not happening today.
b): As things are happening now, people have the chance to make a stand judging by what is happening (from their perspective) for themselves.[/quote]No, its not the “people standing for themselves”, its one radical minority group with weapons and foreign support after another trying to impose their facist regime on an unarmed and impotent populace after another.[quote=“Dangermouse”]So why doesn’t it?[/quote] We do. Thats why people get so continually pissed-off at us. We like to see things thru with the original plan.[quote=“Dangermouse”]What country is going to do this when it is easier just to Kow tow? I’m sure that if possible, many countries would like to band together and rise up against the US should they have the resources, military power and logistics and money to do so. Perhaps they will in the future. I’m sure China, N Korea or the Middle east would like to do something should they suddely have the power bestowed upon them.
Unfortunately (fortunately actually) they havn’t. That’s why we have the postion we find ourselves in now - terrorism and under-the-table wars.
[/quote]Not really. The proof is in the fact that most, if not all free countries, realize the advantage they have being an ally, or at least a non-hostile, to the USA and her allies.[quote=“Dangermouse”]Research some European and Canadian white papers Fred. Then tell me all about the pressure other countries were put under by America to dismantle arms, discontinue military projects and generally be forced to accept Americas “protection umbrella.”[/quote]Look at what the reality of the situation was/is. Academic output rarely equals an unbiased view or conclusion on world events. Agendas are only magnified in the world of “publish or perish.”[quote=“Dangermouse”]Well go on then.
Infact - while we are on the subject of military projects and protection umbrellas and all, care to have a look at the Cold War years and tell me how much Europe asd a whole was sold short by the US? Perhaps you can total up the number of home grown European arms projects that were cancelled due to US pressure? How about the famous example of when the US government pressured the UK to cancel a bomber project it so desperately needed - and then turn round and offer F 111’s in it’s place which were nowhere near up to the job advertised.
I’m sure we could also talk about some missile projects here, too.

OK. So you don’t want to talk about this.
How about we talk about some recent projects like the Joint Strike Fighter program instead, of which many countries are taking part in. Let’s say, for example, that America doesn’t want to take part in the agreed technology sharing and R+D process, keeping all it’s ideas to itself but skimming off everybody elses technology.[/quote]Euro Fighter…need I actually mention EADS and British technologies contribution to this group?[quote=“Dangermouse”]Let’s say that the UK, again pissed off with Americas disgusting “business” attitude, threatens to cancel it’s share in the project - something extremely expensive in terms of billions of pounds (Our billion, not your billion).
Oh, and then the US scrapped the contracted engine designed specifically for the aircraft by Rolls Royce which meant a huge loss of billions British companies connected with RR in the UK. We were not even consulted. So much for the “Joint” in the title.
Again we can see that the US is alienating itself. Not only this, but you are forcing countries which work alongside the US in defence sectors to re-think and work with other countries. America is forcing, at present day, the UK to work more closely with France and Germany because the US is not keeping its side of the bargain on a number of military projects - yet again.
Let’s say that British technology and French technology gets all mixed together and ends up as planes, missiles and tanks. France wants to sell to China. Germany wants to sell to China.
You see what’s happening? America screws other countries and then moans when it finds itself alienated and because agreements weren’t kept.[/quote]I believe the keyword here is “Agreements”…as in contractual agreements. GB signed these. Contracts are meant to be honored. Don’t blame others if the tide changes.[quote=“Dangermouse”] These screwed countries don’t want to listen to America. These countries then want to sell to other questionable countries because they lost out, and yet the US is moaning even though it is one of the main causes of the problems it finds itself in.[/quote]Not really. Politics and the arms trade is a fluid substance. You’ve(Britain) have been surfing this longer than we (USA) have.[quote=“Dangermouse”]Since going alone is not a financial option, Britain would look elsewhere for defense development cooperation - to European industry, and to EU-led programs to create both a common European defense industry and a European force independent of NATO or the USA. A British military that is more and more interoperable with its European partners, and less and less common with the USA, and also not fostering ties at the weapons program level because cooperation is curtailed… is a Britain that will find itself, slowly but surely pulled away from its special defense relationship with the USA. This will, of course, have ripple effects on its foreign policy. Especially given that broken promises and a breakdown of cooperation would be what led to this whole situation in the first place.

Now these are the kind of things that newspapers and TV news don’t generally report on. Defence journals do, though. I suggest you start reading some - Jane’s is a good place to start.[/quote]My bread & butter. Along with quite a few other “trade journals” and sunscription web sites. Sorry, nothing in these supports your theories. Not saying you are wrong in your facts. Just saying that your anger is mis-placed. The playing field is much leveler than you are making out. And private industry is doing very well in defense nabufacturing work.[quote=“Dangermouse”]Infact, pick up any business magazine and you can see where the US has ripped of another country one way or another. (Hint - HP sauce takeover - March 2006)[/quote]Please…are you using “brown sauce” as a POI in this?[quote=“Dangermouse”]Perhaps you are starting to notice where much of this resentment comes from? Many people losing their jobs or having their lives affected due to contracts being cancelled, companies being short changed or agreements not being kept. Yes Fred, this is middle England bar room talk. Maybe you can start to see that your initial views about people hating America because it is successful, although true in some cases, are largely unfounded.[/quote]Technology changes, manufacturing changes. This affects all, world wide. Those who adapt to these changes prosper. Those who develop new technology to go with the changing fields do well. You know this.
Sorry, in the scale of events these issues are minor at best. Britain has profitted greatly thanks to its technological alliance with the US, its affiliated defense group companies and the greater levels of technological expertise it has developed from this alliance. This has enabled Britain, and British companies, to today have a wide ranging position of equality with defense groups world-wide. And the trans-national alliances currently existing are demonstrating that British companies, specifically in the aeronautical, electronic and defense segment, are in now way playing 2nd fiddle to any other member of this world grouping.[quote=“Dangermouse”]
I’m very familar with the lend-lease program. However, let’s look at pre lend lease. Perhaps you can tell me who said these fine words:
We’ve milked the British cash cow for all it is worth….”

Or perhaps you don’t want to. Up to you.

Perhaps you can tell me how much of the lend-lease program ended up at the bottom of the sea because US ships refused to intercept submarines operating in the area. Perhaps you can also tell me how it had to be generally British ships which bought over supplies, not American, therefore using up valuable shipping resources which could have been used better to help when the Home Fleet was being bombed. Lend-Lease was a bit of a farse in the early days, according to some accounts.[/quote]Irrelevant. Look up the US Merchant arine and their actions and [b]casualty rate[quote=“Dangermouse”]ss the Atlantic prior to and during WWII[quote=“Dangermouse”]OK, the UK started the offensive against Germany when it withdrew it’s plans to invade Britain after the Battle of Britain was won. It directed much of it’s efforts to the Russian front. I’d be interested to hear your version of events. I’ve heard that the Americans are very good at re-writing history.[/quote]No need to re-write. [quote=“Dangermouse”]A few faults Fred:

Contrary to popular American opinion, British people do not spend all evening in the pub talking about America and it’s virtues/faults. In fact, even Cricket takes precedence. Then it’s marbles and then, right down the list after conversations about new developments in the velcro industry, basket weaving and cheese rolling, there may - if there is time before last orders - be a conversation about America.
And then it’s usually about Disneyland.[/quote]You really do need to be more selective in who you socialize with.[quote=“Dangermouse”]I’m supporting views from information that I have gathered myself - and while I have alot of good things to say about America, on this forum in particular I like to contradict the pro American feel. It’s just too overbearing to stand sometimes.[/quote]Hoo hum…and this is not?[quote=“Dangermouse”]
Multiple engine designs. Radar technology, IFF, Aircraft carrier design to the present day, Aerodynamics, shell technology, labour and intellectual property - you name it - you’ve taken it. HUD displays in recent times. See above for present day tactics. The UK gave you the rights to manufacture the Harrier as the AV8B, and then you went and sold it to other countries thus undercutting our market. The US even stole the technology that enabled it to break the sound barrier. So yes, it is a gripe.[/quote]The Harrier has just been removed from service. It performed well during its time and Britain sold it world-wide. Along with support trchnology. The game was played according to everyones rules.[quote=“Dangermouse”]Anyway, I don’t think I know which one you are talking about. Maybe I havn’t mentioned it. Perhaps we can add it to the list, eh?[/quote]

[quote=“fred smith”]Since then, your subway has been bombed by Muslim terrorists[/quote][quote=“Dangermouse”]Probably because of our staunch friendship with the US.[/quote]They didn’t mention this as a motivating reason. Why should you?

[quote=“Dangermouse”]Like I said, I don’t “Hate” America. Perhaps you should speak to the majority of muslims and see if they think their hatred of America is irrational?[/quote]I do not think you do wither. But I do think that you are placing a lot of blame where it does not belong.[quote=“Dangermouse”]You know, in the West, communities usually have a say in how they are policed. If you want to put yourself in this position, deal with the position you find yourself in and deal with the criticism accordingly.[quote=“Dangermouse”] stage. Facing almost instantaneous real-time video and internet reportage. With slight regard for truth and context.[quote=“Dangermouse”]It’s not what you do, but how you do them. America is clearly not leading by example.[/quote] Yes we are.[quote=“Dangermouse”] You want the to be at the top, you deal with the baggage and responsibility that comes with it.[/quote]We are. And doing so with the assistance of our allies.[quote=“Dangermouse”] We did for nearly 3 centuries. I would have thought you’d be able to appreciate your position a little more, considering you could have learned valuable lessons from the mistakes of the British Empire.[/quote][/quote][/quote][/quote][/quote][/quote][/quote]Taught in all of our Command schools of all of our Military groups. Fine lessons learned.
Pardon me for jumping into this. It was/is a fine inter-change and I do hope I have contributed.
Carry on now.

Actually they have, several times.

HG

Actually they have, several times.

HG[/quote]
But they had their fingers crossed behind their backs. Plus that inscrutable thing going on.

Doh! :laughing:

HG

America is whatever you want it to be. For some Euros/Brits that suffer from the little man syndrome America is evil/fat/stupid/incompetent/etc. (if this is the case what does that say about them? :smiley: ). For many underdeveloped countries there is a pot of gold waiting for them along with movie stars on every corner. Both assessments are equally absurd but it comes with the territory.

Side Note – I really don’t know if this is just overseas English or English in generally but in my opinion they come across as the whiniest bunch on the planet - which isn’t easy accomplishment because there’s a lot of competition for this title (reference South Koreans). Whether they’re complaining about the inferior American Network CNN (nothing is better than the BBC) or not enough focus on UK events on the radio/newspaper its constant. The word “soccer” can make them go into convulsions and now we have to hear about their horrible loss which is their Swedish coach’s fault and with the help of a Portuguese player (who by the way is never allowed on English soil again). Is whining an English cultural trait and if so when did this start? After the fall of their Empire?

This is a direct challenge to Dangermouse (now that I am back and have some time) to put up those White Papers and other Defense documents that he believes buttress his statements. In the meantime, I am going to post just a few from my end…

[quote]Structurally, there is an enormous disparity in the use of military power by the U.S. and Europe. Particularly after the end of the Cold War, the gap between U.S. and European military prowess widened due to technological advances in the American military. At this point, European and U.S. armies can barely fight together in the field because of the gap in technology that exists.
This disparity is owed to the difference in military spending
. The U.S. spends about $400 - $450 billion dollars each year on defense while Europe spends only $160-170 billion. In addition, the U.S. spends a tremendous amount on research and development (R&D) relative to Europe. The R&D portion of its defense budget is higher than the combined R&D budget of all the European nations. The consequence of this disparity is that those who have more military capacity are more inclined to use it. The U.S. maintains the use of force as a viable option. Europeans, lacking that power, cannot even imagine using it.

Part of the European choice to spend less is due to protection by the American defense umbrella. Perhaps most important, however, is the European desire to set up a balance of power on the continent. Europeans want to create a system in which a repetition of the horrors of the world wars is unthinkable. This is basically what we have, and, to some extent there is no greater gift Europe can give to the U.S. than a Europe at peace. We must recognize this. But this has also reinforced a European tendency to believe that their peaceful norms and practices can be extended without effort to other places and cultures.[/quote]

meforum.org/article/691

and…

The allies’ lack of the requisite military capabilities is but one of the reasons why the United States has virtually sole responsibility for defending common European-American security interests, e.g., in the Middle East or elsewhere outside of Europe, where they are most likely to be threatened. Europeans in general, Germans most of all, have an aversion to projecting power beyond their borders. In modern history, European experience in using force other than to defend the homeland has ended badly, notably, in imperialism and world wars. The resulting mind-set explains why a decade ago some allies criticized U.S. retaliatory strikes against Libya for sponsoring terrorism, why in 1991 no German troops joined the Gulf War coalition, and why today Europeans (the British aside) have qualms about the use of force to compel Iraq to abandon its WMD programs.

[quote]Aware of the allies’ lack of inclination and ability to project power, the United States has assumed in both of its official post-Cold-War national defense reviews–the 1993 Bottom-up Review and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)–that the Europeans would not provide significant forces in a major theater war (MTW) outside Europe. Accordingly, the United States maintains ample forces independently to defend important shared interests, such as securing world oil supplies and confronting hostile states that seek WMD. As long as the United States has the means to defend shared interests without allied help, the Europeans lack the incentive to make the sacrifices such help could require.

A vicious circle is at work. Because it cannot bank on the Europeans to join in projecting power to defend common interests, the United States makes it unnecessary for them to do so. Because they are not needed, the Europeans, already skittish about such a controversial strategic mission for their forces,
that might begin to satisfy the Americans that it is prudent to include allies in their plans to project power. This lets the Europeans off the hook, and so on. [/quote]

ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20- … tgch1.html

and also from the same site…

[quote]Asymmetry in Strategy–and Paradigm. Most criticism of European defense efforts these days focuses too much on the size of allied defense budgets and not enough on how little military and security value the Europeans get for the money they spend. The fact that the United States spends roughly 60 percent more on defense than the European allies–over 100 percent more per capita–aggravates the divergence but is not its cause. The heart of the problem is that the United States is under pressure to use the potential of the information age strategically, and the allies are not.

The United States, as noted earlier, is poised to harness key information technologies–microelectronics, data networking, and software programming–to create a networked force, using weapons capable of pinpoint accuracy, launched from platforms beyond range of enemy weapons, utilizing the integrated data from all-seeing sensors, managed by intelligent command nodes. By distributing its forces, while still being able to concentrate fires, the U.S. military is improving its mobility, speed, potency, and invulnerability to enemy attack.4 By trading technology for “labor,” the numbers of military personnel needed by the United States, in total and in any given operation, are declining, even as the skill required of each of them is increasing. The United States has within its reach the ability to prevail in any foreseeable conflict by virtue of its ability to see, comprehend, and control all aspects of the battlefield.

In addition, the United States is just beginning to reform the management of its defense establishment to take advantage of the technology and best practices of the information age just as many commercial firms have done, to their competitive benefit, over the past decade. The cost of infrastructure should begin to come down for the United States, as more and more support services are procured from private industry, as internal defense organizations import innovative practices from the business sector, and as structures and processes are altered to take full advantage of the new technology. In addition to the RMA gap that is beginning to open, a transatlantic divergence in “military business affairs” could be opening as well.

Already, the United States is outspending its European allies in investment–R&D and modernization–by two to one. Insofar as the United States can reduce the number of personnel involved in support services and other infrastructure costs, it can further increase its investment in RMA-type forces and technology. Meanwhile, the Europeans are saddled with excessive personnel, facilities, and support costs–in effect consuming resources badly needed to improve quality and to modernize. Thus the ability of the United States to manage its defense resources better could also add to the gap.

In a broad sense, the U.S. military is ready to do over the next 15 years what well-run American–and for that matter European!–corporations have done over the past 15: rethink and revise the way they are organized and function in order to harness information technology for decisive advantage. The fact that many of those firms had become bloated, sluggish, unfocused, and unfit to face foreign (mainly Asian) competition gave them, at least those with the brains and guts to admit it, a powerful motivation–survival–to change themselves in order to master the new technology. Those who remade themselves now use information technology strategically; those who merely painted the technology over their old way of working fell behind, technologically and financially.

The U.S. military establishment, though far from unfit or inferior, also has a compelling reason to transform itself. It has a national mandate to be able to project enough conventional strike power to render any enemy defenseless and ready to quit, whenever and wherever U.S. interests need defending. The need to deploy quickly and to neutralize the WMD threat argues for dispersion and increases in standoff strike capabilities, which translate into a reduction in the forces that must be placed in the immediate theater. The advantage of being able to hit any target with any weapon from any platform, irrespective of range, armed service, or medium, argues for perfecting battlefield awareness, target detection, and weapon guidance. To meet such requirements, the successful application of information technology is important enough to justify major shifts in investment, doctrine, and training. Absent such compelling needs, the RMA is mere gadgetry.

How does this compare with the Europeans? Taken together, the allies have the world’s second most potent and sophisticated military capability. They spend $160 billion a year on defense, with which they maintain 2.5 million men under arms and an array of high-performance weapons and platforms. Yet, the allies invest far less than the United States in advanced military information systems, in research and development (R&D) of new technologies in general, and in recruiting, retaining, and training high-quality personnel.5 In effect, the allies have a somewhat smaller version of the forces they relied upon to defend their land from Soviet aggression. European forces are professional, tough, and well-led. But they are far less useful now that the threat to Europe has abated.

European militaries are not challenged by the same mission as their American cousins, i.e., to be able to destroy the forces and infrastructure of any distant rogue that threatens important allied interests, even if it brandishes nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Therefore, they face no imperative to improve their projection capability, to strengthen their standoff precision-strike systems, to integrate their sensors, to network their forces, and to enhance their joint-warfare capability. Because they do not face the chilling prospect of having to operate against rogue states armed with WMD, they are under little pressure to invest in their own RMA, especially at a time of declining defense budgets.

Consequently, the majority of European forces are still immobile and incapable of the “dominant maneuver” and “information dominance” that have become, deservedly, the sound bites of the U.S. military. Lacking a compelling reason to increase defense spending or pare their manpower and support structures, the allies cannot find a spare mark, franc, or lira–soon, “euro”–for building information-age forces. In sum, the United States is moving not only at a different velocity but also in a different direction, with different priorities, based on a different philosophy than its allies in modernizing its forces to exploit the new technology. Keeping with the metaphor of our title, as the U.S. RMA begins to pull away, the allies must choose between the platform and the train.

It is not clear to us–or, we fear, to many allied governments–just what strategic purpose European forces are meant to serve. Since only a small fraction of European forces are truly mobile, and the requirement for immobile forces is only a small fraction of current European end-strength, even the total size of allied forces is mysterious. While the allies have been content to leave out-of-Europe missions to the Americans, they are well aware that the threat of major war in Europe or aggression against Europe is gone. Why the Europeans have over 50 divisions that cannot be projected is harder to understand than why they have only a handful that can.

Perhaps the sheer irrelevance of the old territorial defense mission is a disguised blessing. If the Europeans genuinely believed in the enduring importance of that mission, they would be locked into a set of priorities more or less opposite to those of the United States–and that much harder to budge.6 At least the Europeans are not dedicated to perpetuating massive territorial defense as a top strategic priority; rather, they seem to be prisoners of inertia–more aimless than aimed in the wrong direction. Indeed, some European governments–those of the UK and France, for example–have come to appreciate that until they can restore public comprehension of why military forces are needed, the decline in defense spending will continue.

Some European militaries are being reoriented toward power projection missions, though their reduced defense budgets make overall progress nearly imperceptible. The British have moved the furthest, building on a long record of stressing expeditionary forces. The French, with an interventionist tradition of their own, have a plan to shift from border defense to power projection, but it remains mainly that–a plan. The Germans, especially reluctant because of their history, have earmarked two divisions for use in distant operations, but only one at a time, and primarily in peace support missions; most of their forces have yet to be reoriented.

The European pace of change is much slower than even the hesitant speed with which the United States began the RMA. Having a sense of strategic direction, the U.S. Defense Department is able to justify new investments. For example, the U.S. military establishment can translate growing alarm about Saddam Hussein’s WMD aspirations into a political warrant for RMA procurement and R&D. Lacking both a sense of direction and a sense of urgency, the Europeans will find it hard to win popular support for defense spending in general and RMA investment in particular.

The gap is not merely one of different stress on information technology. It is one of paradigm. The United States military is just now plunging into the information age; the bulk of European militaries remain squarely in the previous age. The state of the industries that serve their respective militaries reflects a similar divide, posing another obstacle to closing the transatlantic gap.

Asymmetries in Industry, Technology, and Markets. Motivation aside, the U.S. military benefits from a sturdier industrial base and a more responsive technological base than exist in Europe. The declining number but growing size of consolidated American defense systems corporations–e.g., Lockheed Martin, Raytheon-Hughes, Boeing, Nothrop-Grumman–contrast with the smaller and more numerous European defense firms. Despite an otherwise integrated European market, European defense companies mostly operate on a national scale. Every major European nation remains sufficiently attached to its sovereignty to want to keep at least one major defense contractor.

But even if, at the wave of a wand, European defense industry could be restructured to resemble American defense industry, the gap likely would persist. It is not clear that a highly concentrated defense industry is necessary in implementing the U.S. RMA. Meeting the needs of the RMA requires not so much a concentrated defense systems industry as a vibrant information technology market and a defense industry, however structured, that is agile enough to buy the best from that market.

Indeed, transatlantic differences in defense industries mask the significant fact that the U.S. information technology is stronger than Europe’s. Consequently, so are the devices, subsystems, software, networks, services, and skills this industry makes available to the U.S. military market via the large defense system prime contractors. As its dominance in the on-line services market shows, the U.S. information technology industry is usually the first to bring key new products to market. In turn, U.S. defense contractors generally possess stronger design, engineering and integration capabilities than the smaller European defense contractors. This is not because the Americans performing these functions are superior to their European counterparts, but because the market demands more of the former than of the latter. Quite apart from the large size and small number of major U.S. defense contractors, they are better at what they do and have easier access to better information technology than their European allies.

Finally, both the U.S. defense contractors and U.S. information technology firms are more competitive than their European counterparts in world markets. Indeed armaments and information technology are two of America’s best export performers. With greater market shares at home and globally, their costs are generally lower than those of European competitors, and that translates into lower prices and higher profit margins.

These stronger U.S. defense and information technology industries in turn are being impelled by their military customers to meet the needs associated with the U.S. power projection and strike missions, needs that will become more challenging still as the United States confronts the problem of WMD-armed adversaries. As a result, the task of networking U.S. units, platforms, weapons, sensors and commands–i.e., creating an information system of systems–will pose a significant new challenge to U.S defense and information technology industries. In sum, the United States must and can develop smarter weapons, better communications, and more sophisticated sensors than its European counterparts.

So another vicious circle is in play. European forces cannot acquire information-age capabilities from industries that are not able consistently to provide them at affordable prices. Because of their physical limitations, European forces cannot be assigned demanding new missions, which does not much bother Europeans who have a distaste for such missions anyway. Without strenuous tasks, European militaries will not require their suppliers to become more inventive and efficient. This compound effect of weak demand and weak supply is making it harder for the allies to keep up with the United States. [/quote]

This is an excellent assessment and should just about serve as the final nail in the coffin of this discussion, eh?

[quote]The history of transatlantic armaments cooperation goes back to the beginning of the Cold War. Since then, however, the nature of cooperation has changed considerably, from simple licensing of US systems to Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s to co-production arrangements in the 1970s, followed by government-to-government joint development programs in the 1980s and 1990s. In recent years, industry-led cooperation has become the most prominent feature.

The changing nature of cooperation reflects the changing motivation of the two sides. During the first decades after World War II, the US helped to rebuild an exhausted or destroyed West European defense industry in the face of the Soviet threat. The more European NATO allies recovered economically, the more they sought a more balanced partnership with the US. After the end of the Cold War, interoperability became a major argument for enhanced cooperation. Since the late 1990s, the technological and financial consequences of globalization have pushed industry towards transnational consolidation and closer transatlantic ties, whereas governments have had difficulties matching industry-led initiatives.

In spite of many good reasons for more transatlantic cooperation and numerous initiatives to achieve that objective, the record is rather poor. Arms trade across the Atlantic has remained primarily a one-way-street from the US to Europe, with few cooperative projects having actually been set up and even fewer having been considered as a success. There are several reasons for failure:

Since the strategic and force planning processes are conducted independently, harmonization of military requirements is almost impossible,
Market access for foreign companies remains difficult: Whereas the openness of European defense markets differs greatly from country to country, the US market is well protected against both foreign investments and sales. Moreover, complex rules and procedures for defense exports represent major hurdles for industrial cooperation.
In the US, both the political leadership and the armed forces are extremely reluctant to rely to any extent on foreign suppliers. On the other hand, in Europe there is widespread anxiety in many arms producing countries about the possibility of US market hegemony. Both attitudes make it very hard to create a positive political climate for transatlantic armaments cooperation.
Even more important, transatlantic cooperation is hindered by a fundamental imbalance of power between the US and Europe:

The US is by far the biggest defense market of the world. In 2001, the DoD spent more than twice as much on defence as all EU members combined. With an increase in US defence spending of $48 bn for FY 2003, and further increases planned from $396.8 bn in 2003 to $469.8 bn in 2007, the transatlantic financing and procurement gap will continue to grow over the next few years.
There also fundamental structural market differences. Due to fragmented defence markets and disparate procurement policies, European countries pay a high price for costly duplications and face great difficulties in efficiently combining their resources. As a consequence, the EU as a whole gets less value for its money than the US. Moreover, the investment profiles are different, the US spending not only in absolute, but also in relative terms more on procurement and R&D than Europeans.
The US has such enormous financial resources, defense-industrial assets and military capabilities that they simply do not need armaments cooperation or arms imports. From the US perspective, the potential benefit of transatlantic cooperation is, at best, the cohesion of the Alliance. This argument, however, is hardly sufficient to overcome bureaucratic and political resistance. The same is true for interoperability: For many in the US, interoperability within the Alliance could best be achieved if Europeans simply bought US products. The fact that the US can conduct the whole spectrum of military operations without any allied contribution does not help to convince the Administration, Congress and Armed forces that they need to suffer the trials and tribulations of transatlantic cooperation.
In Europe, the situation is, again, completely different: Even the most important arms-producing countries cannot afford to maintain a purely national Defense Industrial Base (DIB). With the exception of certain technological niches, they need international cooperation to develop and produce hi-tech weaponry. In this context, access to US technology is in general considered as highly attractive. Moreover, there is a strong European interest in interoperability as the prerequisite for coalition building and therefore for political influence in Washington. However, the lack of financial resources, national industrial interests and the difficulties involved in transatlantic ventures greatly reduces European interest in cooperating with the US. Last but not least, the US pursues an explicit and coherent strategy for defense-related industries, aimed at technological superiority in all relevant sectors. European countries, in contrast, do not have the means to implement such a strategy individually and lack the political consensus to develop one collectively. In consequence, Europeans have difficulties in developing common positions towards the US on armaments issues.
The imbalance between the US and Europe can also be seen at the corporate level. The enormous consolidation process that took place from 1993 to 1997 within US Industry reinforced European anxieties about the threat of US market hegemony. Facing competition from giants such as Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed-Martin and Raytheon, Europe’s national champions and their respective governments (finally) began to accept cross-border integration as the only way to avoid being squeezed out of the market and/or forced into unbalanced subordinate partnerships. The main result of the restructuring process that followed was the creation of three big groups, EADS, BAE Systems and THALES, each of them linked to each other and to the remaining groups by numerous international joint ventures.

This industrial movement, in turn, triggered the so-called Letter of Intent (LOI) process between the governments of the major European arms-producing countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Sweden). In July 2000, the six partners signed a Framework Agreement covering (1) Security of Supply, (2) Transfer and Export Procedures, (3) Security of Classified Information, (4) Research and Technology, (5) Treatment of Technical Information and (6) Harmonization of Military Requirements. In these six areas, the partners committed themselves to create a more homogenous regulatory framework in order to improve market conditions for an increasingly transnational industry.

However, and in spite of all its potential virtues, the Framework Agreement does not actually establish a common armaments policy. On the contrary, armaments remain in the national domain, with defense industrial interests and strategies still diverging.

Among the six LOI countries, France is traditionally the most ambitious about Europe becoming an autonomous political actor (although its partners often suspect the real objective is simply to use Europe as a means to achieve national ends). In the 1990s, France accepted both privatization and internationalization of its defense industry as indispensable, combining market orientation of companies with the politico-strategic objectives of the government. Therefore, France has been a driving force behind the restructuring of Europe’s Aerospace and Defense Electronics sectors. Aérospatiale-Matra was brought into EADS and THALES (formerly Thomson-CSF) transformed into an international player with strong links to the UK (through the acquisition of Racal). In the future, the French government will probably try – again – to bring Dassault into a wider European structure and to find a new reference shareholder for THALES. The main challenge, however, will be land armaments and naval shipbuilding, where the privatization of GIAT and DCN is still pending. The poor shape of the two former arsenals represents not only an important financial burden upon the French government, it is also a major obstacle to greater openness of the French defense market and makes it de facto impossible for Paris to push for European mergers (since both companies are rather unattractive as potential partners).
The UK’s industrial policy is characterized by a “value for money” policy, which includes relative openness of its defense market for foreign competitors. This openness also compensates for a growing lack of competition in the national market. In fact, after the take-over of GEC Marconi by British Aerospace and the recent acquisition of Vickers by Alvis, there are two national champions left which distorts the market-led approach that the British claim to champion. To counterbalance this dominance and to create a second “national” defense electronics supplier competing with BAE Systems, London accepted, for example, the take-over of Racal by THALES. Competition may also come from American companies that regularly team-up with British firms for bids in the UK. Transatlantic cooperation in general is welcomed not only for political reasons, but also as a means to benefit from US technology.

In Germany, the largest part of the aerospace industry is now integrated into EADS. The government has failed, by contrast, to convince land armament and naval shipbuilding industries to follow the same approach – first national consolidation, then European integration. Germany’s leading land systems companies – Krauss-Maffei and Rheinmetall – continue to resist any political pressure to merge. In naval shipbuilding, government plans have also failed. Instead of joining forces with Thyssen Krupp Industries, Babcock Borsig sold its 75 per cent share in HDW to the US investment fund Equity One Partners. Since HDW is a world leader in conventional submarines, this deal has stimulated a debate about a sell-out of German key technologies. Many observers now fear that Krauss-Maffei could become the next candidate for a politically incorrect take-over.
Italy, Spain and Sweden have all tried to integrate their defense industrial assets into wider international structures, without pursuing a clear European preference. The Spanish government has integrated Casa into EADS, but preferred General Dynamic’s bid for Santa Barbara over Rheinmetall’s offer; the Italian government has pushed Finmeccanica – with more or less success – to integrate its units into European joint ventures, but left the A 400M program and joined the F-35 program. In Sweden, certain industrial elements have been linked to European networks (see Saab), whilst others have been sold to US investors (Bofors).
Industrial policy is only one aspect of largely divergent armament policies in Europe. Another example is the somewhat uncoordinated way in which the LOI countries have embarked on bilateral negotiations with the US on regulatory issues. In fact, industrial consolidation in Europe, together with the LOI process and the development of ESDP, alarmed Washington about the possibility of an emerging “Fortress Europe”. The perceived threat of a closed European market, combined with the risk of the lack of any true competition in the US market, pushed the Clinton Administration to launch two initiatives: (a) the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) aimed at streamlining the US export control system, and (b) bilateral negotiations with certain allies on a “Declaration of Principles on defense equipment and industrial cooperation” (DoP).

Whereas the DoP is de facto a bilateral version of the European LOI, covering a broad range of defense trade issues, the DTSI is comprised of 16 procedural reforms to the US export control regime. Moreover, it includes the possibility for certain qualified countries to enter into negotiations aimed at granting ITAR-license exemptions for unclassified exports to the government and to companies identified as reliable.

Up until now, the DoPs have been signed with the UK; Australia, Norway, Spain and the Netherlands, whilst negotiations with Italy seem to be will advanced, whereas discussions with Germany and France are, at best, at an early stage. So far, the UK is the only LOI-country with whom the US has begun to negotiate a binding export control agreement. ITAR-talks with additional partners are envisaged only after negotiations with the UK have been completed. However, under the Bush Administration these transatlantic discussions have apparently lost momentum, their future therefore being unclear. Even with the UK, negotiations on export controls seem to be experiencing difficulties. However, in general, the different stages of negotiations with the partners suggest that Washington still makes a distinction between “reliable” and “less reliable” allies.

Sooner or later, this distinction might create problems for the compatibility of the multilateral LOI system and the bilateral DoP approach. It remains to be seen how transatlantic arrangements would interact in practice with the LOI Framework Agreement. However, at least in certain areas, bilateral agreements with the US might complicate a system whose purpose is precisely to simplify and facilitate European cooperation. For example, could a European Transnational Defense Company qualify for an ITAR exemption if only one of its home countries has an export control agreement with the US? Or, would the ETDC be obliged to create new Chinese walls between its different sites, thereby limiting its internal integration and acting against the philosophy of the LOI process?

To operate in such an uncertain and fluid environment is certainly not easy for European Industries. As has been seen, a European Armaments Policy and a common defense market, are still a long way off, and defense budgets in Europe remain flat The enormous difference between budgets in Europe and the US represents an irresistible incentive for European companies to attempt penetration of the US market. Indeed, access to the US has become a major strategic goal for all big industrial players in Europe.

There are different ways to achieve that objective:

Given the predominant Buy-American policy, direct sales of European products to the US armed forces will probably remain extremely rare exceptions;
Jointly developed defense systems under a government-to-government agreement will remain exceptions as well; European budget constraints on the one hand, and difficulties to harmonize the military requirements across the Atlantic on the other, will continue to limit the possibilities for intergovernmental projects.
Teaming Arrangements with US prime contractors for specific US programs will be politically easier, in particular if the European contribution is limited to sub-systems and components. However, the cost-effectiveness of these industrial arrangements depends to a considerable degree on the regulatory framework that governments agree on. Another possibility to penetrate the US market is to buy an American company and to become a “national” supplier to the Pentagon. British companies, in particular BAE Systems, have pursued this strategy extensively and with a lot of success. For continental European companies, however, this option has been politically unrealistic so far, and there are no signs that this might change in the near future. What we have seen, by contrast, is a multiplication of joint ventures (Raytheon-THALES) and strategic alliances (EADS-Northrop Grumman).

In land armaments and shipbuilding, the situation is different. By contrast to Aerospace and Defense electronics, trans-European consolidation has failed in these sectors, leaving European companies in a rather weak position vis-à-vis their US counterparts. As the Santa Barbara and the HDW take-overs have demonstrated, US investors have therefore a good chance simply to “cherry-pick” the European Defense Industrial base.

To conclude, there are not many reasons to be overly optimistic about the future of transatlantic armaments cooperation. Cooperation will certainly continue, but its intensity will probably remain limited by persistent political obstacles. Moreover, cooperation will be mainly industry driven. If they have a commercial and / or a technological interest, companies can be quite innovative in dealing with bureaucratic and regulatory hurdles. In particular at the less visible – and therefore politically less sensitive – sub-system and component level, closer ties are indeed probable. On the other hand, even the big European companies will only be able to cooperate on an equal footing with their US counterparts if they maintain their capacities as system-integrators and if they remain at the cutting edge of technology – not in all, but in specific key areas. This, in turn, will only be possible if European governments keep at least a certain level of R&T funding and if they – finally – come to a common European strategy for their defense-related industries.[/quote]

eusec.org/schmitt.htm

Has anyone mentioned the Federal Reserve yet?

I’m not sure how one might look at this. You could say that Europeans helped screw up America and make it the greedy cash cow that it is/was (I don’t want to get into that). You could also say that Americans blindly/stupidly pay for wars and suffering without even wanting to think about it.

I’m not sure how the “evil” (to use the most modern and accurate American political terminology) Federal Reserve throws a scew on this topic of another reason for the world to hate America?

Did I use the word evil enough? I wonder perhaps if we could by use of quotes using the word evil enough, alianate the rest of the world from America. Seems like I heard it far too often already.
America to me seems to have boiled down to oversimplification in terms of political challenge and education. To get backing it seems politicians love to either “evil” things up or throw a bit of “patriatism” and “god” in here and there. It’s too easy for anyone outside of the Sates to just hate them if you ask me. America to me simply comprises of two things, government and the people. Now I KNOW I hate the governments actions, but the sticky point is do I dislike Americans enough for not doing anything about their own government and bringing the world into termoil?
I swear I’ll blow my top if I hear another American say well we only have to wait another ___years until Bush leaves his post. My giddy Aunt! Since when did lazyness become the cure for any problem on this scale?

Sulavaca:

I have not the faintest idea what you are talking about. What exactly is your point?

[quote=“fred smith”]Sulavaca:

I have not the faintest idea what you are talking about. What exactly is your point?[/quote]

Perhaps he thinks Americans should throw off the pesky shackles of rule of law and the Constitution and embrace our revolutionary past and ride old Dubba and his Republican buddies out of town on a rail. :noway:

[quote=“jwbrunken”][quote=“fred smith”]Sulavaca:
I have not the faintest idea what you are talking about. What exactly is your point?[/quote]Perhaps he thinks Americans should throw off the pesky shackles of rule of law and the Constitution and embrace our revolutionary past and ride old Dubba and his Republican buddies out of town on a rail. :noway:[/quote]Well…the USA only has to wait until the next election to make any adjustments we deem needed.
Simple as that. :sunglasses:

This is the part I don’t get ……… your fucking government is right in the mix! It’s as if the English are semi-retarded because you’ll blabber on about America bad this America bad that and then when an Americans calls you on it you’ll say “oh yea, my government is not too good either” then one minute later start ripp’n on America and Americans. And it doesn’t stop there…your media, your hack politicians. Should America’s media have stated “how could XXX Britons be so stupid?” after Blair’s reelection? If our voters are lazy then your voters are lazy. If our President is Evil/Hitler/etc. then your PM is Evil/Hitler/etc. You want to go after America I’m cool with that just use the plural form and quite acting like a bunch of Sallies and hold your people, government accountable too.

Ralphy -
You and PPE are displaying entirely too much common sense.
You will not go unscathed for it.

[quote=“TainanCowboy”][quote=“jwbrunken”][quote=“fred smith”]Sulavaca:
I have not the faintest idea what you are talking about. What exactly is your point?[/quote]Perhaps he thinks Americans should throw off the pesky shackles of rule of law and the Constitution and embrace our revolutionary past and ride old Dubba and his Republican buddies out of town on a rail. :noway:[/quote]Well…the USA only has to wait until the next election to make any adjustments we deem needed.
Simple as that. :sunglasses:[/quote]

I was saying this last night. Yes, the weight has moved far, maybe farther than ever before, to the right in the US. But, we are known for righting our wrongs, and I too believe we will relax a bit in the coming years. We are a nation of final exam crammers, but we usually pull through.

I do not like seeing our troops fighting all over the world, but I shudder at seeing them fighting on US soil. Yes, we Americans are selfish. We’ve got a good thing going and want to keep it that way. As a nation we are maturing, and we are becoming and will continue to become more responsible in the world.

I hope the world hasn’t totally given up on us.

Just lookie here: http://www.breitbart.com/news/2006/07/14/D8IRK1C05.html

Seems the old elephants might be out of a job come November after all.